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ABSTRACT 
 
Due to a wave of liberalisation of national economies labour movements are facing increased 
pressure since the last quarter of the 20
th
 century. The application of new production methods 
and new management strategies by multinational companies influenced the re-organisation of 
Global Value Chains. In the course of the 20
th
 century the automobile industry became the 
major global sector with high productivity rates through technological facilitation of mass 
production. As a result of tight global competition and the aim to maximise profits, car 
production was increasingly “peripheralized” to countries such as Brazil. The growing 
fragmentation of workers on a global level requires new strategies of labour movements in 
their fight for decent working conditions. 
The scope of this thesis is the analysis of the applied trade union strategies to protect metal-
workers from the impact of the liberalisation of Brazil’s car industry between 1990 until 2014. 
The case of workers of “Volkswagen do Brasil” in São Bernardo do Campo, Factory of 
Anchieta (São Paulo State) will be taken as a case model for analyses. This factory was 
chosen as it is one of the biggest and oldest car factories of a multinational company in Brazil 
and therefore was strongly affected by global changes in the respective time period. How was 
the global value chain changing in the liberalisation process? How were metalworkers 
affected? Which strategies and collective action metalworkers’ union implemented to deal 
with the fragmentation on a national and international level? How did the strategies of union 
change until 2014? 
The analyses of shifts in the global value chain of the car industry serves to frame the 
challenges workers are facing to organized. The analyses of historical backgrounds aim to 
locate metalworkers of Anchieta. Theories on trade union strategies serve to analyse cyclical 
patterns of labour unrest. 
 
KEYWORDS: Liberalisation, Global value chain, Trade union strategies, Collective action, 
Volkswagen Inc., Volks do Anchieta, Automobile Industry of Brazil, ABC Region of São 
Paulo State 
 
  
 
RESUMO 
TITULO: Estratégias Sindicais face as mudanças na cadeia global de valor da indústria 
automobilística brasileira: o caso da "Volkswagen do Brasil" em São Bernardo do Campo 
 
Devido a uma onda de liberalização das economias nacionais, os movimentos sindicais 
enfrentam uma pressão crescente desde o último trimestre do século XX. A aplicação de 
novos métodos de produção e novas estratégias de gestão por parte das empresas 
multinacionais influenciou a reorganização das Cadeias Globais de Valor. No decurso do 
século XX, a indústria automóvel tornou-se num setor global importante com elevadas taxas 
de produtividade através da facilitação tecnológica da produção em massa. Como resultado da 
concorrência global apertada e do objetivo de maximizar os lucros, a produção de carros foi 
cada vez mais "periferizada" para países como o Brasil. A crescente fragmentação dos 
trabalhadores a nível global exige novas estratégias de movimentos operários na sua luta por 
condições de trabalho dignas. 
O escopo desta tese é a análise das estratégias sindicais implementadas com vista a proteger 
os metalúrgicos do impacto da liberalização da indústria automotiva brasileira entre 1990 e 
2014. O caso dos trabalhadores da Volkswagen do Brasil em São Bernardo do Campo, mais 
concretamente da sua fábrica de Anchieta (SP), será considerado objeto da análise. Esta 
fábrica foi escolhida por ser uma das maiores e mais antigas fábricas de automóveis de uma 
empresa multinacional no Brasil e que, portanto, foi fortemente afetada pelas mudanças 
globais no respectivo período de tempo. Como a cadeia global de valor mudou no processo de 
liberalização? Como os trabalhadores metalúrgicos foram afetados? Que estratégias e 
dinâmicas de ação coletiva os sindicatos de metalúrgicos implementaram para lidar com a 
fragmentação em nível nacional e internacional? Como as estratégias da união mudaram até 
2014? 
A análise das mudanças nas cadeias globais de valor da indústria automobilística permite 
enquadrar os desafios que os trabalhadores estão enfrentando para serem organizados. A 
análise dos antecedentes históricos visa localizar os metalúrgicos de Anchieta. As teorias 
sobre estratégias sindicais procuram analisar os padrões cíclicos de instabilidade laboral. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Liberalização, Cadeia de valor global, Estratégias sindicais, Ação 
coletiva, Volkswagen Inc., Volks do Anchieta, Indústria automobilística do Brasil, ABC 
Região de São Paulo 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND LOCALIZATION OF BRAZIL IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
1.1 OUTLINE OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1.1 Background of the Problem 
In the course of the 20
th
 century technological innovation, liberalisation measures and 
expansion of global transport networks significantly changed the organisation of production 
and trade on a global level. The shift in the global value chains, designed and led mainly by 
multinational companies (MNCs) heavily impacted on the labour movement globally. In the 
course of the 1980s a neoliberal agenda was pushed for global implementation through 
intergovernmental organisations (eg: IMF, Worldbank).  
Fordist production enabled mass production of automobiles at reduced unit costs and 
facilitated a strong workplace bargaining power of workers engaged in this sector. Increased 
global competition pushed for innovation of the organisation of production. Fordist 
production has been replaced by the Japanese model of “lean production” in the course of the 
1980s. The global re-organisation of production and sale has been achieved through 
shortening the time span of product life cycles, transition to a flexible production network 
through outsourcing of spare parts production to subcontracting companies. The automobile 
industry is a typical sector for illustrating the changing profit strategies of MNCs, through 
seeking for “spatial fixes”. The concept of spatial fixes was formulated by David Harvey. 
With the term “fix”, he refers to capitalist aim to “fix” or in other words “repair” profit gains, 
through “geographical displacement and reconfigurations” (Harvey, 1999: xviii). It can be 
considered as a prototype for a globalised pattern of production and investment.  
A significant increase of the “internationalisation” of multinational companies (MNC) started 
with the drop of automobile sale in Triad economies (Western Europe, Japan, North 
America). Hence MNC were seeking to expand its presence and profit making opportunities 
in so called “emerging markets”, such as the Brazilian market. Technological innovation and 
production methods are important impulses to push for globalisation, wherefore the car 
industry can be taken as a role model for those developments in the 20
th
 century.  
With the agenda of the Washington Consensus neoliberal state reforms were globally pushed 
through with the promise of increased national wealth, trickling down from the top. The US-
Fed increased interest rates on debts in the 1980s, which pushed peripheral countries in a 
foreign debt crisis, in particular the countries of Latin America. Subsequently capitalists of 
core countries gained the power to liberalise those states in debt, to implement liberal reforms 
with the aim to more easily access those markets. Neoliberal governments of peripheral 
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countries started to open up their economy to seek for foreign investments to settle up the 
foreign debts. The liberalisation of national market was connected with the expectation to 
access to technological innovation and subsequently achieving sustainable growth of national 
economy and employment. Attracted by tax incentives, relatively weaker labour laws and 
entrance of potential new market areas, MNCs expanded its production to peripheral markets 
to increase their global margin.  
These changes in global economic production networks have significantly re-positioned the 
working class and its labour movement globally in the fight for decent working conditions. 
But does this mean that the power of trade unionism is terminated?  
“Where capital goes, conflict goes” - With this statement Beverly Silver accurately expresses 
what happened in Brazil’s car industry in the late 20th century. Although Brazil has one of the 
best organized labour movement in Latin America, the fight against the exploitation by MNC 
required the application of new strategies, as its labour has not only been thrown into a global, 
but also into regional competition.  
 
1.1.2. Statement of the Problem 
As already mentioned, the automobile industry can be determined as the leading industry of 
the 20
th
 century, characterised by the relatively strong workplace bargaining power within a 
capital-intensive manufacturing sector and complex division of labour. Those characteristics 
have intensified in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century and continue until nowadays. The crisis 
of the labour movement (decline of memberships) and apparent vanish of the working class 
(identification of workers) has created new challenges for the working class. The global 
capitalist crisis of the 1970/1980s subsequently caused a push for a neoliberal agenda, which 
impacted on the peripheral and semi-peripheral markets, such as the Brazilian one: 
privatisation of state-led companies, liberalization of trade and monetary reform (Plano Real), 
outsourcing of labour negatively impacted on Brazil’s social structure (Jakobsen, Freitas 
Barbosa, 2008). Although metalworkers in Brazil are one of the best organized working class 
groups globally, just as in Latin America, the deterioration of working conditions and loss of 
jobs characterise the development of the car industry in Brazil.  
Brazil, as a peripheral country, has a relatively strong dependency on MNC from core 
countries, such as access to latest technology and foreign currency reserves, such as the US-
Dollar. Further the competition for attracting FDIs led to an increased competition between 
Brazil’s federal states which negatively impacted on the working class solidarity between 
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metalworkers of different states. FDIs became essential to gain investments in new 
technologies and for surviving the global competition. 
Given the economic position of Brazil, the workers of “Volkswagen do Brasil” are stretched 
between defending workplaces and conditions and the implementation of new technologies, 
with subsequently the strong dependency on FDI of MNC  
Especially metalworkers employed with the oldest “Volks” factory in Anchieta, São Bernardo 
do Campo, faced the competition by newly constructed factories of “Volkswagen do Brasil”, 
equipped with the latest technology for production. Further the level of salaries and working 
conditions of other Volks factories, for instance the one in Resende (Rio de Janeiro), have 
been much lower than the ones of Anchieta. With the introduction of temporary employment, 
the competition between workers within the factory of Anchieta has further increased.  
Which strategies have been applied by the “Factory Committee”, to protect the workers of 
Volks Anchieta given the increased competition as explained above? 
 
1.1.3. Objective of the Research 
Based on the context as described above, the scope of this thesis is the analyses of trade union 
(TU) strategies of “Volks” (Volkswagen do Brasil) workers of the factory in Anchieta, São 
Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo state, between 1990 and 2014.  
The objective of the research is to prove, that the impact the reorganisation of Global Value 
Chains had on labour, negatively impacted on the working conditions of “Volks” workers and 
required trade union movement to apply new strategies. Further the research aims at showing 
the need for international cooperation along the GVC. 
To contextualise the TU strategies in a country-based context, the global and national shifts in 
the GVC of cars as well as the development of economic and political conditions in Brazil 
will be examined. Further an introduction to the complex system of TU in Brazil as well as 
the international cooperation of the “National Confederation of Metalworkers” 
(“Confederação nacional dos metalúrgicos”, CNM) will support the understanding of the 
applied TU-strategies.  
 
1.1.4. Hypothetical Statement 
The constant seek for capital accumulation requires seeking for spatial fixes, to ensure 
survival of competition and realization of profit gains. As it became more difficult for 
capitalist, active in the global car industry, to achieve high profit gains in the developed 
countries, multinational companies (MNC) shifted to other geographic locations, such as 
16 
 
 
 
Brazil. Internal and external economic developments as well as political conditions and weak 
institution in Brazil facilitated the relatively quick liberalisation of Brazil’s car industry in the 
last decade of the 20
th
 century. This resulted in an intensified lead in car production of 
multinational companies at national level. The strong shift of MNC to other geographical 
location was followed by labour unrest. Beverly Silver observed labour unrest as a integral 
part of a product cycle.  
The changes in the global automobile GVC are interlinked with economic and political 
development in Brazil. The introduction of new technologies, such as the lean-production 
model and global outsourcing of production processes, led to a weakening of a joint strategy 
development of car industry workers on one hand, but accelerated national access to latest 
technological innovations on the other hand. Regional economic incentives for MNC created 
an increased fragmentation of workers, to weaken the well-organised workers of the oldest 
Volks factory in Anchieta, São Bernardo do Campo. The international cooperation of Volks 
workers with IG Metall, IndustriALL as well as the representation in Volkswagen’s global 
works council supported the fight against worsening working conditions and loss of jobs. 
Organisation of workers on a local, regional, national level, as well as alongside a GVC is 
essential to combat their exploitation.  
 
1.1.5. Rationale of the Research 
The global wave of liberalisation and global integration of labour have weakened labour 
movements globally. Analyses of Global Value Chains could help to understand the new 
strategies of capitalism and overcome the fragmentation and increased exploitation of 
workers. This can be an opportunity for workers to identify joint strategies to organise better 
globally. The analyses of trade union strategies based on the example of well-organised 
metalworkers of a semi-peripheral country, are meant to contribute to the development of 
improved cooperation among workers.  
 
1.1.6. Theoretical Framework 
To contextualise Brazil’s working class development, the history of the economic 
development of this country and its car industry will be localized in the global historic context 
of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century. Further the capitalist geographical order of national economies, 
based on the concept of the world system theory, should support to better carve out the 
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specific political, economic and social circumstances of Volks’ metalworkers of Anchieta, 
São Paulo.  
The development of the car industry will be analysed alongside the concept of GVC, for 
showing clearly the global shifts in the re-organisation of the automobile production and its 
impact on the bargaining power of labour.  
The core theoretical framework for the analysis of the trade union strategies will focus on the 
concept of fixes and the changing relation between labour and capital, as developed by David 
Harvey and further defined by Beverly Silver: “Where capital goes, conflict goes” (Silver, 
2003: 41). Based on this citation, labour conflict in the car industry of Brazil will be analysed 
on the example of labour unrest and its relation to changes in economics, mode of production, 
political representation and workplace bargaining power. Labour unrest in the oldest factory 
of Volkswagen in Brazil, Anchieta, will be taken as the case model for analyses. 
 
1.1.7. Methodology and arrangement of chapters 
The research will be based mainly on secondary data from literature and journals and on the 
other hand on primary data collected through interviews. 
Narrative interviews will be held with at least 3 members of the factory commission of the 
factory in Anchieta. Further, to reflect on the international committee of Volkswagen Inc. 3 
works council members will be interviewed on their subjective view on the collaboration with 
the world works council (“Weltbetriebsrat”) of Volkswagen Inc., as well. To protect the 
integrity of the factory commission members, the interviews will be anonymized.  
 
The research will be systemized in 3 periods, split between the following political and 
economic transformations of the Brazilian state: 
1. Period: 1930 – 1980 (Period of military and democratic regimes;  
  democratization in the 1980s), Chapter 1 
2. Period: 1990 – 2002 (Period of market liberalisation), Chapter 2 
3. Period: 2003 – 2014 (Period of political representation of working class), Chapter 3 
 
The trade union strategies will be analysed alongside those three time periods, while the 
period from 1990 – 2014 will be given much more weight due to its actuality. The idea of the 
phase structuring is meant to be connected with the economic and political phases of Brazil 
influencing the transformation of metal union strategies to protect workers. The strategies will 
be analysed on the example of the oldest Volkswagen plant in Brazil, in São Bernardo do 
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Campo, Anchieta (São Paulo State). As the multinational company of Volkswagen has a 
comparably long history in Brazil and the strategical shift of Volkswagen Inc. management 
between 1990 and 2014 can be better analysed.  
Chapter one provides an overall introduction to the research topic, the concept of Global 
Value Chains, the economic development and labour movement in the 20
th
 century until the 
beginning of the 1990s. Based on global developments, Chapter one further aims to localize 
Brazil through an outline of its history and development of its labour movement. Chapter two, 
three will strongly focus on the changes of the car industry in Brazil, political and economic 
developments and reaction of labour, in particular of workers of Anchieta.  
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1.2 LOCALIZING BRAZIL IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
Chapter 1 aims to outline the history of Brazil in those dimensions relevant for the research 
questions, which will be subsequently discussed in Chapter two and three.  
This chapter starts to present developments of economy, concept of Global Value Chains as 
well as the development of car industry and labour movement from a global viewing angle. 
With a brief introduction to the global shifts in the Value Chain of the car industry, the 
specifics of this production sector will be put in a historic frame and to better locate with the 
development of the car industry in Brazil.  
Brazil’s political and economic history of the 20th century will be outlined in detail to 
facilitate the contextualisation of its labour movement and car industry. The analyses will 
cover roughly the period from 1930s till 1980s. 
 
1.2.1 Global economy in the 20th century  
Eric Hobsbawm names the beginning of the 20
th
 century “The Age of Catastrophe”, on 
grounds of World War 1 (1914 – 1918), the global economic crisis followed by World War 2 
(1938 – 1945) and the formation of economic blocs (NATO, Communist, Third World) 
(Hobsbawm, 1996). This century is marked by the breakup of the feudal power structure and 
development of “democratic” systems with the aim to gain equality in wealth and social 
justice. Those aims were neither realized in the NATO bloc, nor in the Communist bloc, but 
heavily impacted on the global economic development, with continuous manipulation on 
colonised countries (“block-less countries” or “Third World”).  
With the dissemination of Keynes’ “General theory” in 1936, the traditional faith in liberalism 
has been criticized through analyses of the negative impact of the free market economy and 
the importance of full employment, realised through state interventions (fiscal and monetary 
policies). The need and positive effect of stimulated aggregated demand and eventually the 
stabilisation of market economy have been recognized on a global level, due to the 
recognition of the “General Theory”. Karl Marx proved in his analyses of capital 
accumulation, that the concept of a “perfect competition” is absurd, as the concentration of 
economic power due to increase of enormous corporations in the 20
th
 century on a global 
level increased (Hobsbawm, 1996: 103-4).  
After World War II the two national super powers, USA (Roosevelt) and USSR (Stalin) 
negotiated global borderlines, although without the strong involvement of the Red Army 
(USSR), Germany could not have been defeated. The era of the “Cold War or Cold Peace” 
and at the same time the era of the “Golden Age” commenced. The Golden Age is 
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characterised by strong state interventions, investments in production, steady growth of GDP, 
low unemployment rates, increasing wages and consumption power, improvement of labour 
law and social security systems, high taxation, low inflation and increasing profit in Western 
European Countries. The Marshall Plan, financed by the West-Europeans’ ally, the US, was 
the main driver for the recovery and stabilization of economies in Europe. With the 
introduction of the Marshall plan US government had the hope to liberalize European markets 
and become their main trade partner, which has not worked out as planned (Hobsbawm, 1996: 
238 - 240).  
The introduction of the international exchange rate agreement, the “Bretton-Woods-System”, 
in 1944, elevated the US-dollar to the global key currency, with the aim to stabilize exchange 
rates of currencies, based on gold reserves. Global institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been created to control the adherence to the 
“Bretton-Woods-Agreement”.  
The golden era, lasting from the 1950s until 1970s, signifies a unique period of time with 
constant improvement of living standards mainly in Western European countries. Social 
protection, increasing wages, low unemployment rates, stable economies and strong labour 
movements made it possible to decrease the inequality in Europe to a historically low level. 
That was possible due to strong state interventions, broad consumption power and 
subsequently booming economy through the implementation of the Marshall Plan. As shown 
with Graph 1 below, the income-share of the top decile declined in Western European 
countries as well as in the US, especially during 1950s and 1970s. The economic 
globalization developed in the course of 1960s and increased heavily since 1973.  
A new global division of labour has been observed in the course of the 1970s, due to the 
starting shift of industrial economies to peripheral economies, which were previously more 
state-led. The shift has been followed by transfers of high-tech industries. A technical 
revolution in transport systems and communication facilitated worldwide production. Based 
on deliberate efforts of “Third World” governments for industrialisation, the protection of 
their home markets was reduced. Further lack of financing limited the scale of 
industrialisation. Especially with the breakdown of the Soviet Union the world became 
globally more capitalistic and dominated by companies of the core capitalist countries. As 
industries developed in or close to cities due to better access to infrastructure and paying 
better wages, a strong movement from rural to urban areas occurred.  
By 1973 the world slid into instability and crisis. The shock of the global oil price in 1973 and 
additionally the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system led to an economic recession in the 
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core countries. The competition for profit gains increased heavily and led to a global wave of 
liberalisation, which was intensively pushed by liberal forces. 
The decades after 1973 were no “Great Depression” in the sense of the 1930s. Although the 
classical cyclical downturn reduced industrial production in the developed markets 
international trade of industrial products continued and increased in the course of the 1980s. 
Therefore, in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century the developed countries were far way richer 
and productive, than in the early 1970s, but with a heavily increased inequality within its 
societies. The population of those countries were cushioned by the generous welfare system 
and social security systems, set up and extended during the Golden Age. Therefore, there was 
less social unrest than one could have expected. Nevertheless, government finances faced the 
situation of increasing welfare payments, while state revenue declined due to slower 
economic growth than before (Hobsbawn, 1996:362 - 404).  
 
Graph 1: The top decile income-share: Europe and the U.S., 1900 - 2010 
 
Source: Piketty, 2014 
Until the 1980s, it has been underestimated in general, how irretrievable the positive gains for 
societies during the Golden Age had been. In the course of the 1970s, inequality began to 
increase again in the core capitalist countries as Graph 1 shows above. The free marketers 
won influence on governments in the beginning of 1980s, which was realized by the 
neoliberal political administration of US president Ronald Reagan’s and UK’s prime minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s. The heavy power loss of trade unions in UK during the 1980s due to the 
breakdown of the strike of British miners can be taken as a symbol of the strong neoliberal 
attacks on trade unions globally. Trade union memberships sharply declined, social rights 
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have been dismantled and exploitation has been heavily increased by the redesign and 
geographical shifts of Global Value Chains.  
As the US Fed increased the interest rates for its currency, most of Latin American countries 
were pushed in a debt crisis. IMF pressured those countries in debt, to implement an agenda 
of liberalisation, especially of foreign trade and financial sector, through “structural 
adjustment programmes” (SAP). Core countries granted credits in return to pay back its debts. 
The implementation of SAP led to decreasing real wages and reduction of social programmes, 
strongly affecting peripheral countries, which had not experienced a “Golden Age” at that 
time and therefore labour was less protected. The liberalisation of foreign trade regulations 
caused an increase of exports of low-processed commodities, again mainly to the core 
countries. The GDP growth of peripheral economies remained low, as mainly foreign debts 
were covered with increased exports. As domestic markets were now more easily accessible 
due to the liberalisation of foreign trade, several countries have been thrown into global 
competition. The effect on the domestic industry was dramatic, as increased global 
competition of MNC smashed its progress. De-industrialisation was the consequence and 
therefore gains in national productivity could not be achieved. The world market prices for 
raw materials and food decreased, as liberalisation of domestic markets enlarged global access 
and supply.  
Latin American countries faced a debt crisis in the 1980s, followed by a wave of liberalisation 
and increased exploitation of working class and its social welfare system characterises the 
“lost decade of Latin American countries” (Jäger, 2012: 25-6).  
 
23 
 
 
 
1.2.2 The concept of Global Value Chains 
In general, the aim of Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis focuses on the content and nature 
of inter-firm linkages and overview of its power network, which regulates the value chain 
coordination between buyers and of suppliers. GVC analyses the full performance varieties of 
companies and workers to develop a product from its conception to the final consumption and 
beyond. GVC activities included are for example, design, production, marketing, distribution and 
support to the final consumer. The activities that comprise a value chain can be contained within a 
single firm or divided among different firms (Globalvaluechains, 2011).  
Analysing GVCs has become a useful tool to identify characteristics of different global 
production and service sectors, as it shows the fragmentation of production across various 
countries and observation of shifting patterns. Additionally, the identification of the GVC lead 
firms and suppliers make the structure of governance clearer and how lead firms’ policies impact 
on choices of production activities conducted in specific locations. GVC analyses further help to 
understand, how countries and their national labour movement are put into competition with each 
other due to continues spatial fixes and facilitates the identification of common strategies 
regarding national policies (Hernández, 2014: 46). A value chain can cover only a single 
geographic location or a single firm, while global value chain is divided among multiple firms and 
geographic spaces. 
GVC analysis became globally more relevant in the course of 1970/80s, as new forms of 
production coordination were implemented in many sectors. The wave of economic liberalisation 
affected especially countries of the semi-periphery and periphery and facilitated the increasing 
globalisation of Multinational companies through outsourcing of production activities to those 
countries, to fix their profit gains. Nevertheless, Multinational Companies retained their role of 
coordinating networks of various activities (eg design, distribution, production).  
The term “Transnational companies” (TNC) denominates the division of activities between 
factories and decision making processes, while “Multinational Companies” (MNC) are 
characterised through a functional division of work and a hierarchy of competences, at which 
top stands the lead firm (Speidel, 2005: 88-9). As decision making processes in the producer-
driven car industry are still rarely transferred from the headquarter factory to other factories, 
the term “Multinational Company” will be used hereinafter.  
The outsourcing of activities and the fragmentation of production are not new. The 
neoclassical trade economist Bertil Ohlin noted as early as 1933 that, “As a matter of fact, 
production is in many cases not divided into two stages —raw materials and finished goods— 
but into many” (Ohlin, 1933). There are examples of global value chains before the 1980s. 
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But what is undoubtedly new is the scale of the phenomenon and the way in which 
technological change has allowed a fragmentation of production in the last two decades of 
the 20
th
 century, which was not possible before. 
The main reason why firms can fragment their production is because trade costs have been 
decreased significantly. Trade costs include the whole range of costs that companies face due 
to transfers between factories or offices where goods or services are produced and further 
transferred to the final consumer. In the case of goods, trade costs include land transport and 
port costs, freight and insurance costs, tariffs and duties, and costs associated with nontariff 
measures. They may also be extended to include mark-ups from importers, wholesalers and 
retailers. In the case of services, transport costs stand for low communication costs (although 
services can also be provided by natural persons that have to travel to the country where the 
consumer is located) and trade barriers are non-tariff measures. Other important costs relating 
to global value chains are co-ordination costs as geographically dispersed activities have to be 
managed in a consistent way (Gereffi, et al, 2005: 80-5).  
MNC are nowadays the prime movers and shaper of globalization: they influence national 
politics, shop at the expense of governments for lucrative investments and shield profits from 
taxes. They count for 80% of international trade. Lowering of social protection standards in 
the name of competitiveness and flexibility and the elimination of protective instruments for 
the de-commodification of labour is the outcome of GVC management (UNCTAD, 2013: ix - 
xi). An important distinction made by Gereffi is characterizing the bipolar model of GVC in 
“producer-driven” and “buyer-driven” chains. Producer-driven GVC are typical for industries 
with a high level of capital and technology, while buyer-driven GVC are simple products, 
with low possibility of feature specification and therefore buyer-relationship easily establishes 
as well as ends. Especially, the auto industry can be characterized as producer-driven, which 
means MNC have a dominating role over the production systems (Humphrey, 2003, p. 119). 
With governance of GVCs, Gereffi describes the force of lead firms to influence the design of 
financial, material and human resources within a GVC (Gereffi, et al, 2005: 97).  
Producer-driven value chains are hierarchically structured and characterized by vertical 
integration. The dominant construct of governance is led by managerial control, which flows 
from lead firm managers to subsidiaries and affiliates. Power is usually concentrated at the top 
of the hierarchy (Fichter, 2015: 4). 
So the car industry within the concept of GVC analysis is considered as a producer-driven 
chain, where the power governance is concentrated at the headquarter factory of a MNC. In 
the following the history and specifics of GVC in the car industry will be outlined.  
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1.2.2.1 Global Value Chains of the global car industry 
The term “internationalisation of production” differs from the term “globalisation of 
production” by the quantitative and qualitative level of production sites in different countries. 
Internationalisation signifies a broader focus on the presence of a foreign company in a 
peripheral country. In contrast, “globalisation of production refers more to the buy-out of 
high-technology factories, which have an important role within the framework of competition. 
Based on the terminology described above, the proper term “internationalisation of 
production” will be taken to analyse the evolution of the car industry (Speidel, 2005: 88-9). 
 
The car industry is basically an assembly industry with the major need for intensive 
technological innovation. It brings together an immense number and variety of components. 
The core part of the automobile production circuit is a complex set of relationships between 
the assemblers of vehicles and the suppliers of components, which account for between 50 
and 70 per cent of the cost price of an average car.  
Figure 1 illustrates the three major processes prior to final assembly: First-tier suppliers are 
manufacturer of bodies, components, engines and transmissions. This might be performed by 
assemblers, but shows a strong development of outsourcing. Second-tier suppliers usually 
produce designs, determined by assemblers or first-tier suppliers. Third-tier suppliers 
provide basic spare parts (Dickens, 2010, p. 332).  
First-tier suppliers usually participate in new development projects of car MNC, while 
second-tier suppliers are providing supply parts for forging, casting, stamping etc. Third-tier 
suppliers, provide raw materials. While the assembler holds the power of production through 
the specification of the component, suppliers design a solution with their own technology. 
Hence, assemblers transfer costs for research and development to component suppliers. The 
hierarchy in the value chain led to a specialisation of component suppliers and a shift to 
global sourcing. Contracts with suppliers are predominantly chosen based on costs. This 
allows assemblers to increase cost pressure. Component suppliers reached scale and 
specialisation through mergers, which led to a reduction in the number of suppliers. 
Component plants were located close to the plants of the assembler. Therefore, de-
nationalization of the local suppliers was achieved, which made tariffs and local content of 
products irrelevant to industrial policy (Dickens, 2010, p. 337). 
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Figure 1: The car production circuit 
 
Source: Dickens, 2010, p. 333 
The GVC of cars is determined by a hierarchical structure where on the top are MNC of the 
car industry. First-tier suppliers, who are in close relationship with car assemblers, are in the 
position to organise the production of finished subsystems in cooperation with a huge network 
of lower-tier suppliers. The dependency of lower-tier suppliers on first-tier suppliers resulted 
in a fortification of regional production networks to ensure just-in-time production 
(Hernández, Martínez-Piva, Mulder, 2014: 61). 
 
1.2.2.2 Shifts in global production  
With the introduction of a moving assembly line by Henry Ford in the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, the mass production and consequently consumption of this complex commodity has 
started. Production shifted from Taylorism to Fordism – a term that has been introduced by 
Antonio Gramsci. Fordism has its origin in the “monopoly capitalism” in the end of the 19th 
century in the USA, in which the Ford Motor Company restructured production processes. 
The standardized production of two commodities, cars and housing, gave the start for mass 
production of these commodities. The Fordism model included a new organisation of mass 
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production and labour, leading to an increase of economy of scale through assembly belt 
production. To ensure the success of mass production, consumption power for mass 
consumption is required, which means wage levels needed to increase. Therefore, Ford had no 
choice than increasing the wages of workers, but also intensifying the working tempo and 
taking control over the private life of workers. Gramsci interpreted the new path of 
standardized mass production as a new form of hegemony and therefore a “new way of life” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 317), which was adapted to several locations on a global level. 
The mode of car production started to shift in the 1970s, with the introduction of a more 
efficient and cost-reducing production method, the so-called “lean production”, introduced 
by the Japanese car company Toyota (Toyotism). The crisis of capitalism pushed capitalists 
for a new organisation of production and work. In the 1970s the Japanese companies 
introduced new organisation of production to achieve a small inventory and ensure at the 
same time that production sufficiently covers demand of dealers. The new organisation of 
production aims at “just-in-time” supplies and “lean production” process (Hobsbawn, 1995: 
405 - 40). The internal production process was re-designed through outsourcing of parts of 
production. Increased outsourcing and bundling of core value chain activities in supplier firms 
gave room to the emergence of Global Value Chains in the 1980s.  
Although it has been expected, that labour is further losing power through the production 
model of Toyotism, Beverly Silver analysed, that labour unrest actually became more 
powerful. The Toyotism model is based on tight time schedule, which can be easily disturbed 
through labour unrest. Historically the labour unrest corresponds with a pattern in a product 
cycle. Therefore, Silver contributes to the idea of rethinking the product cycle. Through 
several historic analyses Silver has proven, that labour unrest occurs in each and every cycle 
of production. In particular the car production can be easily influenced by labour, as it is made 
out of an enormous number of components to produce this highly complex and expensive 
commodity and is organised in a tight time schedule. Capitalist could quickly experience a 
profit-losing situation, if the production is stopped by workers. 
In a historic view, labour unrest shifted from the textile industry to the automobile industry in 
the 20
th
 century and within this industrial sector from one geographical area to another. 
Capitalists tend to fix their profit gains by shifting investment from one sector to another and 
from one location to another (Silver, 2003: 75). Within the context of GVC, the connection 
between product cycle and labour unrest, will be analysed with the case of Volks in Anchieta 
and will be outlined in more detail in the following sub-chapters.  
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The automotive industry is distinctive because of its highly concentrated firm structure: small 
numbers of giant companies hold an extraordinary strong power over smaller firms. 
Therefore, the entry barriers for potential “new comers” of a market are comparably high. 
Although car companies from other countries as the Triads (South Korea, China) successfully 
entered the global car market, the three leading car companies on a global level still have their 
headquarters in the Triads (Japan, Germany, USA). Consequently, the Triads still dominate 
production and sales of the global car markets, but face increased competition to hold their 
global market share. Through a wave of mergers, acquisitions and equity-based alliances 
during the 1990s MNCs were fostering their power. Another distinctive characteristic of the 
automotive industry is the close location of final vehicle assembly and parts production to 
consumer markets because of cost reduction of transaction costs. Market saturation in the 
capital core countries and tendency for automakers to build where they sell, has tremendously 
increased since the 1980s. On one hand the automotive industry became a highly global sector 
by the mid of 1980s and on the other hand strong regional structures have been developed, 
which are integrated in global chains (Sturgeon, et al., 2008: 297 - 312). 
There are few fully generic car spare parts that can be used in a wide variety of end products 
without extensive customisation. Suppliers are often the sole source for specific parts of 
module variants. This creates the push for close collaboration, raises the costs for suppliers 
that serve multiple customers and concentrates most design work into few geographic 
clusters, typically near the headquarters of lead firms. Centrally designed vehicles are tailored 
in a further step to local market requirements. Those specific parts are manufactured in 
multiple regions for multiple local markets. Further design activities and buyer-supplier 
relationships typically span multiple production regions. Therefore, we can divide between 
local, national and regional value chains. 
At the design level the aim of car companies is to leverage the design for multiple car models 
in order to achieve better economies of scale. As this part of the GVC is central, the design 
and development work usually is located near car companies’ headquarters. Nevertheless, the 
need for local customization led to the development of local, national and regional value 
chains, which are integrated in global structures, as Figure 2 shows below (Sturgeon, et al, 
2008: 313 - 321).  
Due to the high market concentration, the entry barriers for smaller firms are immense. Only 
few spare parts are standardised. To decrease the design effort, vehicle platforms are shared 
by related car models. Figure 2 illustrates the production chain of the car industry at different 
levels (global, national, regional, local). 
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Figure 2: The nested geographic and organizational structure of the automotive industry 
 
(Source: Sturgeon, et al: 2008: 304) 
 
Usually, the car production is located in industrial regions of a country, such as the ABC-
region of São Paulo state. Within those clusters, which are normally owned by global 
suppliers, supplier park model includes spare parts that are too costly for transportation, 
which further facilitates a JIT production setup, characterised by low inventories. Especially 
the logistic flows in the car GVC are complex and represent a major amount of costs, as 
already mentioned. Therefore, logistics are a part of a GVC where there seems to be room for 
further optimization, as this affects the export competitiveness. As mentioned above, GVC are 
divided in the lead firms (auto producers) and suppliers. Usually lead firms hold the decisive 
power over product strategy, purchase and financial strategy, and final assembly. Lead firms 
are not only in power of GVC design, but also as huge employers. 
Much of global growth in the automobile industry has been achieved in emerging markets. 
The global production of cars grew from 1975 until 1990 by 2 % per year. The increase was 
achieved mainly due to increased motorisation in highly populated emerging economies, such 
as China, India and Brazil. More integrated global industry resulted in larger regional and 
global-scale systems of production, consumption, innovation, sourcing, command and control. 
These global ties have been accompanied by strong regionally integrated structures at the 
operational level.  
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Especially since the second half of the 1980s the global car industry tremendously accelerated 
to a globally integrated industry. That can be analysed by the shift to strongly integrated 
systems both regional and global regarding production, consumption, sourcing and command 
and control. Although vehicles in general are designed based on global market requirements, 
an increasing number of regional design centres are highly influential to tailor the design for 
the national and regional end markets. Several circumstances, such as the national and local 
consumption power, condition of road network, suitable kind of fuel and public policies (eg. 
taxation), require cars with different equipment This trend results in strong regional structures 
in the operational level (Sturgeon, et al, 2008: 313 - 321).  
 
1.2.3  Labour movement in the 20th century 
Trade unions have been mainly acting on a national level to achieve collective bargaining 
contracts and as social partners of the government to improve and protect social welfare and 
influence macroeconomic policies. Due to the adoption of “Fordist” production by companies, 
the majority of TU experienced a membership growth. The new TU members were mainly 
male workers with unlimited, full-time contracts. The increasing internationalisation of 
national markets limited the power of trade unions and it became more difficult to protect 
workers on a national level (Hyman, 2007: 4). By the end of the 1970s and 1980s trade union 
density began to decline on a global level due to neoliberal attacks and subsequently 
worsening conditions for the working class. The reaction of TU have been rather defensive, as 
the focus was more on remaining the achieved level of collective agreements and 
institutionalized achievements (Fichter, 2015: 11).  
The following Table 1 shows the decline of TU memberships in core capitalist countries since 
the 1970s. It has been observed, that changes in union density rates are interlinked with major 
changes in the legal-political, social or economic environment of labour unions. Therefore, 
union density statistic provides a useful comparative indicator which relates to shifts in 
industrial relations (Visser, 2006: 39).  
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Table 1: Union membership development in the European Union, 1970 -2003 
 
Source: Visser, 2006: 43 
In the 1980s the main aim of new employment strategies focused on flexibility, for shifting 
the risk of uncertainty to the working class. Casual jobs, self-employed workers, part-times 
and flexible hours characterise the range of working contracts to fragment labour and decrease 
solidarity between workers, further through the introduction of highly individual incentive 
systems. While assembly-line work has not declined, the number of fixed working hours 
declined from 65 % in 1978, to 59 % in 1984, and 52 % in 1991. The increasing flexibility of 
work led to higher job insecurity and temporary employment of “outsourced labour”. Further 
outsourcing of production processes to subcontractors made it possible to lower the required 
number of workers. Subcontracting has been on the rise since 1974. While in 1974 
subcontracting accounted to 5.1 per cent of the global industrial turnover, it increased to 8.9 
per cent in 1991. Internationalisation of economies made it easier for MNC to avoid national 
employment regulation and decreased the power of states to protect social structures and 
weakened trade unionism. Further ideological changes from collectivism to individualism has 
intensified and weakened workers’ solidarity (Visser, 2006: 45).  
The labour market became more dualistic, as the separation between qualified workers (high 
wage level and unionized) and minimally qualified labour (underpaid and weakly protected) 
strongly intensified during the 1980s (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2007: 219). 
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The increased economic globalization of the 1970s and 1980s has not been accompanied by 
social measures, but more with reduction of social protection standards to serve the neoliberal 
agenda of “flexibilisation” and competitiveness. The global dynamic of FDI, global 
production and cross-border trade has speeded-up significantly since the late 1980s. Market 
growth and huge surplus of low-cost but skilled labour have led to large FDI flows to supply 
local markets and export to developed countries. This global sourcing model has been 
supported by trade and investment liberalisation through free trade agreements.  
As mentioned before, the reorganisation of GVC is driven by vertical disintegration of MNC. 
This implies a power conflict between labour and capital. While the mobility of capital and 
goods has increased, labour’s remained relative immobile and therefore its vulnerability 
(Fichter, 2015: 2-4).  
Regarding the factor of “governance” of GVC, Fichter argues that a high level of lead firm’s 
influence does not directly translates into an organizing and campaign advantage of labour 
simply because of clarity of centrality of power. Undoubtedly TU face much higher burdens, 
in case the governance of a GVC is split between various actors. Nevertheless, a high level of 
governance, such as in the case of Volkswagen Inc. and other global car producers, does not 
necessarily results in agreements on labour standards, but needs a proper organisation and 
solidarity alongside the local, national and global level of value chains. Fichter argues that the 
strongest connection between individual workers and the trade unions, is the workplace-based 
collective power. Therefore, the main fundament for improvement of working conditions 
within a GVC is a locally and nationally strong power base (Fichter, 2015: 7). 
The neoliberal era of the late 20
th
 century has been characterised by the “finanzialization”, 
liberalization and privatization, facilitated by technological and logistical innovations. The de-
commodification process of labour was accelerated through externalization, “flexibilisation”, 
outsourcing and subcontracting on a global level. The term “precarity” became equivalent 
with work in general, as even the “core workforces” needed to face increased uncertainty. 
Deregulation and fragmentation of the labour reorganizes and redefines workforces within 
workplaces everywhere, relocating jobs to wherever they can be done cheaper and for greater 
profit. 
Early mid-1980s an emerging model of horizontal segmentation into a core workforce, which 
will conduct the organisation’s key, firm-specific activities surrounded by a cluster of 
peripheral groups has become the standard model (Atkinson, 1984: 3).  
In order to understand the entire value chain, it is crucial to study the evolution of the 
industry, the trends that have shaped it, its organization. Once there is general knowledge 
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about the industry, segments of the chain can be identified and differentiated by the value they 
add to the product (Gereffi, 2005: 102). The shifts of the GVC in the car industry will be dealt 
with in the following. 
 
1.2.3.1 “Where capital goes, conflict goes” 
The analyses of the GVC with the case of Volks in Anchieta will be based on the localization 
of Brazil, as a semi-peripheral country in a capitalist world. The systematization of capitalist 
order has its roots in the “World-system theory”, which is an approach to conduct analyses 
based on world history and social change in a global context and has been developed in the 
1970s. Major scientist, such as Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein influenced this 
theory with the aim to replace the “modernization theory”. The world-economy is a capitalist 
one and therefore will aim for the permanent accumulation of capital. The theory focuses on 
the global division of labour and positions national economies in relation with each other, to 
show countries capitalist power within the hierarchy of the world’s economy, as a world-
system. Therefore, national economies and labour are classified between “core”, “semi-
peripheral” and “peripheral”. The difference between those classifications is based on the 
power relations and dependency between economies. While Western-Europe and USA are 
classified as core countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC
1
) are positioned as semi-
peripheral countries, in contrast to peripheral countries such as Paraguay, Uzbekistan, 
Bangladesh and Cambodia (Wallerstein, 1974: 410). Here we can see the geographical 
dimension of the world-system theory.  
Analyses clearly illustrate, that the history of capitalism and the history of the working class 
are strongly interconnected with each other. Beverly Silver based her historic analyses of 
labour unrest on the world system theory. She argues, that labour movement will play an 
important role in the 21
st
 century and emphasizes on continuous working class activity and 
resistance rather than victimization. She looks at the rise and decline of labour unrest in 
different locations and connects them with each other through looking at the relation of labour 
and capital and spatial fixes. The term “spatial fix”, as mentioned before, has been formed by 
David Harvey and signifies the aim of capitalists to “fix” profit gains by “geographical 
displacement and reconfigurations” (Harvey, 1999, xviii) and is therefore also named as 
geographical fix. The main aim of the spatial fix is to shift capital to countries with cheaper 
labour and less labour protection by state. In the event, that labour becomes too strong in the 
                                                 
1
  The acronym “BRIC” has been formed by the economist and investment banker Jim O’Neill in relation 
to expected growth of those economies, as well as their immense size of population and production.  
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head quarters’ country. This is not necessarily connected with the loss of worker’s power, as 
the power of workers in the core countries might decline, but the working class power in the 
periphery will grow. As the number of countries to shift to are actually limited, due to high 
transaction costs and dependency on infrastructure, the possibilities of geographical fixes is 
limited. Rooted in the theory of spatial fixes, Silver further defines the following fixes of 
capitalists to secure profitability: 
Product fix signifies capital shifts to new branches or product lines and 
technological/organisational fix characterises the development of modern production and 
organisation methods to gain higher yields. Labour unrest therefore does not only shift within 
shifts of geographical locations within one industrial sector, but continues if capital realizes 
product fixes. Then labour unrest shifts from industry to industry.  
Silver argues, that those fixes will not solve the “challenges for capital”: while the product fix 
led to higher yields on the short run, but leads to stronger labour unrest (eg. the automobile 
industry, which has been indirectly built upon the flight of capital from the textile industry). 
Actually the technological fix has increased the power of labour, as for example the stop of 
production lines can cause heavy impacts on the profitability.  
Contemporary global capitalism is characterised by tight competition, capital fleeing trade 
and manufacturing to secure profits with shifts to financial capitalism and speculations. The 
so-called financial fix does not necessarily need to undermine the power of labour: especially 
at the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 century the financial fix has been 
comparatively high, before it has been invested in the new industries of the 20
th
 century.  
In summary, Beverly Silver emphasizes that globalisation does not necessarily mean a global 
weakening of the global labour movement, as all movements of capital included a reaction of 
labour forces. Despite the changes, the alternating effects of labour on capital and vice versa 
does not need to end. The shift of capital to low-income countries, the increased importance 
of financial capitalism and the serious crisis of core countries’ labour movement does not 
symbolize the victory of capitalists over labour (Silver, 2003: 179).  
As long as no stable relation between labour and capital is realised, militancy will grow and 
push for further spatial fixes and will not lead to a “race to the bottom” regarding working 
conditions and wages. Technological and organisational fixes associated with post-Fordism 
have not weakened the workplace bargaining power of workers of the automobile industry, 
for example. Although production capitalist of the textile industry shifted to the car industry 
(product fix), labour unrest did not decline and therefore did not fulfil the expectation of 
secured profits. Moreover, metalworkers are less dependent on alliances with other working 
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class fractions and social movements and therefore have a strong bargaining power. 
Especially the automobile industry caused a major push factor for driving capital to other 
geographical locations. This resulted in increased workers’ bargaining power and militancy, 
which has been measured by level of strike activity (Silver, 2001: 170). Fixes therefore are 
only relocating social contradictions, labour-unrest and establishment of new working classes.  
A further interesting classification of worker’s bargaining power is distinguished by Erik Olin 
in 2 different types:  
One type is called the “associational power”, which classifies the formation of collective 
organisations, unions and political parties. “Structural power” is divided in two sub-
classifications, as the “market place bargaining power”, that results directly from more or 
less tight labour market or low unemployment rates and “workplace bargaining power” that 
consists of the strategic position of a particular group of workers within the production 
process. The bargaining power of workers can be activated exclusively (specific group of 
workers) or inclusive (linked with other workers’ groups and/or social groups). Both forms 
could either weaken or strengthen the bargaining power of working class groups.  
Silver further classifies two different types of labour unrest: 1) “Marxian struggle”, which 
characterises workers’ struggle to receive a fairer share of profits and more control and 
participation in working processes. This consequently ends in capital trying to seek for spatial 
fixes, such as a technological/organisational one with the aim to overcome worker’s 
resistance. 2) The “Polanyian struggle” signifies workers’ struggle against the dispersal of 
free market and further dismantling of social rights and regulations (Silver, 2003: 16-8). 
The concepts of spatial fixes and classification of labour unrest and bargaining power will be 
used to analyse the shifts in the automobile industry and strategies of labour movement of 
Volkswagen workers in Brazil in the following.  
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1.2.4 Localizing Brazil 
1.2.4.1 Brief history of Brazil in the 20th century 
Brazil’s history is the one of a colonised country with brutal and long-lasting slavery. In 1888 
slavery was officially abolished, which makes Brazil one of the last countries to abandon 
slavery. The subsequently formed republic was formed and led by an oligarchy system. 
Presidential elections between 1894 and 1930 were held every 4 years. The main source of 
income for oligarchs was the production of coffee, as the most important agricultural export 
product. Capitalists of the “coffee-oligarchy” coming from São Paulo and capitalists from 
Minas Gerais succeeded in ruling the political elite of Brazil. As only elites were eligible to 
vote, most of Brazil’s population was excluded (eg. illiterate). Subsequently poorer regions of 
Brazil had no political representation at all.  
In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, Brazil’s economy was mainly build upon by agricultural 
activities (coffee, sugar cane, rubber) and with a rural population of 60 per cent. Due to 
Brazil’s colonial history it became a world market supplier for raw materials to capitalist-core 
countries. Slavery decelerated technological development, which had an effect on the import 
of manufactured goods (Furtado, 1963). The prices for coffee dropped during the First World 
War due to decreased demand. The continuous decline of price for coffee led to a rebellion in 
1930 (Bernecker, et al, 2000: 215 – 7). 
Politically Brazil went through various difficult periods, as the rebellion of 1930 was followed 
by a coup d’état from the top: Getúlio Vargas introduced with the concept of “Estado Novo” a 
corporatist dictatorship, which was overthrown in 1945. 1946 a democratic system was 
defined within its constitution and Vargas came into power again as an elected president in 
1950. He committed suicide in 1954 to avoid a military coup. Getúlio Vargas, an influential 
and contradictory person, of Brazilian history (Leubolt, Auinger, 2011). In summary, between 
1930 and 1980, Brazil was alternatively governed by authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
Instead of integrating former slaves in Brazil’s economy, migrant workers from Europe were 
targeted as qualified work force, which impacted the exclusion of Brazilians and the increase 
of inequalities. The inequality in its society dramatically increased, as the military dictatorship 
in alliance with oligarchy groups realized a dramatic exploitation of Brazil’s working class. In 
the same time frame, Brazil’s industry grew enormously, but remained regionally 
concentrated to the south and southeast of Brazil.  
The strongly formed progressive power realised a democratization process with 
improvements for the working class and reduction of poverty.  
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Between 1930 and 1980s the rural, agricultural society of Brazil shifted to an urban and 
industrialized one. By the beginning of the 1980s, more than 70 per cent of the population 
was living in urban areas. The annual economic growth rates add up to 6 per cent, which 
made Brazil one of the largest economies in the late 1970s among developing countries. 
The industrialization of Brazil increased, when Getúlio Vargas came into power for the first 
time, as imports of manufactured goods decreased due to the impact of the First World War 
and the world economic crisis of 1929. Therefore, the need for a national industry was given. 
Vargas implemented incentives to promote import-substituted industrialization (ISI), as part 
of the “Estado Novo” in 1937. With the concept of “Estado Novo”, created by the military 
dictator, Getúlio Vargas, authoritarian changes in the political, economic and societal policies 
have been realized, characterizing Brazil until nowadays. 
The World-system theory is an important theory coming from Latin America and refers to the 
dependency and position of economies with each. The different position of economies 
impacts on shaping different economic interventions for the welfare of the entire society. 
Most of the Latin American countries are classified as “semi-periphery” due to its position in 
the world economic system and in the context of LA transitioning from primary export-led 
growth to ISI
2
exports of mainly food and raw materials to the core capitalist countries 
(Prebisch, 1950: 2). Therefore, Fordism in the core countries needs to be differentiated from 
Fordism in semi-peripheral countries. The peripheral Fordism can be characterised by a far 
higher heterogeneity of labour, informal workers, less developed welfare state and high rates 
of inflation, due to the global monetary order of the US-dollar. In difference to other countries 
in Latin America, Brazil was the only one which achieved the setup of a nearly complete 
structure of branches. Nevertheless, due to hegemony of core capitalist countries, Fordism 
could not be transferred to other countries reaching the same effect (Becker, Weissenbacher, 
2016). Moreover, the recessed industrialization in Latin America has its roots in its structure, 
formed during the colonial era, which hindered the national creation and access to 
technological innovations. With the export crisis of Latin American countries due to the world 
economic crisis in 1930, the lack of money to finance imports led to a boost of national 
industrialisation: Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was adapted by most Latin 
American countries giving priority to protectionism of and expansion of the domestic 
markets. But industrialization and therefore increase of productivity itself did not lead to 
social welfare and growing equality. Further the need for US dollar to finance imports needed 
                                                 
2
  Between 1930 – mid-1980, industrialisation strategy has been based on systematic deepening and 
horizontal integration of manufacturing industry, with the objective to replace imports. 
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for the growth of Latin American countries was not sufficient and shows the dependency on 
the global key currency and therefore limitation of monetary policy interventions. The 
challenge of gaining a positive balance of trade limits the available capital needed for 
industrialization and innovations of agriculture technology (Prebisch, 1950: 1- 5).  
The industrialization process in Brazil was strongly supported by government intervention 
through investments in state-owned companies, payment of subsidies to private companies 
and quotas and tariffs on imports. For achieving higher growth rates, incentives to attract 
foreign capital were successfully implemented in the mid of 1950ies. Especially FDIs in the 
car industry were flowing in the country. MNC played a growing role in Brazil since then. As 
imports were regulated through quotas and tariffs, it was more profitable for MNCs to invest 
directly and subsequently protect Brazil from global competition. Poverty and low incomes 
hindered mass production to sell its products. For several reasons ISI did not lead to a 
decreased inequality and homogeneity of Brazil’s labour market (Leubolt, Auinger, 2011).  
As mentioned before, the surplus value of the economic growth was only possessed by the 
oligarch group and authoritarian regime, which brutally oppressed militancy of labour until 
the 1980s.  
 
Brazil is the fifth biggest country in the world, in terms of population and land size. Due to 
those facts the potential of a growing economy with a huge potential for consumption was 
targeted by liberal reforms. The state as “development agent” played and plays a crucial role 
in Brazil, as the state holds a major property share of over 200 big companies in Brazil 
(mainly in resources, energy, transport) and therefore is an important employer 
(Bielschowsky, 1992). Table 2 shows the continuously increase and fall of the GDP growth of 
Brazil. A steady increase of the GDP could have been achieved from mid 1960s until the 
beginning of 1980s, when struggle against the military dictatorship reached its peak. 
Despite the impressive struggle of Brazil’s social movement, the 1980s are called “the lost 
decade” as the global crisis of 1980s pushed the country in a foreign-debt crisis, hyper-
inflation and increase of commodity crisis. Imperialist institutions such as IMF and World 
Bank were in a position to push for the implementation of neoliberal politics. The 1990s was 
the decade of trade liberalisation, introduction of flexible working hours and privatisation of 
state-owned companies. 
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Table 2: GDP growth Brazil, 1961 - 2012 
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Source: World Bank Data 
Brazil’s political framework is shaped by its history and size of the country. While the South 
and Southeast became the biggest industrial hub of Brazil, the North and Northeast of the 
country have the highest poverty until nowadays. “Power-elites” were and still are regionally 
split and thus never formed a national consensus (Leubolt, Auinger, 2011).  
In Chapter two the political-economical history of Brazil in the decade of the 1990s will be 
discussed in detail. Based on the information of the last two subchapters, the following one 
will give a brief introduction to the roots and development of trade unionism. 
 
1.2.4.2 Development of Brazil’s car industry 
Until 1905 less than 100 cars have been registered in Brazil. Ford started the first assembly 
line in Brazil in 1919 with the Model T in São Paulo. In 1925 General Motors followed and 
entered the market as well as Fiat in 1928. At that time, there was no component production 
and product development executed in Brazil. During the Second World War imports of car 
components dropped, which created the need for an enlargement of its domestic car industry 
with the implementation of ISI. An important shift for the domestic production of car 
components was the fortification of Brazil’s steel industry, which was realized during the 
government of Getúlio Vargas (1950 – 1954) in the 1950s. Getúlio Vargas approved a 
national industrialization plan, which introduced import barriers on automobile spare parts as 
well as a limitation of vehicle imports. During the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956 
– 1961) an Executive Group for the Automotive Industry (GEIA) was formed, which defined 
a set of requirements for any car producer interested in the establishment of a production plant 
in Brazil. The combination of protectionism and promotion of the car industry in Brazil led to 
a steady growth in the second half of the 20
th
 century. As sales prices of manufactured exports 
from the core to the periphery increased, due to tariffs and import quotas, MNC started to 
establish factories in those countries. Nevertheless, the production remained euro-centric. In 
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the 1970ies Brazil’s car industry experienced a fast expansion (20.7% average annual growth 
rate) and was in 1974 among the top ten car producers worldwide. Capitalists from the Triad 
countries invested heavily in Brazil in the 1970ies. Therefore, the employment in 
manufacturing doubled. A new working class were concentrated in huge factories: 60,000 
workers employed in São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo State (DIESSE, 2015: 4-6).  
The economic miracle of Brazil (1968 – 1974) was possible due to the aim of core capitalists 
to flee labour unrest in the core countries. Seeking for low protection of labour, MNC of the 
car industry increased their investments in the course of 1970s. The number of workers 
employed in manufacturing strongly increased from 20,039 (1950) to 75,118 (1970). The new 
working class was concentrated in huge production plants of the ABC region, with over 
60,000 workers employed in this industrial region. Therefore, especially the car workers of 
the ABC region were strategically well positioned in a complex technical division of labour 
(Silver, 2003, p 54-7).  
Production and employment increased steadily during the late 1960s until the economic 
recession in 1982/1983. As car exports became an important factor for Brazil’s economy, 
strikes and militancy put not only pressure on the profitability of MNCs, but also on the 
Brazilian government to balance out its enormous debts to foreign banks.  
The phase-out of Fordist production began with the oil price crisis in 1973, as the number of 
sold cars dramatically decreased. Japanese car companies achieved growing market shares 
with the introduction of “Toyotism” (Speidel, 2005: 95). The external growth of MNC car 
companies was realised through merger and acquisition of companies. Standardization and 
modular mode of production and array of products was implemented in the course of 1990s. 
The “time to market” strategy aimed to reduce time for design and production and production 
costs. This requires a tight collaboration between subcontracting companies and inclusion of 
them in the design process. Further it was important for MNC to ensure a constant and safe 
procurement of raw materials and car components (global sourcing). Subcontracting 
companies were put into a higher competition, which allows MNC to decrease costs of 
production (Speidel, 2005: 98-9).  
In the following the case of a Brazilian car spare part manufacturer will be briefly outlined to 
illustrate the proceeding liberalisation of its national car market. 
 
 
The case of Freios Varga 
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The story of a leading Brazilian component manufacturer, called “Freios Varga”, can be 
taken as an example for the development cycle of Brazilian auto component manufacturing 
industry in general. Freios Varga started to produce spare parts in the 1950 for the domestic 
market. Due to market restrictions many locally-owned firms entered the spare part market. 
At the beginning of 1960 Freios Varga began with the production of spare parts, designed by 
Volkswagen. To improve its technological expertise, a company called Lucas took a minority 
stake in the company and began to design new spare parts of Brazilian car models such as 
Ford Corcel II and VV Gol. Freios Varga relied on Lucas for basic technology, but remained 
its engineering capability to adapt designs for the local market. In general, the joint venture 
was a success, as it led the company to a dominant position within the domestic marked and 
even increased its exports in the 1970ies. Increasing amounts of Freios Varga’s production 
were exported to the North American market. However, Lucas merged with Varity 
Corporation, while Freios Varga successfully competed with Varity in the North American 
market in the mid-1990s. To diminish the competition, Lucas-Varity merger bought the 
remaining 66 percent of Freios Vargas share. The founding Brazilian family of Freios Varga 
lost the control over the company (Humphrey, 2005, p. 30). The case of Freios Varga can be 
taken as a typical example for the denationalization of the Brazilian car components industry 
in the 1990s. Out of the 20 biggest component production companies in Brazil in terms of 
sales value, 10 were locally owned in 1995. In 1998 7 out of these 10 companies had been 
taken over by multinational companies (MNC) (Costa, 1998, p. 94).  
Similar shifts in ownership have been observed in India and Eastern Europe.  
 
1.2.4.3 Introduction to Volkswagen Group and “Volks” 
On May 26
th
 1938 the company of Volkswagen was founded by the Nazi regime and 
instructed by Porsche Ltd to design a car for the masses. Porsche holds the majority of 
Volkswagen Inc. shares and is integrated in the Volkswagen MNC. The main factory has been 
constructed in Wolfsburg, where it is until nowadays. In 1939, 2.700 workers and in 1945, 
5.700 workers have been employed in the Volkswagen factory Wolfsburg. In the aftermath of 
World War 2 the British military government took over the company of Volkswagen and 
continued with the production of cars. In 1949 the company was handed over to the German 
government, by the acceptance of the latter to fulfil obligations such as a guaranteed influence 
of trade unions. For instance, a factory agreement has been set up, which stipulates, that the 
factory can only be extended, downsized or closed with the clear agreement of the works 
committee.  
42 
 
 
 
In the same year the trade union for metalworkers in Germany, “IG Metall” has been newly 
founded, after facing heavy repressions during the Nazi dictatorship. In 1960 the German 
parliament decided to privatize the so far state-owned company and was subsequently 
transformed to a joint stock company, where the majority is made up by small shareholders. 
In 1962, 69.000 workers have been employed at the factory of Wolfsburg. To ensure that the 
common welfare idea of Volkswagen is maintained, a law, called the Volkswagen law, has 
been introduced to ensure, that the voting right of the stockholders’ meeting is limited to 20% 
to ensure a division of power and the voting rights of the state. This law shaped the company 
concept of Volkswagen Ltd: ensuring stable yield and stable employment (IG Metall, 2009).  
 
Volkswagen’s strategy has been shaped during the 1950s and 1960s by strong participation of 
Volkswagen’s works committee and guaranteed wages and social standards at levels, which 
were above the national collective agreement. As this economic time has been characterised 
by a booming economy and growing power of trade unions in Europe and the long history of 
Volkswagen in Wolfsburg, “IG Metall” has had a strong power representation at the company 
level since it’s re-foundation in 1949. Therefore, the collaboration between Volkswagen 
management and workers has been described as predominantly harmonic (Speidel, 2005:59). 
In the 1950 the management board of Volkswagen decided to strengthen its exports due to 
proceeding liberalisation of worlds’ economies. Due to increased international competition, it 
was further aimed at modernizing its production and the re-organisation of its structures. 
Pressured by the competitive advantages US car producers achieved through Fordist 
production systems, Volkswagen needed to upgrade its production technology to remain its 
world market share. Fordism targeted 2 aims: 1) Increased economies of scale 
(standardization, high technology for mass production) and 2) division of labour (less skilled 
workers, simplified replacement of labour). In 1954 assembly lines have been installed in the 
Volkswagen’s factory in Wolfsburg, followed by a vertical integration, with the aim to 
optimise the value chain for maximising profits (Haipeter, 2000: 142-44).  
In the 1970s Volkswagen Inc. has been affected by the global crisis and sharp decrease in car 
sales. Accompanied by internal strategic mistakes a dismissal of 32,000 workers has been 
realised between 1974 and 1975. The works committee negotiated a compensation payment 
for the dismissed workers for accepting the huge reduction of jobs, as well an extended 
factory agreement for securing the remaining jobs. Further qualitative improvements of 
working conditions have been accepted by workers. Volkswagen management started to 
implement new production technologies and reorganise its production chain on a global level, 
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although an internationalisation strategy has actually started decades earlier. Between 1950s 
and end of 1980s Volkswagen Inc. established factories outside of Europe in Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey (Speidel, 2005: 60 – 63).  
 
Volkswagen Inc. entered the Brazilian market in 1953, with the foundation of “Volkswagen 
do Brasil” (hereinafter “Volks”). The first production was established in the factory of 
Anchieta, São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo State. As car models of MNC, which were 
designed in core countries for peripheral markets, were not appropriate for the national 
requirements (e.g.: road conditions, consumption power, climate conditions). The main 
factory “Volkswagen-Anchieta” has been constructed for a vertical mass production, which 
has been diversified in the 1970s. Until the mid of the 1990s the factory contributed a big 
share in the GVC of Volkswagen Inc. car production, which has changed very much through 
the reorganisation of production (Schulz-Côrtes, 2007). From 1950s till 1980s the following 
car models were produced in Volkswagen Anchieta as Table 3 shows. 
 
Table 3: Car models of Volks do Brasil, 1950s – 1980s 
year car model 
1957 Volks Combi bus 
1959 Sedán 1200 
1962 Fuscão/Karmann-Ghia 
1969 VW 1600, Variant, TL 
1972 Sedan/VW Carocha 
1974 Brasiília 
1974 Passat 
1977 VW Miura 
1980 Gol Gol (carro popular) 
Source: Just-auto.com, 2012 
Especially the production of VW Carocha and VW Gol strongly contributed to remain its 
market leading position in Brazil car market in the course of the 20
th
 century. In comparison 
to other car companies in Brazil the number of different car models produced by Volks, were 
comparably low, because Volks aims to produce a car for the masses and therefore the 
company organised a Fordistic production method till the end of the 1980s.  
Until 1980 the factory of workers of Volkswagen -Anchieta were not protected by a collective 
agreement and further no systemized exchange between workers and management. The 
workers organised a “secret works council” to organise their interests. Nevertheless, Volks-
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Anchieta’s management ensured the loyalty of its workers through individual case 
management. The management of Volks accepted the election of a factory commission in 
1980, although trade unions were not allowed to participate, as they aimed to set up a “yellow 
works council”, so-called “pelegos”. Volks neglected the recognition of the independent 
metalworker union bargaining partner and the latter subsequently called for a boycott of the 
factory committee election. After negotiations of 2 days, the committee has been elected 
(Schultz-Côrtes, 2007: 87-9).  
The longest metalworkers strike took place in 1985, with 85.000 workers participating, calling 
for wage increase to compensate the lost consumption power due to enormously high 
inflation. The strike lasted for 53 days and was heavily suppressed by the board of GM, Volks 
and Mercedes. Due to the aggressive strategy of car companies and the weak law to protect 
workers and their unions, the strike was oppressed not to be successful. More than 2.500 
workers have been fired, including many trade unionists (IGMetall, 2005).  
Since 1982 the German trade union IG Metall Wolfsburg, where Volkswagen’s headquarter is 
located, founded the working group “InterSoli”, to better connect and collaborate with 
unionist of other countries. “InterSoli” has been established to ensure the continuous 
collaboration and exchange between trade unionists of different countries. CUT and IG Metall 
for Volkswagen have already established collaboration between each other. For example, IG 
Metall collected funding to support the strike in 1985. The aims of the working group further 
cover the exchange about planned reorganisations and technological innovations of 
Volkswagen’s management as well as the potential effects on workers, in order to protect all 
workers of Volkswagen Inc. “Intersoli” is one initiative of German trade unionists to 
strengthen global solidarity. For example, Volks collaborated with the military regime and 
acted with harsh repression of unionist in Brazil. IG-Metall therefore increased the pressure 
on the board of Volkswagen to end enslaving Volks workers in Brazil (IG-Metall, 2016).  
Nevertheless, the global competition further grew as new global players entered the car 
market, which put pressure on Volkswagen Inc. to re-organise its production chain. In the 
1970s and 1980s the differences in mode of production and car models has been declining on 
a global level. Volkswagen Inc.’s strategic decision was taken in the end of the 1980s, due to 
decreasing numbers of sales and the aim to cut down production costs through platform 
production to reduce the dependency between the factories and increase the degree of capacity 
utilisation. The platform strategy allows a cost-reduced product development (standardization 
of production processes, technology and usage of standardized spare parts for different 
models. The platform strategy is the most important re-organisation of production of 
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Volkswagen Inc., as costs for design and reduction of time cycle until the placement of the 
product in the market. Further the strategy of spare part reduction (standardization) for a 
remaining a broad variety of car models (product diversity) led to profit gains in economy of 
scales of mass production (Haipeter, 2000: 352).  
While the inner-invisible spare-parts are standardised (divided by classes of cars), the visible 
parts are produced according to brand’s characteristics. Volkswagen Inc. could significantly 
cut down production costs with the introduction of the platform strategy. To increase profits, 
an increase in the economies of scale and therefore standardization of car models around the 
global is the main aim of global car producers. As the costs for design and engineering build 
the major part of the total production costs, platforms were established to design standardized 
car parts, used for a variety of car models. For example, Volkswagen and PSA are using the 
same platform for different car brands within the company. With the platform strategy, spare 
parts have been standardized on a global level, costs have been reduced and the speed of new 
model development has been accelerated. Another advantage of standardization of car models 
is the reduction of the dependency on fluctuations in demand, as the response to changed 
demand can be handled more easily (Humphrey, Memedovic, 2003: 23). 
Production concentration of the Volkswagen group increased, while its sale concentration did 
not change much. The global and regional distribution of vehicle production and sales of the 
leading companies shows the concentration of production and sales in home locations is 
changing only slowly, whereas in peripheral markets production has been heavily increased. 
Since mid-1980s global automakers and large suppliers of vehicle parts are deeply engaged in 
multiple regional integrated production systems. Production growth in semi-peripheral 
markets allowed Volkswagen Inc., to broaden its array of products (Haipeter, 2000: 357).  
The following table 3 shows the car models, which were produced in Brazil during the 1980s: 
 
 
 
Table 4: Car models produced in Brazil in 1980s 
Year Car model Car MNC 
1980 Gol Volkswagen 
1980 Panorama C Fiat 
1980 Fiorino Fiat 
1981 Del Rey Ford 
1982 Parati Volkswagen 
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1982 Saveiro Volkswagen 
1982 Monza Chevrolet 
1982 Pampa Ford 
1982 Fiorino Furgão Fiat 
1983 Escort  Ford 
1983 Oggi Fiat 
1984 Uno Fiat 
1984 Santana Volkswagen 
1985 Premio Fiat 
1986 Elba Fiat 
1988 Kadett Chevrolet 
1989 Verona Ford 
1989 Ipanema Chevrolet 
1989 Elba CLS Fiat 
Source: just-auto.com, 2012 
 
Table 3 illustrates the comparably few car models, which were introduced by Volks in 
comparison to especially Fiat. Nevertheless, Volks succeeded to remain as the leading car 
company in Brazil, mainly due to its strategy to construct cars for the masses.  
 
1.2.4.4 History of trade unionism in Brazil 
In 1906 the first Brazilian trade union federation, the Confederação Operária do Brasil (COB), 
was formed. Until 1920, the anarchists set the tone: They called for autonomous, 
decentralized unions and continued to defend the workers' interests on direct action such as 
strikes. This time was marked by radical confrontations with the company and the 
government that was going on with their repressive apparatus hard against the numerous 
strikes for wage increases and reduction of working time (IG-Metall, 2005). 
Between 1917 and 1920 São Paulo state registered 112 strikes. One of the largest and most 
successful strikes in Brazil's labour history started in 1916 and expanded to a general strike in 
1917. Legislation for workers’ protection hardly existed and legislation compliance was 
barely observed. Thanks to the militancy of the labour movement of Brazil, the industrial 
growth after the First World War and the impact of the Russian Revolution, some union 
demands succeeded to be included in the 1920s legislature: The railwaymen, a numerically 
large and very militant group, sat in a labour disputes in 1923 by setting up a pension fund 
and the statutory protection against dismissal. By legislative decree workers of industries, 
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trade and finance won in 1925 a claim of 15 days paid annual leave. In 1926 the first Child 
and Youth Protection Act followed, which limited the working day to six hours per day. At 
the end of the twenties, the strikes had become rare and the repression of workers increased 
systematically (Migrant-online, 2007).  
During the lapse of time of Brazil’s First Republic (1889 – 1929), the formation of 
independent labour unions was prevented. The first trade unions formed concurrently with the 
industrialization of Brazil. Due to premeditated huge working migration from Italy and Spain, 
Brazil’s trade unionism has been influenced by anarcho-syndicalist characteristics. Vargas 
recognized the importance of organizing workers during the industrialization of Brazil and 
therefore strategically aimed to prevent a potential threat by the formation of an independent 
and militant trade union movement. Consequently, Vargas created a labour rights system, 
which put trade unions in the position of seemingly recognized state-partners in all sectors of 
industry and trade for ensuring a material existence of the economy. This strategic move 
succeeded in controlling the labour movement and decelerated militancy formation (Krüger, 
1991: 463 - 7).  
 
The first labour laws were enacted in 1931. Vargas positioned trade unions under the 
administrative and political control of the Labour Ministry. In 1943 the labour laws were 
revised and summarized in the “Consolidation of Labour Law” (Consolidação das Leis do 
Trabalho – CLT), which has its roots in Italian fascist labour rights (Krüger, 1991: 466). The 
decree of the “Consolidated Labour Laws” is crucial for the regulation of social policies, 
workers’ participation and labour market regulations until nowadays, as they have been hardly 
revised. CLT includes the following regulations:  
1) Legal recognition of unions: Ministry of Labour decided on granting a “carta 
sindical”, which is connected with the fulfilment of requirements, such as the 
curriculum vitae of TU leaders and the permission for election. 
2) Trade union unicity: union’s power to represent all workers determined by 
profession and territory of work. Therefore, workers do not have the freedom to 
choose their union, but can decide to sign up with the labour representation or not. The 
categories of professions have been defined by the Ministry of Labour.  
3) Compulsory union tax: the literally called “union tax” is automatically deducted 
from wages and collected by the Ministry of Labour and further distributed to its 
recognized union system. 20 % of the union tax remains with the Ministry of Labour.  
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4) Right to strike: a plenty of legal requirements need to be fulfilled, on which the 
Ministry of Labour has the power to decide, whether the strike is legal or not.  
5) Collective bargaining process: Labour movement and employer organisations are 
required to engage in collective bargaining. The Labour Court has the power to 
intervene in this process.  
Source: Schulz-Côrtes, 2007: 91-93 
CLT regulations show the immense power of intervention given to the state. CLT elevated the 
power of the Ministry of Labour to acknowledge and control trade union actions. The right to 
strike was defined in a way, which made its organization legally nearly impossible. Moreover, 
no regulation on the formation of union representation at the shop floor-level is included, as 
well as covering certain professions, such as public servants. Therefore, the CLT had a 
“disorganizing” effect on the labour movement and made the protection of workers apparently 
more difficult (Lang, Gagnon, 2009: 250-1). Beside the CLT, an important change for 
Brazil’s formally employed was the introduction of the minimum wage in 1940. Both, CLT 
and the law on minimum wage are in place until today.  
Brazil’s TU at that time, can be classified as an authoritarian corporatist system, as the 
state has a strong power to determine social classes with the aim to integrate the 
representation of work and capital in a vertical order to burden conflicts (Leubolt, Auinger, 
2011). 
Between 1940 and 1980 formal employment grew significantly fast with a growth rate of 6.2 
per cent on average per year and employment in the manufacturing sector grew by 423 per 
cent. On the contrary the inequality in the society increased from “21-fold to 47-fold between 
1960 and 1980” (difference between 10 percent of poorest and richest population). In 
difference to developed countries, Brazil is characterised by high income-inequalities, high 
number of unorganised and informal workers and lack of a universal system for social 
protection (Jakobsen, de Freitas Barbosa, 2008, p 115 – 7). The time period 1968 - 1980 is 
characterised as an “economic miracle”, as through ISI the industry enormously grew (30 per 
cent annual growth of production capacity) with increased annual growth of GDP (13 per cent 
per year), unemployment rate was low (2 per cent per year) and formal employment 
increased. The strongest concentration of industry has taken place in the so-called “ABC 
region
3”, which is situated in the periphery of São Paulo City4 and is the biggest industrial hub 
                                                 
3
  The acronym „ABC“ refers to the names of the biggest, industrialized municipalities, in the periphery 
of São Paulo city: Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano.  
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of Brazil until today. Although economic growth strongly increased during late 1960s and 
1970s, the surplus was not distributed to workers, but shared between oligarchs and the 
military regime. 
Brazil’s economic development between 1968 until 1974 matches with the starting Triad-
Capitalists strategy to shift car production to areas where workers are less protected and 
organized. During 1964 till 1966 Brazil was controlled by a military dictatorship, led by 
Marshall Humberto Castelo Branco, who came into power through a Coup d’ètat against João 
Goulart (Jango) realized in 1964. The military coup installed an extremely repressive regime, 
which succeeded in oppressing the trade-union movement and effectively repressing any 
working-class opposition at both levels: plant level and national political level (Silver, 2003, 
p. 54). 
With a relatively high number of industrial workers in the ABC region, and their better 
position in the production chain for Brazil’s growing industrial sector, the Metalworkers’ 
Union of São Bernardo do Campo (MWU-SP) became the hub for “Novo Sindicalismo”. 
Brazil’s “New Unionism” formed in the late 1970s on a grass-root level in the context of 
strong social movements. The military regime held wages at a low level, although 
productivity increased, but the consumption power for the growing number of commodities 
was limited due to increasing inflation and consequently loss in real wages. The increased 
level of organised workers and strong support of social movements in Brazil led to 
impressive, successful strikes in 1978, 1979 and 1980 and opened up the doors to reform the 
industrial relationships due to changed economic and social environment. Luiz Inácio da 
Silva, Lula, became prominent in his role as a charismatic labour leader of the metalworkers, 
due to his successes as a strike leader at the end of the 1970ies. The main aim of those strikes 
was to fight against the state-led wage policy (política salarial). Those mass strikes were not 
legalised by the state, but could not been defeated due to the impressive support of Brazil’s 
society. With the success in strikes the phase of democratizing of Brazil’s state system has 
started (Migrant-online, 2007). 
The first official factory committee (comissão de fábrica) has been established in 1981 in the 
factory of Ford. Due to weak legislation on the formation and function of a “comissão de 
fábrica”, unions mobilized to elect CIPAs (Comissão Interna de Prevenção de Acidentes) 
additionally to the factory committees, because member of CIPA are more protected by law, 
compared to works councils. CIPA signifies the internal commission for the prevention of 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
  São Paulo city experienced a tremendous growth from 1934 (approximately1 Million inhabitants) until 
nowadays (approximately 11 million inhabitants), with the highest growth rates during the „economic miracle”.  
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accidents in the workplace. CIPAs were an important instrument for union movement until 
the beginning of the 1980s. “Cipeiros” where in the position to establish an information 
network for workers and set up factory committees and therefore strengthen union’s presence 
at workplace (Lang, Gagnon, 2009).  
Through the strong commitment of social movement activists in the course of 1980s and the 
support of the metal workers with their strong workplace power, the formation of the 
“Workers’ Party” (“Partido dos Trabalhadores” PT) in 1980 was the result of the successful 
power struggle of “social movement unionism” for political representation of Brazil’s 
oppressed working class. The PT became the first party with internal-democratic structures 
(pluralism, bottom-up member participation). This can be taken as the start of democratization 
of Brazil in the course of the 1980s. Growing representation of the working class and social 
movements further resulted in the formation of the “Central Única dos Trabalhadores” (CUT) 
in 1983, as the main national trade union central in Brazil. The formation took place in São 
Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo, which symbolizes the strong power of the metalworker union 
within CUT. The union is strongly tied with PT as it was formed to represent and to act with 
the vision of a “Novo Sindicalismo” or in other words a “Social Movement Unionism” 
(Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 5). The debt crisis of the 1980s accelerated labour unrest, as 
hyperinflation consequently led to a weakening of the working class and increase of poverty. 
General strikes have been held in 1983, 1986, 1987 and 1989. Workers claimed the 
reimbursement of income losses caused by anti-inflation policies. In contrast, companies as 
well as the state benefited from the hyperinflation due to losses in real income of Brazil’s 
working class. The power position can be interpreted as an attack of companies and state at 
the growing power of labour and social movements. Nevertheless, the militancy power of the 
trade union movement has been strong during the “lost decade”, which intensified the 
increasing popularity of PT. The number of strikes held shown in Table 4 symbolizes the 
growth of the working class power. The union density increased from 12.7 per cent (1979) to 
28.0 per cent (1989) (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 178-9).  
 
Table 5: Number of strikes and strikers, Brazil, 1982 – 1990 
Year  Number of Strikes Number of Strikers 
1982 144 480.000 
1983 393 880.000 
1984 618 1.320.000 
1985 927 6.090.000 
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1986 1.665 6.160.000 
1987 2.188 8.590.000 
1988 2.137 8.220.000 
1989 3.943 18.380.000 
1990 2.357 20.300.000 
Source: Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 179 
 
Although labour movement of Brazil became very powerful, the neoliberal agenda was 
pushed by president Collor and president Cardoso, CUT faced a declining mobilisation 
power, due to decreased efforts in its aim of social transformation and further increased 
unemployment led to declining membership numbers (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 216-22). 
The “Citizens’ Constitution” was formed during the democratization struggle in the 1980ies 
in the attempt to improve labour and social laws. It was taken into effect in 1988 (Leubolt, et 
al., 2011) and was the only modification against the restriction of labour movement and 
limitation of the power of the Ministry of Labour over elected union leaders, since the decree 
of CLT. Nevertheless, the Citizen’s Constitution did not include basic conditions to develop a 
democratic labour-relationship. Beside conflicting regulations, the corporatist structures have 
not been changed. Therefore, Brazilian trade unionism can be defined as institutions 
restricted by public law. The formation of a union is dependent by the acceptance of the 
labour ministry. Within defined regions and occupational groups unions can form. To file an 
application more than a third of a specific occupational group in a specific region need to be 
registered as members. A commission of the labour ministry decides whether a trade union 
will be authorized. For each occupational group in each region only one trade union can 
register. Therefore, pluralism of trade unions is excluded by law. In case a trade union is 
accepted, the finance resources are guaranteed as each worker has to contribute one full 
working day payment per year, independent whether the worker chooses to be a union 
member or not. The so-called “Trade Union Tax” is collected by the employer and transferred 
to the ministry of labour, which distributes the tax defined by a certain calculation model to 
local unions and union confederations.  
Additionally, workers can voluntarily join a union and need to pay a fixed membership fee, 
which entitles them to access social benefits and legal advice of that trade union. Further they 
are entitled to vote for the trade union steering committee. In general, voluntary memberships 
are very rarely. Another source of funding for trade unions is coming from wage increases, 
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whereof a certain percentage goes to the trade union. Due to this financing system unions can 
exist independent from “active” memberships (Leubolt, Auinger, 2011).  
A typical trade union in a small city normally has a well-equipped trade union house with 
doctor’s office, dentist, a small pharmacy and sometimes a social room as well as a 
hairdresser. The trade union funding can be only used for social support, which is defined by 
law. Often members and steering committees’ members are more than decades with a specific 
trade union. This system of local trade unionism makes it nearly impossible to implement a 
joint strategy as their interests are very heterogeneous. Although federations and 
confederations are established, they hardly have legal power to influence collective 
bargaining. They are limited to representation, consulting on a national and regional 
government level (Krüger, 1991).  
The legal structure of trade unionism in Brazil makes it possible to be under the control of 
politics. For example, the labour ministry is allowed to control trade unions, in case there are 
any doubts. Controls were increasingly often executed after 1964, particularly in bigger trade 
unions. Between 1964 and 1975 about 70% of all trade unions with more than 5.000 members 
have gone through an intervention of the military dictatorship. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was 
eliminated by political forces in 1979 and 1980 from his leadership position for the metal 
worker union of São Bernardo do Campo. In 1980 he was convicted for 2.5 years because of 
breaking the national security law by undertaking a strike. Strikes have been the main reasons 
for state-led violation of trade unions autonomy of. Ironically the right to strike is explicitly 
guaranteed in the constitution and was never recalled during military dictatorship. As already 
mentioned, the reason the right to strike was not changed during military dictatorship lies in 
the very complex regulations of strike procedures. In case a strike is undertaken, an employee 
is protected by the state through dismissal prohibition and full payment of salary. In case the 
employer does not fulfill his obligations, the employee has the right to receive compensation 
from the state. For this reason, trade unions are not allowed to have strike funds. Nevertheless, 
the employer also has the right for compensation in case a strike was improperly intervened.  
In reality 90% of strikes after 1978 were illegal, as employers as well as the ministry of labour 
could identify bureaucratic mistakes. For example, it is defined by law, that a strike can only 
be considered in a plenary meeting in a secret ballot. At the meeting 2/3 of the union members 
need to be present. 2 days after a second meeting need to happen, where another voting need 
to be done, but only 1/3 of members must be to be present.  
The strong connection of Brazilian trade unions with the state made it difficult for unions to 
position their own identity. The state represented the biggest partner and enemy of trade 
53 
 
 
 
unions in regards of working class negotiation conflicts as well as influencing national 
economy and social policies. Until today, trade union’s identity is dependent on state’s power 
within trade unionism, which caused a relatively weak representation of unions at company 
level. Usually there are no works councils and no grassroots organization foreseen at the 
company level. Before 1964, in a political phase of democracy trade unions attempted to 
organize within companies, as the direct interaction and top-down solution finding with the 
ministry of labour was an easier path to take, instead of organizing at the grass root level 
(Krüger, 1991). 
The trade union power of Brazil is limited due to structural complexity and union 
fragmentation. There are over 18,000 trade unions registered in Brazil, with more trade unions 
founded every day. The former general secretary of CNM, Valter Sanches, put emphasize on 
the complexity of Brazil trade union system at the globalisation forum in 2008: “Our trade 
union system is highly complex, even we do not fully understand it” (DGB-Broschüre, 2008: 
30). 
The trade union tax system makes it easy for trade unions to survive without the need for a 
broad support of workers. This enables many trade unions to act rather in favour of employers 
than of employees, as they are not dependent on the voices of the shopfloor-level (DGB- 
Broschüre, 2008). 
In the course of the 1980ies the labour movements in Brazil entered into a severe crisis. Union 
density was declining combined with a decreasing identification of workers as members of the 
working class. The reason for this development can be seen in the “hypermobility of 
productive capital”, which led to a global labour market in which workers are pushed to 
compete with each other and limited the sovereignty of states. Further the fragmentation of 
workers and increasing unemployment led to decreasing working class identification. 
Expansion of MNC to emerging countries has led to an enormous competition of with the 
engagement of unorganised workers. This led to an enervation of labour’s bargaining power 
and a “race to the bottom” regarding salaries and working conditions on a global level. The 
global competition put pressure on states to be attractive for direct investments, which results 
in declined protection of workers. Additionally, the reorganisation of production and labour 
led to a fragmentation of labour and it became more difficult to organise them (Silver, 2003: 
4). 
 
1.2.4.5 Formation of metalworkers’ unions  
54 
 
 
 
The “Trade Union of Metalworkers of ABC” (“Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do ABC”) was 
founded in 1932, as an official union. The ABC Metalworkers Union represented all 
metalworkers of the ABC region, except of the region of São Caetano do Sul.  
As the number of produced vehicles in Brazil increased significantly during the period of the 
“golden age” and therefore the number of workers employed in manufacturing strongly 
increased from 20,039 (1950) to 75,118 (1970). The large industrial proletariat was 
concentrated in huge production plants of the ABC region, with for example over 60,000 
workers employed only in that region. Therefore, especially the car workers of the ABC 
region are strategically well positioned in a complex technical division of labour. Pushed by 
real wage losses and heavy restrictions due to military regimes, massive successful strikes 
were held at the end of the 1970s and reached significant wage increases and the existence of 
new and more or less independent trade unions. The labour movement in Brazil could not be 
ignored anymore.  
The board of MNCs tried to defeat strike action by eliminating unions from their factories. 
Volkswagen factories, for example, were equipped with a security system, which includes 
video cameras, 2 former soldiers and over 60 police men. The recently proved cooperation of 
Volks management with the military regime shows the bilateral suppression of state and 
capitalist on the working class. Nevertheless, militant power of the grown industrial working 
class together with social movements was that strong, that Volkswagen needed to accept the 
strength of labour unions in 1982 and accepted the recognition of factory committees. By 
1987 a strike activity peak of 9 million workers was recognized. In the second half of 1980ies 
the wages in the industrial sector grew by 10 percent each year and thus nullified the IMF-
inspired government anti-inflation plan (Moreira, Maria, 1989: 67).  
With the formation of “Central Única dos Trabalhadores” (CUT) in August 1983, the “social 
union movement” founded a labour central (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 2 – 5). It has been founded 
at the national workers’ congress. During the 1980s the CUT became the leading trade union 
and the biggest trade union central with 2.800 affiliated trade unions. With the signing of the 
“Citizens’ Constitution” the right to strike, the formation of independent labour unions and 
limitation of state interference has been regulated. Unfortunately, the new social union 
movement did not succeed to include job security guarantees to the constitution (IGMetall, 
2005).  
The development of “Novo Sindicalismo” has been specially supported by the Metalworkers 
Union of the SP state (MWU-SP). In the beginning of 1978 MWU-SP’s leadership started to 
support shop floor actions and demands, such as enterprise-level strikes, to further 
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democratize the union. The great number of shop floor-level strikes showed the bargaining 
power of the metalworkers on one hand, but hindered the development of further democratic 
participation. Especially independent “factory commissions” have not been strongly 
integrated. Their main critiques have been the reduction of participation due to instalment of 
delegates, factual reduction of weighting of votes of union opposition and the increasing 
power of CUT (Sluyter-Beltrão: 88). 
Although the democratization of MWU has increased, mainly TU leaders were involved in 
taking key decisions. The strong solidarity between union movement factions, wherefore Lula 
Inácio da Silva was the leading TU representative, faced a growing oppression by the military 
regime. In 1992 the “National Confederation of Metalworkers” (CNM) became a branch of 
CUT and became a member of the International Federation of Workers in the Metallurgical 
Industry. 1993 years later the union central Força Sindical founded the metal worker 
confederation “Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Metalúrgicos (CNTM), which was 
part of the corporate state-structure. Therefore, metalworkers have 2 different trade unions on 
a regional and national level, which have similar power and accepted each other. Within the 
metalworkers’ sector, 60 per cent of their members are working in automobile factories. 
(Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 88 - 91). As mentioned above, the metalworkers’ union was the first 
to establish a works council in 1981, despite all legal barriers, which shows their strong 
workplace bargaining power.  
CUT’s internal factional conflicts intensified between 1989 and 1990. In the course of 1987 
the first major conflict within the CUT affiliated unions through internal union-electoral 
battles between leadership and left minority groups. The internal battle showed the political 
program of the majority fraction of CUT (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 290). The strongest 
employers’ organization is the industrialists’ representative chamber of the economically 
strongest state in Brazil, São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo – 
FIESP). The Brazilian industrial coalition (Coalizão Empresarial Brasileira – CEB) is 
coordinating the influence of the Brazilian industrial sector on the process of international 
trade negotiations.  
Chapter 1 gave an introduction to the history of economy, society, development of car 
industry as well as the formation and development of trade unionism in Brazil, by drawing the 
relations to global developments. In the following Chapters, the development of the car 
industry, shifts in GVCs and TU strategies of “Volks” workers will be examined for the time 
period of 1990 until 2014.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LIBERALISATION OF CAR INDUSTRY, 1990 – 2002 
Based on the information provided in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides information on the global 
re-organisation of car production in the context of a global market liberalisation as well as the 
development of Brazil’s economy in the last decade of the 20th century. The reaction of 
Volkswagen management and impact on workers of Volks da Anchieta from 1990 – 2002 will 
be analysed. The core part of this chapter deals with the applied trade union strategies of 
workers at the Volkswagen factory “Anchieta” in São Bernardo do Campo.  
 
2.1  GVC chain shifts in the global car industry 
Between 1990 and 1993 it was clear that the developed capitalist countries faced an economic 
depression, which consequently affected semi-peripheral countries due to their economic 
dependency. MNC needed to develop new global strategies to secure profits. The Post-Fordist 
model of “lean production” enabled MNCs to cut down costs and re-organise its production 
in order to intervene against declining profit rates through entering new national markets.  
Between the years 1990 – 1997 the geographical and technological fixes strategically could be 
realised by MNC. This led to increased global sales of cars by 3.8 million units achieved in 
the emerging markets (eg. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico). In comparison only 
230.000 units were sold in the Triad. Global production increased in the same period by 5.1 
million in peripheral markets compared to 1.7 million units in the Triad. Leading car 
assembler companies in Western countries produced 60 – 70 % of car value in their countries 
of origin. This has changed very much due to a heavy wave of outsourcing in 1990s. A 
considerable part of this rapid growth was concentrated in a small number of semi-peripheral 
countries. These included Latin America (mainly Brazil and Mexico), which emerged from 
the stagnation of the 1980s. The geographical spread of vehicle output and sales in developing 
countries has not been accompanied by a spread of ownership in the assembly sector. 
Globally, the auto industry remained concentrated, with a small number of companies 
accounting for a significant share of production and sales (Humphrey, et al, 2005).  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the changes of the automobile industry are characterised by 
increasing market fragmentation, long-term changes in demand and a highly cyclical market. 
In the beginning of the 1990s global suppliers achieved a prominent role as design, production 
and FDIs has become more and more their responsibility. Although suppliers hold stronger 
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power over GVCs now, the fragmentation of power ensures that leading automakers are on 
the top of shaping GVCs globally (Dickens, 2010: 337). 
To increase profits, an increase in the economies of scale, standardization of car models 
around the globe needed to be the main aim of global car producers. As the costs for design 
and engineering build the major part of the total production costs, platforms have been 
established to design standardized car parts, used for a variety of car models. For example, 
Volkswagen and PSA are using the same platform for different car brands within the 
company. With the platform strategy, spare parts have been standardized on a global level, 
costs have been reduced and the speed of new model development has been accelerated. 
Another advantage of standardization of car models is the reduction of the dependency on 
fluctuations in demand, as the response to changed demand can be handled more easily 
(Humphrey, 2003: 23) 
Graph 2 illustrates the huge shift of car production from the Triads to developing countries in 
the period from 1960s until 2007. 
 
Graph 2: Percentage of world total automobile production 
 
Source: OICA statistics, 2009 
MNCs enjoy several advantages in their investment strategies, in comparison to national 
companies. For instance, they can better spread the risk of losing profit gains, as being active 
on a global level and therefore less dependent on the development of a single nation. MNC 
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have better access to the global finance market and therefore finance investments at a lower 
interest rate and moreover have the buffer to strengthen its global market position, to 
eliminate competitors. MNC’s subsidiaries further have better access to the latest technology 
and are better positioned in competition, as global sourcing significantly reduced production 
costs (Bielschowsky, 1992: 18) 
Although the production of cars in peripheral countries heavily increased, as shown in Graph 
3, sales of cars declined during the so called “East Asian crisis”. Between 1997 and 1998 the 
capitalist crisis in East Asia caused a recession of economies of the semi-periphery, with a 
considerable decline in car sales, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Forecasts and outcomes of growth in vehicle sales in emerging market region, 
1996 – 1998 in percentage 
Country or region Forecast growth 
1996 - 1998 
Outcome 1996 - 1998 
ASEAN + 10    - 68,5 
Argentina + 10 + 21,0 
Brazil + 14 - 11,4 
China + 22 + 10,7 
India + 38 - 25,3 
Central Europe + 29 + 23,6 
Mexico + 75 + 93,5 
(Source: Humphrey, 2003: 4) 
Table 6 shows the declining trend during the crisis. The forecasted growth for the Brazilian 
automobile market (+14 per cent) did not realise at all. The outcome of sales even declined, 
compared to the base year 1996 (- 11.4 per cent). The capitalist crisis of South East Asia and 
Russia affected Brazil’s economy 1998 because of its dependence on foreign capital, which 
was possible due to the liberalisation government of FHC, who shifted the Brazilian economy 
into neo-dependency. To avoid a “flight of capital”, the already high interest rates were 
increased again, which benefited financial capitalist and therefore had a negative influence on 
productive investments, consumption power and an explosion of public debt increase from 
32,8 per cent (1997) to 56 per cent (2002) (Becker, et al., 2010).  
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2.2 GVC impact and shifts in Brazil’s environment 
The focused time period of this chapter can be labelled as the one of trade liberalisation in 
Brazil and many other countries of the semi-periphery and periphery. Due to the impact of the 
“lost decade” (1980s), the Brazilian state has been internationally pushed to deregulation of 
its market as an answer to the debt crisis of the country. Neo-liberalisation measures such as 
privatization, deregulation, “flexibilisation” and outsourcing were increased, which put the 
Brazilian economy strongly in international competition (Leubolt, Auinger, 2011).  
Liberalisation of structure was on the top of the political agenda of the president Fernando 
Collor de Mello’s (1990 – 1992), continued by Itamar Franco (1992 – 1994) and peaked out 
with the president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 – 2002). Brazil’s economy was thrown 
into the global competition, with the effect of growing investments of MNC, attracted by 
liberalisation of markets in the semi-periphery. Through the inflow of FDI, productivity, 
growth and unemployment rate were increased, but came together with privatization and 
transition to a more flexible labour market (Jakobsen, Freitas Barbosa, 2008).  
In order to understand industrial restructuring and territorial development at a regional scale, 
stabilization of Brazil’s currency (Real, R$) and hence reduction of inflation need to be taken 
into consideration. As the hyper-inflation in the 1980s dramatically intensified the poverty, 
“Plano Real” became a popular intervention in 1994, to lower inflation rates. “Plano Real” 
has been developed and implemented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in his role of finance 
minister at that time and signifies a set of economic interventions. The stabilization of 
inflation rates positively affected consumption power and led to an economic growth. 
Inflation decreased from a monthly rate of 50 per cent in June 1994 to 6 per cent in July, 
which made FHC a popular politician, as inflation affected Brazil’s population most. As 
interest rates remained extremely high, financial investments became more and more 
profitable than investments in production. To balance out the negative foreign account, 
privatization was facilitated to attract inflow of FDI especially between 1996 and 2000 
(Leubolt, Auinger, 2011). Cardoso’s political agenda resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
dependency of Brazil’s economy on multinationals and financial institutions originating from 
core countries. Scientists, such as Geisa Maria Rocha, are interpreting the government of 
Cardoso as a period, where Brazil’s economy has been pushed into a “neo-dependency”. 
While inflation decreased, imports increased by 52.7 per cent in the second half of 1994, due 
to the over evaluated Real (Rocha, 2002: 7).  
Brazil’s trade deficit increased from 1995 until 2000, which was a negative result of Plano 
Real. Imports automatically became more competitive, whereas exports became less. To 
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reduce the growing trade deficit, more foreign capital was aimed to attract, which ended in a 
flight of foreign capital, as domestic investments and consumer demand heavily decreased. 
Brazil’s economy came into a recession, with increasing unemployment and poverty and 
consequently an increase in the already high inequality of wealth.  
FHC’s creation of a neo-dependency of Brazil’s economy through neo-liberal reforms, such 
as the strong aim to attract FDIs, led to a weakening of domestic production with an industrial 
de-growth in 1998 (-1.4 per cent) and in 1999 (-1.6 per cent). As car industry is one of the 
most influential sectors of Brazil’s economy, the impact has been massive unemployment in 
urban areas. Further the increase of taxes from 28 per cent of the GDP in 1995 to 34 percent 
in 2001. While direct taxation negatively affected the working class, indirect taxation 
weakened nationally produced commodities in Brazil and abroad (Rocha, 2002: 12-7).  
Table 7 illustrates the dramatically increase of FDIs from 1994 until 2001 and a sharp decline 
in 2002, as explained above. 
Table 7: Brazil: FDI inflows 1990 – 2002 (billions of US dollars) 
Years Total inflows 
Net 
Participation in 
Privatization (% of 
inflows) 
Financing of 
current account 
(% of inflows) 
1990 0.6 - - 
1991 0.6 - - 
1992 1.4 - - 
1993 0.7 - 120.6 
1994 1.8 - 116.8 
1995 3.9 - 24.0 
1996 9.6 2.3 43.1 
1997 17.8 5.2 51.1 
1998 26.3 6.1 77.0 
1999 29.9 8.7 119.7 
2000 30.5 7.0 123.9 
2001 22.6 1.0 107.6 
2002 6.6 0.2 81.0 
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Relatório Annual, 1995 – 2000, Figures for current account 
financing are from SOBEET, www.sobeet.com.br 
The table below shows the average number of strikes in the 1990s. The increasing 
liberalisation of Brazil’s economy in the 1990s caused growing unemployment. Declining 
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number of employment and hyperinflation weakened the power of unions, which can be 
clearly seen in the declining number of strikes. 
 
Table 8: Number of average strike per year in Brazil of 1990s 
Period Political situation Average number of 
strikes per year 
1990 -1992 Presidency of Collor and impeachment, strike 
for more democracy 
1.126 
1993 - 1994 Presidency of Itamar, start of Plano Real 842 
1995 - 1998 Presidency of FHC 865 
1999 - 2002 2
nd
 presidency of FHC 440 
Source: Noronha, 2009 
The increase of FDIs can be related to the liberalisation of the Brazilian economy. Especially 
during the presidency of FHC, liberalisation of the car industry significantly increased, MNC 
of car manufacturer heavily increased its production capacity in Brazil. Those developments 
weakened the national and regional power of workers during the last decade of the 20
th
 
century.  
In the following chapter the evolution of Brazil’s car industry and impact on metal workers 
will be discussed in detail.  
 
2.2.1 Car Industry Production in Brazil 
In so called “emerging markets”, such as the Brazilian one, production and sale in those 
markets increased rapidly in the mid of the 1990s, as the MNCs seeking for geographical 
fixes to compensate stagnating sales in the Triads. In the aim to attract FDIs and modernize 
national production technology, state-led incentives have been created to attract FDI. The 
hegemony of neoliberal ideas from the core countries has reduced the role of the state 
intervention in economy and led to reduction of public investment in social policies. Before 
the 1990ies, the Brazilian industry was locally more complete in its product supply chain and 
metal workers’ union stronger. Most of the vehicle cycles of growth were absorbed by the 
domestic industry and less by exports (DIESSE, 2015).  
 
Quantitative restrictions were eliminated in 1991, but tariffs on vehicle imports remained 
high, especially in the second half of the 1990s, in the view of liberals. State policies led to an 
increased production expansion of multinational car companies in Brazil, as import of cars 
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and components could be imported to Brazil at reduced rates (Humphrey, 2003, p.128). In 
1995, a Brazilian automobile regime was set up to modernize industrial areas, accelerate 
investment and to increase external competitiveness in that sector. Multinational car 
companies who already entered the Brazilian market expanded their production and new 
global competitors (eg. South Korea, China) arrived.  
 
Table 9: Brazil: Automobile Production and Sales 1990 – 1998 (units) 
Source: ANFAVEA, 2000 
Table 9 shows the development of production, exports, imports and employees engaged in the 
car production. While production steadily increased until 1997, imports increased relatively 
more compared to exports. This can be related to the reduction of import tariffs on cars. Table 
9 further shows on one hand, that domestic production mainly served the domestic market. On 
the other hand, productivity increased by comparing the number of production with the 
number of employees in that period. The main reasons for the rapid growth of output and 
sales was the integration in the regional car market within MERCOSUR
5
 (Laplane, Sarti, 
2000). 
With the Economic Complementation Agreement, signed between Argentina and Brazil, 
regional trade was aimed to be strengthened through elimination of tariffs between those two 
countries (signing the MERCOSUR Agreement in 1995, limitation of trade liberalisation for 
vehicles and development of similar policies). Consequently, the trade between those national 
economies increased from USD 18 million (1990) to over USD 1 billion (1996). 
The trade agreement between Argentina and Brazil resulted in the establishment of regional 
car production and division of labour engaged in production of components and vehicles. The 
                                                 
5
  Mercosur or Mercosul (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur, Portuguese: Mercado Comum do Sul, 
Guarani: Ñemby Ñemuha, Southern Common Market) is a sub-regional bloc. Its full members are Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Its associate countries are Chile, Peru, Colombia and 
Ecuador. Observer countries are New Zealand and Mexico. 
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external tariffs and protection was much higher for vehicles compared to other commodities 
(Humphrey, 2003: 22). This shows the importance the automobile industry was given by the 
governments of Argentina and Brazil. Table 10 illustrates the significant growth of 
automotive trade in the first half of the 1990s.  
Table 10: Automotive trade between Argentina and Brazil (1990 and 1996) 
Product Year From Brazil to Argentina From Argentina to Brazil 
  Value USD million Share % Value USD million Share 
Cars 1990 16,0 3,9 1,8 10,2 
 1996 334,1 54,0 766,1 95,3 
      
Spare Parts 1990 43,9 8,2 51,1 40,1 
 1996 534,8 41,0 273,5 77,2 
Source: Humphrey, Memedovic, 2003: 22 
Nevertheless, the developing regional division of labour within MERCOSUR was 
undermined by exchange rate instability in the latter part of the 1990s. The exchange rate of 
the Brazilian currency is managed by its Central Bank. A steady devaluation of the Brazilian 
Real in the latter part of the 1990s was followed by an exchange rate crisis and a sharp 
devaluation in 1999. This devaluation disrupted the basis of the division of labour within 
MERCOSUR, making Argentina’s components production, in particular, uneconomic. 
Laplane and Sarti stated the following: “The number of cars and light commercial vehicles 
imported from Argentina decreased by 49 per cent, as a result of the drop in demand and as a 
result of higher prices with Brazilian Real value”. While automotive trade between the two 
countries has been managed by the two governments to limit imbalances, plants at the 
company level for regional integration were severely undermined. The devaluation of the 
Argentine currency in 2001 did not resolve the problem. While it made Argentina’s exports to 
Brazil more competitive, it severely disrupted the domestic economy and led to a sharp 
decline in automotive production (Humphrey, Memedovic, 2003). 
 
Table 11: Recovery and stagnation of vehicle sales in selected emerging markets, 
1996/1997 – 2001 (percentage) 
Country Base year 2001 sales in relation to base year 
Argentina 1997 - 58,6 
Brazil 1997 - 18,2 
India 1996 - 1997 + 4,7 
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Mexico 1994 + 55,8 
Thailand 1996 - 49,4 
Source: Humphrey, Memedovic, 2003: 5 
Market liberalisation was followed by an increased production capacity of MNC car 
companies as well as to a horizontal reorganisation of global production chains. This can be 
visualized further through the rise of MNC first tier companies on a global level (Humphrey, 
2003) as well as the geographic shifts and reduction of first tier companies. The number of 
part suppliers in Brazil was reduced from 2,500 to 300 companies during the decade of 1990 
(DIESSE, 2015). Analyses of automotive trade for Brazil show that the leading vehicle 
producers are involved in a complex division of labour that stretches far beyond the region. 
Vehicles and components are flowing within the region in both directions. This shows just 
how complex the international division of labour has become. 
Graph 3 pictures the steady increase of car production in Brazil from 1985 until 1997. The 
impact of the East Asian crisis becomes visible in the chart between 1997 and 1999, where 
production significantly decreased.  
Graph 3: Total units of car production in Brazil (1985 – 2010) 
Source: ANFAVEA, 2015 
Given the heterogeneity of automotive strategies implemented in the Mercosur, it will be 
extremely difficult to identify and compare global and regional strategies across different 
assemblers. Therefore, the GVC analysis will be focused on the assembler of Volkswagen in 
Brazil that had clear ambitions to achieve regional integration and globalization of production 
in Brazil. 
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For giving an overview on the increased FDIs of AMNC, the following table informs about 
the production of new car models in Brazil in the course of the 1990s: 
 
Table 12: Car models produced in Brazil in 1990s 
Year Car model AMNC 
1990 Uno Mille  Fiat 
1991 Tempra  Fiat 
1991 Versailles Ford 
1991 Elba Weekend Fiat 
1992 Uno Mille Brio Fiat 
1992 Omega Chevrolet 
1992 Uno Mille Electronic Fiat 
1993 Logus Volkswagen 
1993 Tipo Fiat 
1994 Uno Turbo Fiat 
1994 Uno Mille ELX Fiat 
1995 Pick-up Trekking Fiat 
1996  Palio Fiat 
1996 Ford Fiesta Ford 
1997 Palio Weekend Fiat 
1997 Ka Ford 
1998 Marea Fiat 
1998 Corolla Toyota 
1999 Strada Cabine Estandida Fiat 
1999 Palio Adventure Fiat 
1999 Palio Weekend Fiat 
1999 Brava Fiat 
1999 Palio Citymatic Fiat 
1999 Renault Clio Renault 
Source: Just-auto.com, 2012 
Although most of the new car models were introduced by Fiat, Volks remained the car 
leading company, due to its success with the car model Volkswagen Fusca (1970s) and VW 
Gol (1980s), also known as the “carro popular” (car for the people). Volks aimed to remain 
its market leading position in Brazil and therefore designed strategies for this market, as new 
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market entrants (eg. Hyundai, Honda) challenged their market share. The most important 
competitors for Volks since 1994 are GM, Fiat and Ford.  
 
2.3 Strategy of Volkswagen do Brazil 
The reorganisation of the GVC further affected the areas of design and procurement. The 
main shift was the integration of first and second tier in the car model design process and re-
location of first and second-tier directly to the factory of the MNC.  
Since the 1990s a strategic aim of Volkswagen Ltd. has been the fortification of its suppliers 
on a global level. “Global sourcing” means a constant control of prices on a global level, 
seeking for the purchase cost reduction. Moreover, the so-called “Forward Sourcing” signifies 
the aim to reduce time and costs, through the early integration of tier suppliers in the 
designing process. In 1993 Volkswagen Inc. signed off a factory agreement, which clearly 
defines the steps of contract evaluation and the participation of the works council in the 
selection of suppliers to ensure and control working conditions of those workers and quality 
of delivered spare parts. This agreement was signed to empower the rank-and-file to 
participate in the decision making process of product design and the contracted tiers. The 
factory agreement aims to ensure that contracts with first-tier suppliers are realistic and new 
production methods are based on “real” innovations (Speidel, 2005: 117). This step should 
ensure, that reliable tier-suppliers are contracted to ensure the production flow and limit 
potential negative effects on Volkswagen workers.  
Volkswagen Inc. new market strategy included the global introduction of the new platform 
strategy, as briefly described in Chapter 1, and decentralisation strategy, but did not extend 
the limited autonomy of Volks. In Brazil, Volkswagen Inc. benefitted from the “fiscal war” 
(guerra fiscal), which made new investments in other regions of Brazil, than São Paulo, more 
attractive from a cost point of view.  
As all MNC in the global car market, Volkswagen implemented the Toyotism-model of 
production organisation in the 1990s, which has been relatively late. The reorganisation of its 
international production and value chains were the main aims for restructuring as well as 
division of labour within the MNC. The Volkswagen factory in Resende has been 
established in 1996, exactly under the condition of regional-cluster modular production, 
equipped with latest technology. This means, that several companies share one factory. These 
conditions allowed a shortening of product-life-cycles, with the aim of a quicker amortisation 
of investments (Speidel, 2005: 103). Since the beginning of 1990s the internationalisation of 
Volkswagen Ltd became very clear. In 1993 the production in foreign countries counted for 
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53 per cent of the total production volume, which was the first time that fewer cars have been 
produced in Europe. Between 1991 and 2000 the employment abroad increased: about 50 per 
cent of Volkswagen workers on a global level were employed in peripheral countries.  
The internationalisation of production of Volkswagen was pushed by its crisis in 1992/93. 
The crisis of Volkswagen was not mainly caused by the stagnating number of sales on the 
international market, but more the absence of technological structural adaptation. In 1993 the 
global produced volume of Volkswagen decreased by 15 per cent, a loss of 2 billion 
“Deutsche Mark” (Germany’s currency before the launch of the Euro) due to delayed 
technological adaptation of factories. The consequence of the loss has been the reduction of 
20,000 jobs. The newly appointed Volkswagen chairman of the board, Ferdinand Piëch
6
, 
evaluated the lack of economies of scale, low productivity and high production costs and 
complicated production flows as reasons for Volkswagen’s loss (Haipeter, 2000: 317). Piëch 
main aims for a reorganisation contained the introduction of low hierarchies, decentralisation 
of competencies, global supply chain redesign and acceleration of and more flexible product 
design process (Speidel, 2005 105-106). The need for a technological fix for Volkswagen Inc. 
was clear and has been started in 1994 on a global level as the following table shows.  
 
Table 13: Annual reports of Volkswagen Inc 
 Production 
(thousand) 
Employment 
(thousand) 
Net sales in Mio 
(German 
Demark) 
Operating 
Profit 
Investment (mio 
German 
Demark) 
1980 2.574 258 33.288 321 4.279 
1990 3.058 261 68.061 1.086 5.372 
1991 3.238 277 76.315 1.114 9.910 
1992 3.500 273 85.403 147 9.254 
1993 3.019 253 76.586 -1.940 4.840 
1994 3.042 238 80.041 150 5.651 
1995 3.595 257 88119 336 6.863 
1996 3.977 261 100.123 678 8.742 
1997 4.291 275 113.245 1361 9.843 
(Haipeter, 2000: 97) 
                                                 
6
  Ferdinand Piëch is an Austrian oligarch, who founded the Porsche Ltd. Volkswagen was founded by 
the Nazi regime, with instruction of Porsche Ltd to design a car for the masses. Porsche holds the majority of 
Volkswagen Inc. shares and is integrated in the Volkswagen MNC. 
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Table 13 shows relevant indicators of Volkswagen Inc. in the 1990s in relation to the year 
1980. While production almost doubled, employment only increased slightly. The 
Volkswagen crisis can be seen by looking at the operating profit from 1992 – 1994. In this 
time period a heavy decrease can be observed. Investments reached its lowest level in 1993. 
The rush for investment, implemented mainly in developing countries boosted in 1994. Since 
then an upward trend can be seen, by reaching again profits, investments and number of 
produced cars in 1997.  
In the late 1990s it was not only Volkswagen Inc., but also Fiat, Ford and GM that invested in 
the expansion of production capacity in Brazil, due to the increasing liberalisation of the 
market and state incentives for construction of new factories. Volkswagen Inc. constructed 3 
new factories between 1996 and 1999. The bigger newly-built factories, Resende and São 
José dos Pinhais, have been constructed in other regions, than the metal workers’ stronghold 
of São Paulo.  
Table 14: Factories of “Volks” in Brazil 
Year of establishment State Location of Factory 
1957 São Paulo São Bernardo do Campo, Anchieta 
1976 São Paulo Taubaté 
1996 Rio de Janeiro Resende 
1996 São Paulo São Carlos 
1999 Paraná São José dos Pinhais 
Source: CNM, 2016 
The decision of Volkswagen Inc. on the location of Volks new factories in Brazil has been 
manifold: the main portion of investments since 1996 have been implemented in “emerging 
markets”, such as Brazil. These newly built factories have been planned as a part of a regional 
cluster, in which tier-suppliers have been included from the very beginning. Further, the 
factories were equipped with the latest production technology. Therefore, the productivity of 
the oldest factory in Anchieta has been put under pressure. The choice of industrial location 
within Brazil has been further motivated by state-led incentives (fiscal war) and selection of 
states where workers appeared to be less organised and the wage levels are lower than in 
Anchieta.  
The realization of geographical and technological fixes by Volkswagen’s management 
resulted in massive layoffs of Anchieta factory workers and led unions to bundle their efforts 
on defending workers’ jobs. The number of workers employed in the factory of Anchieta 
dropped from 40,000 in 1978 to 26,000 in 1996, and the number was expected to continue to 
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drop further as Volkswagen simultaneously built new plants in “greenfield sites” in Resende 
(Rio State) and São Carlos (Silver, 2003).  
Anchieta factory was constructed for mass consumption according to the Fordist model. As it 
is the oldest factory of Volkswagen Inc. in Brazil, it lacked technological improvements, 
which were instrumental to remain important. In 2002, the opening of the “Novo Anchieta” 
(New Anchieta), due to its modernization and capacity to produce the new car model “Fox”, 
symbolized a milestone for the management of Volks. Investment was mainly focused on 
restructuring, installation of robots an automated painting.  
Nevertheless, the massive layoffs caused consequently a drop of memberships of CNM for 
the ABC region. CNM memberships dropped from 202,000 in 1987 to 150,000 in 1992 and 
130,000 in 1996 (DIESSE, 2015). The metal workers’ union has been weakened in its 
influence and hit by a wave of liberalisation measures.  
 
2.4 Metalworkers’ trade union and labour unrest 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the military dictatorship was ended in the mid of 1980s. Strong 
social movements succeeded in signing off the “Citizen’s Constitution” (1988) and the legal 
formation of leftist trade unions increased. Although a new Constitution was signed in 1988 
and social movements gained a powerful impact on Brazil’s society, the internationalisation 
of the country through deregulation and liberalization of the economy integrated Brazil 
strongly in global value chains and subsequently limited the power of trade unions (Jakobsen, 
de Freitas Barbosa, 2008, p 115 – 7). 
Especially the industrial sector was re-shaped through liberal economic reforms and high 
technological adjustment costs. The re-shaping included the removal of import barriers, 
introduction of sectoral policies and provision of state-led financial incentives to attract FDIs 
(eg: subsidies, tax exemptions and loans at low-interest rates). On one hand, the 
modernization of the national industrial sector has been realized, but on the other hand the 
metal workers’ union has been put under pressure.  
MNC reorganised their process and product linkages, which enabled them to increase 
outsourcing and simplify assembly operations (Bielschowsky, 1992: 18).  
The metalworkers of the ABC region were undermined, as new investments were realized in 
other regions of Brazil, where labour is less organised and state incentives for MNCs increase 
profitability. Graph 4 shows the geographical shift of labour unrest in the car industry. Until 
1970ies strike activities mainly occurred in the Triad and increased heavily in semi-peripheral 
countries since the 1980ies (Silver, 2003: 43). 
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Graph 4: Geographical distribution of labour unrest mentions, automobile industry, 
1930 - 1996 
 
Source: Source: Source: Silver, 2003: 43 
In the last 2 decades of the 20
th
 century “Toyotism” or the Post-Fordist car production 
method, “lean production” became a global model for car production. As already outlined in 
Chapter 1, the main aim of “lean production” has been cost cutting measures and achieving 
higher profit margins. This model in its origin model included an “employment security 
provision”, which was not applied globally and led to a negative impact on worker’s 
bargaining power (Silver, 2003: 4). The exclusion of an employment security provision 
limited the motivation of workers to contribute to the constant improvement of production 
processes, which was the main idea of the lean-production model. Beverly Silver argues, that 
the profit-maximizing measures of leading automobile producing MNCs (AMNC) and at the 
same time requesting active cooperation of their workers are causing increased geographical 
arrangement of their labour force, divide along the core versus periphery. AMNC had to 
realize with the upsurge of militant labour movements in the Brazilian car industry, that the 
geographical shift to peripheral countries and the end of a product cycle increased labour 
unrest.  
The Japanese “lean production” model put pressure on car producers in the other Triad 
countries and resulted in the adoption of the “lean-production” model and in a stronger focus 
of technological fixes of the latter, in regaining control over workers due to division between 
“core workers” and “precarious workers” with the aim to increase profit rates. While “core 
workers” are granted job security and better salaries, “precarious workers” face job insecurity 
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through atypical contracts. Therefore, a transition to flexible working hours, just-in-time 
production, quality circles and outsourcing were introduced on a global level. In distinction to 
the Japanese model, the Triads did not offer any job security to their workers in semi-
peripheral countries. This disapproved the idea of cooperative work for quality and process 
improvement for workers. Thus the downgraded “lean production” model should be better 
named as “lean and mean” model. The latter was broadly implemented in the production 
system of MNC in the 1990ies (Silver, 2003, p 66-7).  
Silver describes the “lean and dual” model as a Post-“Toyotist”-model, as job stability is 
offered to a core group of workers, while a pool for workers with worse and unstable working 
conditions is held by MNCs. Silver emphasizes the differences between “lean and mean” and 
“lean and dual” as key to understand the causes of labour unrest in the car industry within the 
recent decades (Silver, 2003, p 67 – 68). 
The technological fix of the “lean and mean” model has not succeeded in avoiding labour 
unrest, as no job security was offered which led to high turnover rates, big strikes and massive 
job reduction. Further the vulnerability of “just-in-time” production had no negative impact 
on the bargaining power of labour, as production flows are strongly dependent on each other.  
The “lean and dual” model in comparison, led to much less labour unrest as job security was 
guaranteed only to key labour, which was therefore motivated and committed to realize a 
“lean production”. At the same time less privileged workers faced flexible working 
conditions, which did not require employers to fire them (Silver, 2003, p 68-9). 
Realizing the limitations of the “lean and mean” model, MNC shifted to the adoption of the 
“lean and dual” model. With work force from the reserve army of labour were mainly 
employed in a subcontracted low-tier firms (female and rural workers) in low-wage countries 
and upper-tier workers employed with “part-time” or “temporary” labour contracts. The core 
labour force was held loyal, due to their importance of ensuring a lean production. This led to 
a labour market dualism (Silver, 2003, p 69).  
 
As already mentioned, the ABC Region in São Paulo state is the oldest and biggest hub of car 
production in Brazil until nowadays. Therefore, the case of the Volkswagen plant in Anchieta, 
São Bernardo do Campo, is taken as a case for this thesis to analyse the changes of working 
conditions and the strategies of trade unions to protect their workers  
The Trade Union Confederation for Metalworkers “Confederação dos trabalhadores 
metalùrgicos” (CNM affiliated to the Central Union of Workers in Brazil “CUT”) has a long 
and successful experience in collective industrial action. CNM was officially founded in 1989 
72 
 
 
 
(CNM, 2016). The main aim was to unify the metalworkers of all regions in Brazil to better 
react and coordinate struggles and represent the workers in institutional bodies of Brazil as 
well as on an international level. The confederation seeks for class solidarity and equal rights 
and conditions of all metalworkers, independent of race or gender. A core duty of CNM is its 
influential role of Brazil’s industrial policies, improvement of workers’ rights and organizing 
joint actions and supporting rank and file unions (Cardoso et all, 2014). 
According to CNM/CUT’s definition, the metallurgy branch covers all activities that include 
the converting process of physical, chemical and biological materials as well as “substances 
(agricultural, forestry, mining) and components in order to obtain new products” (CNM, 
2016). The branch is divided into the segment of steel and basic metallurgy, electrical and 
electronic, aerospace and defence, naval, capital goods, automotive and other transportation 
means. The industrial activity in Brazil is concentrated in São Paulo state (43.5%), which has 
the oldest industrial area of Brazil, the ABC region (Cardoso, et al, 2014).  
The car production in Brazil mainly serves its domestic market, which is one of the largest in 
the world (globally ranked on 4
th
 place). Nevertheless, Brazil’s car market has a potential to 
grow, as many Brazilians do not own a car. The growing number of imports of auto parts and 
accessories caused a negative impact on Brazil’s foreign trade balance, as only 8.3 % of sales 
revenues are exports.  
While MNCs reorganised their production and expanded their car production capacity in 
Brazil, the number of workers was relatively decreasing. Tertiarisation created a 
fragmentation of workers in the automobile GVC as well as changed working conditions. The 
changed shape of production networks required new trade union strategies to protect the 
workers in the metal sector.  
 
The political democratisation in the 1980s changed working relationships through increased 
autonomy for trade unions and companies, but the corporatist idea and structure remained. At 
the beginning of the 1990s trade unions participated in sectoral chambers (Câmaras 
Setorais), which have been introduced at the end of president Sarney’s government, who was 
in power from 1985 - 1990. In the first place the sectoral chambers were used by companies 
to increase pressure on the government. The new set up of the chambers in participation of 
trade unions realised to include social dialogue. The most important chamber has been the 
one for the car industry, as it has been the most important sector for Brazil’s economy and 
the innovative agreements (acordos das montadoras) showed the potential of a neo-
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corporatist
7
 arrangement in the democratisation of Brazil’s industrial relations. The so-called 
“agreements of factories of car companies” were a result of the bargaining process taking 
place in the chamber and had a significant impact on Brazil’s economy. With the agreements 
the needed environment for a higher production and sale in the car industry has been 
established, through modernisation, increase of wages and short-term protection of jobs 
(Bresciani, Benites: 1995). 
The establishment of sectoral chambers led to a changed behaviour of factories’ management 
board of MNC regarding the distribution of information regarding economic and organisation 
with the factory committees (Comissões de Fábrica) and the trade unions. Although the 
sectoral chamber achieved progresses, they were not lasting for a long time, as already 
mentioned. Since 1995 the regular meetings were not taking place anymore, due to the lack of 
interest of most MNCs’ employers. The chambers were not only established because of the 
liberalisation of Brazil, but were as well influenced by its political situation. As Lula da Silva 
went for presidential election in 1994, with good chances to win, companies feared a potential 
left-wing government and therefore showed more will for collaboration with Brazil’s’ 
workers. With the dissolution of the sectoral chambers the chances of politically restructuring 
of company’s engagement in employment policies ceased. Nevertheless, a national discussion 
about the need for forums for labour relationships has been intensified.  
Increased competition between producers of the Triad countries resulted in a higher market 
concentration of those in peripheral markets. New investments of MNC in Brazil declined 
from 1987 until 1995. After the election of FH Cardoso in 1994 the implementation of liberal 
politics and facilitation of foreign investment began to grow again, but was flowing into other 
areas of Brazil, then the ABC region, in order to avoid the strong metal-workers’ union of the 
ABC region. Brazil’s different states were put into competition with each other and tried to 
attract FDI through reduced tax payment (“Guerra fiscal”) as well as the payment of 
governmental subsidies. Consequently, new investments went to other states of Brazil and led 
to massive layoffs in the ABC region. While Volkswagen built new factories in Rio de 
Janeiro State and São Carlos in the State of São Paulo, the employment in the older factory of 
Anchieta was reduced from 40,000 (1978) to 26,000 (1996). Consequently, the union 
membership in the ABC region dropped from 202,000 (1987) to 130,000 in 1996 (DIESSE, 
2015: 22). 
                                                 
7
  Neo-corporatism focus on the participation of organised social groups in the development of the state 
policies. In difference to the model of pluralism the big organisations are not focussed on putting pressure on 
government and companies, but on participating in decision making processes.  
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Graph 5 below shows the steady decline of employees engaged in the car industry in Brazil 
since the 1980s until 2003. While over 120.000 employees worked in the car industry in 1985 
only 80.000 employees remained employed in 2002. While employment in the car industry 
showed a declining trend in the 1990s, the car production shows a steady increase. 
Liberalisation of the car industry led to increased production and access to technological 
innovations in car industry in Brazil, which consequently increased the productivity of 
Volkswagens’ factories.  
 
Graph 5: Employment in the Brazilian Car Industry (1985 – 2003) 
 
Source: ANFAVEA, 2015 
 
Table 15 displays macroeconomic indicators of Brazil in the first half of the 1990s. The trend 
shown is a strong fluctuation in GDP growth and tremendously high percentages of annual 
inflation. The number of strikes declined in the 1990s in comparison to the 1980s, which 
shows the internal crisis of CUT to mobilize workers at the shop floor level, as well as the 
impact of the GVC shifts.  
 
Table 15: Macroeconomic Indicators Brazil, 1989 - 1994 
Year GDP Inflation (annual 
%) 
Real Urban Wages 
(1982 = 100) 
Unemployment Strikes 
1989 3.2 1,783 88 4.5 3,943 
1990 - 4.4 1,477 75 4.4 2,357 
1991 0.2 480 75 6.4 1,349 
1992 - 0.8 1,158 76 6.8 557 
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1993 4. 2,709 82 6.3 653 
1994 5.8 910 83 6.3 1,034 
Source: Sluyter-Betrão, 2010: 282 
To accelerate the modernisation of the local industry, tariffs have been drastically reduced and 
governmental subsidies have been issued to strengthen restructuring. Working class has been 
more divided, as CUT’s rank-and-file workers were shifted from state-regulated jobs to the 
informal sector and therefore could not be protected by CUT anymore. „The CUT has been so 
slow to organize on the shop floor and it is not easy to build workers’ support there now, 
because the bosses often appear to be more democratic than unions“, said José Maria 
Almeida, board member of CUT. During the economic recession labour movements hardly 
had the power to influence political decisions on the economy. CUT union leaders feared the 
factory commissions, as the latter had much more power inside the factories. Therefore, less 
factory commissions have been established in Brazil to minimize critics on CUT (Sluyter-
Beltrão, 2010, 282-3).  
Trade union strategies have been changed due to the presidency of Collor. The focus has 
shifted from grassroots mobilisation to lobbying for workers’ interests with governmental 
institutions: 
 
New three front strategy, February 1990 
1) Organize rank-and-file workers 
2) Mobilize society via broad social alliances 
3) Pressure congress to block anti-labour measures 
 
Re-designed strategy, March 1990 
1) Pressure government through state-labour dialogue 
2) Pressure congress to block anti-labour measures 
3) Pressure judiciary to block anti-labour measures 
(Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 297) 
The new strategy has been presented in March 1990, presented in the newspaper “Estado de 
São Paulo” and shows a significant shift from CUT’s combative strategy, as presented in 
February 1990 in the Brazilian newspaper “Folha de São Paulo”, to a rather defensive 
strategy. CUT’s left minority reacted strongly against the strategic shift, as they characterised 
it as a capitulation to mainstream political society’s and abandon of class-based unionism and 
social transformation. CUT transformed to a mainstream public interest group strategically 
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focused on the promotion of social and political reforms. In 1991, the congress of MWU-
ABC was prepared to aggressively challenge the left minority factions. Statutory changes, 
decided at CONCUT III has weakened the union opposition and favoured unions with large 
memberships (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 297). 
CUT shifted to a defensive strategy and tried to show their flexibility to employers, due to the 
fear of losing out more and more jobs. The first consensual proposal between capital and 
labour has been agreed in April 1990 in response to a government austerity package that had 
provoked the shut-down of Brazil’s automotive assembly lines. The fight against the 
worsening working conditions due to economic recession was bringing together all 3 labour 
centrals and a broad variety of professional associations and leading industrial employers. The 
agreement placed CUT side by side with the „Business Unionism” or so-called “Result 
Unionism”, represented by Força Sindical together with an important new association, the 
PNBE (Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresas).  
The second half of 1990s was characterised by an intensification of the intra-CUT factional 
conflict. Strategic manoeuvre as well as contradictory pressures from the government led to 
rivals between Workers Party’s leaders and grassroots support base.  
Additionally, the neoliberal government was able to recruit a new ally: the federal judiciary. 
In the late 1980s the Labour Court had sometimes favoured union positions in its arbitration 
of labour disputes. In 1990 the court shifted its posture by playing a critical role by declaring 
major strikes abusive. Employers no longer needed to negotiate, as the court took decisions 
more in their favour (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010: 297-305). 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva went for presidency election against Fernando Collor de Mello in 
1989, but could not achieve the majority of votes. Collor was the first democratically elected 
president and tried to fight hyperinflation with the so-called “Collor Plan”, which did not lead 
to success. Collor got impeached in 1992 due to cases of corruption and replaced by his vice-
president Itamar Franco’s. His new labour minister, Walter Barelli, had a strong relationship 
with CUT, promoted new public forums in order to reform the state-corporatist labour 
structure. The main aim of Barelli was the promotion of a new national system of collective 
bargaining with the support of CUT. Unfortunately, the Labour Ministry abandoned the 
reform in 1994 (Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010, 383).  
As mentioned before Volks accepted the election of a factory commission in 1980, but 
neglected the recognition of the independent metalworker union bargaining partner and the 
latter subsequently called for a boycott of the factory committee election. After negotiations 
of 2 days, the committee has been elected. Volks Anchieta’s factory commission consist of 21 
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workers and 4 employees, who are elected in a secret ballot, have a mandate for 3 years and 
are released from work to fulfil their mandate. The existing CIPA has been integrated in the 
factory commission. Therefore, the latter is also in charge for health and safety of workers. 
The factory fabric commission has the following rights: 
- Information on the introduction of new technologies; 
- Participation in the introduction of new organisation of work; 
- Information on planned outsourcing and sub-contracting; 
- Information on salary structure and job promotion; 
- Profit share of workers; 
- Transition to flexible working hours; 
- Reduction of working hours to safe jobs; 
- Programmes for advance education for workers and minimum standards for 
educational requirements; 
- Participation in strategical goals. 
Source: Schultz-Côrtes, 2007: 171 
Since 1999 a trade union committee (Comitê Sindical de Empresa, CSE) has been founded 
parallel to the factory commission for workers of “Volks do Anchieta”. They have the same 
function as factory committees and their activities are regulated by company-level 
agreements. However, only union members may participate in CSE elections. CSE are not 
defined in any law and therefore have no rights to protect workers.  
At the beginning of the 1990s the relationship between workers and management of Volks 
Anchieta has been influenced by the establishment of Autolatina
8
 and the establishment of 
sectoral chambers. The collaboration between workers of Ford and Volkswagen has been 
conflictive due to the different management style of the two companies. In the first half of 
1990s the workers of Autolatina managed to set up joint political strategies with the help of 
the established chamber. Nevertheless, Autolatina was established to cut down costs and 
therefore a huge job reduction has been announced by its management. In 1991 a strike has 
been organised by metalworkers of Volkswagen and Ford against the dismissal of 5,490 
workers of Autolatina. On the 20
th
 of February 1991 the President of Trade Unions met with 
Brazil’s president of the National Congress, the fraction of PT as well as the Minister of 
Economy to discuss the planned layoff. On the 26
th
 of February 1991 the management of 
                                                 
8
  „Autolatina“ names the strategic alliance between Volkswagen and Ford at the end of the 1980s. The 
joint-venture was established due to the effects of the economic recession, with the aim to cut down costs by 
joint usage of platforms. Volkswagen held the majority of shares (51%). The increasing global competition and 
therefore competition and mistrust between Volkswagen and Ford, Autolatina did not bring the expected success 
to stabilize profit rates. Therefore, this Joint Venture was suspended in 1995.  
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Autolatina confirmed the suspension of the planned layoffs and opened up a period of 
volunteering. After the phase of volunteering a number of 1,357 workers has been agreed on 
to be laid off. In April 1991 “ferramenteiros” (“toolmakers”) of Volks claimed for equal 
payment. Due to unsatisfactory offers of Volks management the “ferramenteiros” went on 
strike with the slogan “Salary matters, the rest is in no hurry” (“Salário é o que interessa, o 
resto não tem pressa). The strike went out successful with a wage increase of 20.4% 
(abcdeluta, 1991).  
As graph 5 above shows, unemployment began to increase in 1991 with a loss in real wages 
due to heavy inflation. Nevertheless, the number of strikes began to decrease, which shows 
the pressure on trade union power, caused by tertiarisation, higher unemployment and internal 
crisis. Additionally, Volkswagen Inc.’s internal crisis due to decreased sales and profits 
pushed for the aim to re-organise its GVC, as discussed before. Those developments heavily 
impacted on workers of Volks Anchieta and therefore of Autolatina.  
In 1993, 400 assembly line workers of Autolatina went on strike due to the wage gap in 
relation to other assembly line workers. Due to the stop of some machines, the distribution of 
1,000 cars got delayed. One week later the management of Autolatina confirmed the wage 
gap and agreed on the restructuring of positions and salaries for ending the strike (abcdeluta, 
1991). 
Due to the agreement of modernising Volkswagen Anchieta and the increased trustful 
collaboration between the workers and the management conflicts were significantly reduced 
in this plant. Nevertheless, the re-organisation of production and measures to reduce costs of 
production with global sourcing included a strong reduction of jobs. Major strikes in 1999 and 
2001 followed to fight for social justice, which will be outlined in the following. 
After the formation of the European enterprise works council of Volkswagen in 1990, a 
“World Works Council” (WWC) of all Volkswagen Inc. workers has been founded in May 
1998 at the Volkswagen Inc. worker conference in the Czech Republic in agreement with 
Volkswagen’s board of management. Members of the WWC cover all production sites of 
Volkswagen, except for those, which are partially owned by foreign companies (Joint 
ventures), such as the ones in Portugal and China. The annual meetings of the WWC are 
financed by Volkswagen (IG Metall, 2005). 
The main aim of the WWC consists of the information and consulting on a global level. The 
formation of a worlds’ council is a unique forum for the representation of workers’ interest on 
a global level. This can be connected with Volkswagen Inc.’s management, who are used to 
the German trade union tradition, which has been historically strong (IGMetall, 2005). The 
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works council has proved to be a helpful forum to discuss about management’s strategic 
goals, but the impact of improvement of working conditions was doubted by the interviewees.  
The re-organisation of Volkswagen Ltd.’s GVC the establishment of the platform-strategy, as 
explained above, led to a strong fragmentation of workers and increased dependence of tier 
suppliers on the MNC. Labour conflicts increased, as the fight for aims of workers had 
become more difficult. The following strike can be taken as an example for it, as Luiz 
Marinho described: 
1,500 workers of 9 different companies of the platform consortium, connected with the Volks’ 
factory in Resende (Rio de Janeiro) started a strike in August 1999 for better wages. The 
workers of the platform-consortium are not affiliated to CUT, but with Força Sindical (FS) on 
a regional level. FS was not strongly supporting the strike, but workers heavily pushed them 
to call for a strike. The main claim of the workers in strike has been the adjustment of salaries 
according to the inflation rate for the past 12 months and further increase in wages according 
to the salary levels paid in Volkswagen -Anchieta plant. The salaries in the ABC Region are 
on average the highest in the metal sector of Brazil. For instance, workers of Volks Anchieta 
earned a monthly salary three times higher than the ones of the Volks factory in Resende. This 
was the introduction to a national strike of all automobile workers against the tax war between 
Brazilian states in their fight for regional investments (Sanches, 1999). 
Since 1999, Volkswagen Anchieta has, beside the “comisão de fábrica”, as well a “comite 
sindical de empresa” (CSE), in the size of 23 members. Since 1999, the statues of the CNM 
of the ABC region include the establishment of CSE in each factory, to ensure management 
respect labour regulations. The CSE-members include the representatives of union, who are 
directly elected by union members. Their task is the representation of the union within the 
factory, which is not covered by labour law. Further they are responsible for the submission of 
claims, effect negotiations, and all activities required for collective worker action. CSE 
strengthen the worker representation on the shop-floor level and monitor the alignment with 
factory agreements and collective bargaining contracts. At least one representative of the 
“comisão de fábrica”, should be members of the CSE too, to ensure a collaboration between 
them and better anchoring of the union on a shop-floor level. As labour law does not permit 
the representation of the union on a factory level, CSE is acting without the protection of a 
law. Therefore, after the first years of establishment, CSE has not been officially recognized 
by the management of Volkswagen Anchieta. Only in July 2002, the management accepted 
the collaboration with CSE, but they were not granted a protection from dismissals.  
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Those committees, representing workers, have a strong voice in the factory of Volkswagen 
Anchieta, as 87 per cent of the workers are unionised. This is a much higher level, compared 
to other car factories (São Caetano – 32 per cent; Volvo Curitiba – 25 per cent, Fiat Betim – 
10 per cent) (Schulz-Côrtes, 2007: 84-99). 
In 2001 Volkswagen Inc. management announced the huge reduction of 3,000 jobs, after the 
aim of Volkswagen management to reduce the weekly hours of work was rejected. 
Consequently, the entire workforce of Volks workers, 16,000, went on strike. The trade union 
leader of the ABC region, Luiz Marinho went to Germany to seek for conversations with the 
management of Volkswagen Inc. and the world works council. A final agreement was reached 
with a total cut 15 per cent of wages and 25 per cent reduction of wages for new employment 
contracts, as well as the outsourcing of part of the production on one hand, but on the other 
hand 1,500 workers have been re-employed immediately. The dismissed 1,500 workers 
received holiday benefits. Marinho states, that the reduction of jobs, due to declining number 
of car sales is connected with Volkswagen Inc. management to introduce new car models. 
Further the government of FHC did not support the aims of the workers as well. This situation 
made it impossible to gain a better deal with Volkswagen Inc. (Marinho, 2001). 
The interviewees of Volks do Anchieta replied that the announced loss of jobs put heavy 
pressure on the factory committee, but decisions were taken in democratic agreement and no 
conflicts occurred. It was much more difficult to organize general strikes, in comparison to 
1980s, due to national economic pressure. The interviewees stated that general strikes have 
been the most effective form or labour unrest.  
In the view of the interviewees of the factory commission, the strikes held from 1990 – 2002 
have been successful due to the support of mainly CNM, but also due to the strong 
relationship with IG Metall. In their view, the loss of jobs was not avoidable, but bargaining 
went our successful, as the factory of Anchieta was equipped with technological innovations, 
which was important to remain the relevance of this factory. Further factory agreements 
(acordos coletivos) were signed to improve the working conditions of the remaining workers. 
Interestingly the representation of Volks do Brasil workers in VW’s WWC was characterised 
as a good forum for information sharing, but had no impact on the working conditions and 
bargaining processes, according to the interviewees (Interviews Volks do Brasil, 2016).  
 
Mello e Silva analysed the increasing flexibility of labour regulation and social rights, which 
needed to be accepted by CUT, due to the enormous pressure on the working class during the 
1990s caused by liberalisation. Due to the state-power over unions, CUT favoured direct 
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negotiations with employers. With the introduction of profit related pay and hour bank in 
1995, government policies on labour protection were undermined. Especially in the 
automotive industry, were MNC targeted on liberalisation of employment regulation, tax 
incentives for new investments in technological innovation, profit related pay became the 
norm, concentrated in the South-Central region of Brazil.  
Decentralised negotiations were mostly for the benefit of larger unions, but weakened the 
bargaining power of smaller ones. Mello e Silva further emphasizes, that due to various 
potential ways of calculating profit rates, the profit related pay could be easily manipulated. 
The company specific agreements (arcordos coletivos) created an individualizing impact on 
collective bargaining (Mello e Silva, 2014:27). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IMPACT OF “LULISMO” ON LABOUR MOVEMENT AND BEYOND, 2003 - 2013 
 
3.1 Global Supply Chains in the rise of BRIC countries 
This period is characterised by intensified fragmentation of GVCs on a global level. Trade 
liberalisation pushed by the World Trade Organisation through the implementation of 
Washington Consensus facilitated the global intensification of GVC. During the 1990s, ISI 
has been replaced by Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI), which can be analysed through 
the implementation of corresponding national industrialization policies, focused on 
intensification of exports. In the case of Brazil, this can be clearly identified on the 
governmental drive of the presidency of FHC, as outlined in Chapter 2.  
By 2009, world exports of intermediate goods were higher than export of financial and capital 
goods for the first time. The increased fragmentation of global industries resulted in highly 
complex industrial relations. Domestic industries of semi-peripheral countries are integrated 
in complex industrial networks, which have been accelerated through a wave of FDIs and 
global sourcing. Therefore, governments need to engage in GVC-oriented industrialization 
policies, to ensure growth in specialised industrial niches (Sturgeon, et al, 2013).  
The liberalisation of semi-peripheral countries, such as China, Russian Federation, India and 
Brazil (BRIC), added huge markets, due to its enormous size of population and resources. 
MNCs from the Triads have been motivated to invest in BRIC countries, for gaining higher 
profits, motivated by “low-wage” labour markets, better access to raw materials, growing 
middle class and therefore potential huge markets for consumption. MNCs enlarged their 
strategies of outsourcing and offshoring. Governments of BRIC countries established needed 
infrastructure and capabilities to handle production of complex goods. Therefore, GVC lead 
firms gained again more power in shaping GVC and establishing global business networks.  
Core countries have been hit by the financial economic crisis in 2008, which made it more 
difficult for MNCs to gain profits in the Triads, while BRIC countries experienced continuous 
growth. The merchandise imports of the core capitalist countries grew only by 27 per cent 
between 2005 and 2010. In contrary to the BRIC countries, where merchandise imports grew 
enormously: Brazil (147 per cent), India (129 per cent), China (111 per cent). These figures 
prove the shifts of final consumption markets to semi-peripheral countries, which puts them 
into a more powerful position to influence global politics and economy.  
In the so-called “Post-Washington Consensus” era, BRIC-countries evolved to a global 
economic position of important actors of aggregated supply and demand, although they differ 
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very much in economic and social terms and involved in different levels and stages of GVCs 
(agriculture, extractive industries, manufacturing and services). The role of those semi-
peripheral countries developed from vertically integrated industries to higher-value niches in 
the context of GVCs, with stronger “South-to-South” trade. The interaction between global 
and local suppliers has increased, with the further establishment of international and regional 
business networks. Nevertheless, lead companies intensified the competition between 
suppliers, to further reduce transaction costs on a global level. Therefore, national states are 
facing decreasing power to fortify local suppliers (Hamilton, Gereffi, 2009, 156).  
Hamilton and Gereffi characterized 3 different types of industrial development strategies of 
governments, in regards to their position within GVCs:  
1) Horizontal policies that impact on the entire national economy and focus on improvement 
of basic infrastructure to increase competitive national economies. In other words, this 
means investment in, for instance, education, health infrastructure and R&D expenditures. 
Here, the public sector usually takes a leading role in providing access to these factors in 
the form of public goods.  
2) Selective or vertical industrial policies are focused on special industrial sectors on a 
national level. The industrial sectors are strategically connected with access to natural 
resources, which enable opportunities for linkages with domestic suppliers (e.g.: autos in 
Brazil). Further, they have an impact on national economy regarding domestic 
consumption needs. These industrial policies resulted in ISI development strategies, which 
has been disrupted in Latin America by the debt crisis of the 1980s and displaced by EOI 
development strategies in the 1990s.  
3) GVC oriented policies leverage international supply chain linkages to increase a nation’s 
position in global and regional value chains. With implementation of GVC oriented 
policies, the recreation of entire supply chains within a national territory is aimed.  
While Free Trade Agreements are enabling factors that permit greater openness to GVCs 
linkages, these are often complemented by national policies, which try to improve regional 
production networks in specific industries. The aim is to facilitate upgrading of the 
opportunity of emerging economies to increase regional economies of scale and scope 
(Hamilton, Gereffi, 2009: 157). 
 
 
The following table illustrates the GVC-oriented industrial policies as well as the horizontal 
policies applied by BRIC countries.  
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Table 16: Industrial development strategies of BRIC countries 
GVC-oriented industrial policies Brazil Russia China India 
Specialization in GVC niches in global and regional 
production networks, to add value to primary or industrial 
commodities 
◘ ◘ ● ● 
Local content requirements to attract global suppliers and 
policies to facilitate intermediate and primary goods imports ◘ ◘ ● ● 
Use of GVC links to upgrade domestic production and 
brands  ● ◘ ● ● 
Horizontal policies (economy wide) 
Improved infrastructure, especially trade and transportation 
infrastructure ● ◘ ● 
○ 
Increased education  
● ◘ ● ● 
Workforce development 
◘ ○ ◘ ◘ 
Investment in R&D 
● ● ● ● 
Sustainable energy development 
● ◘ ◘ ◘ 
Tax incentives 
● ◘ ◘ ● 
Foreign Direct investment ○ ◘ ● ● 
Free Trade Agreements 
◘ ○ ● ● 
○ unimportant        
● particularly significant        
◘ moderate importance        
Source: Gereffi, Sturgeon, 2013: 340 -41 
In the case of Brazil, horizontal policies of the 2000s focused on the upgrading of 
infrastructure regarding trade, transportation, education, R&D, increase of energy production, 
as well as granting tax incentives for investment. Most of those policies were applied to 
enlarge the production of the automobile industry. 
Brazil’s governmental policies further address the improved integration in GVC links, to 
positively influence domestic production, through the strengthening of regional networks. 
Based on the categories, as Gereffi and Sturgeon outlined in Table 8 above, the GVC-oriented 
industrial policies of Brazil and Russia show similar patterns, in comparison to China and 
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India. Especially China, as one of the most populous country, has become the world’s export 
nation with a GDP growth of around 9 per cent per year. Brazil is comparably heavily 
focussed on the exporting of primary products, with relatively low value added.  
In comparison with China, Brazil’s economic development strategy shows similarities, but 
also different interventions. Due to its market size and development, Brazil has a dominant 
role within Mercosur. Brazil is further concentrated on export of agricultural products, with 
low processing levels to its largest trading partner China. In 2010 Brazil’s imports and exports 
to China accounted for 15 per cent. Imports from China are mainly composed out of high-tech 
products. This shifts Brazil again in a position of a nation, exporting commodities with a low 
level of value-added.  
During the respective time period, the Lula government succeeded in significantly lowering 
the poverty rate through large social programs and subsequently increasing its middle class. 
Therefore, the consumption power was increased, which positively affected the domestic 
market and growth of GDP, which created a positive impact on the car industry.  
National industrial policies mainly included tax incentives to stimulate local technological 
innovation, as well as manufacturing of components and assembly.  
As mentioned above, Brazil’s industrial policies were not strongly “GVC-oriented”, 
compared to China and India (Hamilton and Gereffi, 2009, 152).  
The global production further shifted from the North to the South since 2002, due to the 
liberalisation of BRIC countries. Although Lula’s government focussed on a fortified 
economic relationship with China, concerns have increased considering the composition of 
exports. The high-technology commodities imported from China did not favour the Brazilian 
economy. However, Brazil has strong domestic technological sources and a huge domestic 
market, which has been fortified by industrial policies (Sturgeon, Gereffi, 2013).  
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3.2 Global Car industry in the new millennium 
The replacement of car models with improved technology, style and strategic positioning has 
further accelerated in a timely manner. Cars can be classified as image-driven consumer 
goods, integrating a huge demand for latest technologies and design, from luxury to low cost 
consumer segments. As the global production of innovative car models requires enormous 
resources and consequently high costs, the proper product life-cycle management is 
continuously of high importance, to ensure its successful sale. Technological innovation 
remains the main driver to survive the tight global competition in the global car industry, 
which increased more due to new market entrants from China and South Korea.  
Modular production methods enabled to satisfy consumers’ individual demand for car features 
and safety devices, facilitated through innovative communication technology. To accelerate 
national innovation in industry and consumer demand, governments reacted with incentive 
programs. Environment friendly and energy saving technological innovations became key 
targets for the car industry as well as national governments. For instance, Brazil’s government 
has reached energy independence on one hand, due to its huge petrol reserves and on the other 
hand through the subsidized production of ethanol, as an alternative fuel. Therefore, global 
car producers developed “flex-engines” to facilitate the usage of both. The innovation of a 
“flexi-engine” has been transferred to other countries already (Townsend, Calantone, 2014:1-
4). This can be taken as one example, how innovation activities shifted more and more from 
the Triads to semi-peripheral countries. The technological shifts have been intensified in 
BRIC countries in the respective decade. For example, subsidiaries and independent suppliers 
in Brazil have been involved in advanced innovation technologies as well as in the 
development of innovative products and services. The shift in the development of 
technological innovations can be further proven with the continuous industrial de-growth in 
the Triads. Moreover, financial investment continuously shifted to semi-peripheral countries 
too (Rasmus, et al, 2012).  
The world production of vehicles increased from 59 million in 2002 to nearly 100 million in 
2014. Only between 2008 and 2009, caused be the effects of the global economic crisis, the 
global car production decreased. In 2010, 87 million vehicles have been produced worldwide, 
with the biggest portion produced in China (25.3 per cent). This has been realised by the 
strong intervention of the Chinese central government, through direct investment and 
increased access to credits. The market entry of MNC was only accepted as joint ventures, 
with the condition to transfer technological innovations. Therefore, foreign participation was 
limited to a maximum amount of 50 per cent (DIESSE, 2015: 93 – 95).  
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Graph 6: Global vehicle production 2002 – 2014 (Global and Volkswagen Inc) 
 
Source: oicanet, 2015 
Graph 6 shows the global steady increase of vehicle production, which was only interrupted in 
2008 and 2009, due to the global economic crisis. The global production increased globally 
significantly, which correlates with the global production of Volkswagen Inc. The MNC 
increased its production from 5.017.438 vehicles in 2002 to 9.894.891 vehicles in 2014. 
Volkswagen Inc. nearly doubled its vehicle production on a global level, which was mainly 
gained in China. This trend is not true for the production of Volks, which stagnated in the 
respective period of time. While in 2002 517.570 automobiles were produced by Volks, in 
2013 the number of vehicles only reached a number of 500.104 produced cars, showing a 
steady decline since 2011. As the car production in Brazil went up from 1.791.530 in 2002 to 
3.498.012 in 2014, a comparably slow growth occurred in regards to Volks, which might 
show the loss of its market leading position (oicanet, 2015).  
Table 17 below illustrates, that out of all car MNCs, only Volkswagen Inc. increased its 
production share in Europe, between 1997 and 2006. All other car companies shifted its 
production more to semi-peripheral countries. In terms of sales, it is true for all companies, 
which sales in their “home region” stagnated and profit gains were made in other markets, 
then the ones of the Triads.  
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Table 17: Production and sales of motor vehicles in home region by company in 1997 and 2006 
  Region’s share 
in global 
production (%) 
Region’s share 
in global 
production (%) 
Regional sales’ 
in global sales 
(%) 
Region’s share 
in global sales 
(%) 
Company Region 1997 2006 1997 2006 
General Motors America 69 50 63 54 
Ford America 69 43 64 55 
Renault Europe 97 75 93 62 
PSA Europe 85 70 84 62 
Volkswagen 
Group 
Europe 62 66 59 56 
Fiat Europe 60 55 66 53 
Toyota Japan 73 56 43 26 
Nissan Japan 62 41 42 22 
Honda Japan 57 37 36 20 
Source: OICA 2007, www.oica.net, 2007   
Between 2002 and 2013, the global car production increased by 48.1 per cent (28.3 million 
cars), whereof 66 per cent (18,8 million cars) have been produced in China. During that time 
period Brazil’s national car production increased by 107.1 per cent. While in 2002 Brazil has 
been ranked as the eleventh largest global car producer, in 2013 it climbed up to the seventh 
rank. In the following sub-chapter, the development of the car industry in the 21
st
 century will 
be outlined in detail.  
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3.3. The New Developmental path 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the 1990s were labeled as the decade of liberalisation with 
deregulation of the working conditions, increasing unemployment rates and shift of CUT’s to 
a more defensive strategy and therefore loosing connection with social movements. The 
power of the “Novo Sindicalismo” trade unionism has been weakened by liberalisation of 
Brazil’s market and further by the impact of the severe financial crisis in 1998/1999 (Baltar, 
et al, 2010: 9). 
In contrast to the neoliberal political agenda, PT, CUT and social movements proposed 
politics of social reforms, with having Lula as a charismatic leader. The popularity of 
Cardoso’s liberal reforms was high and mainly caused by the significant decrease of inflation, 
affecting mainly people living in poverty. Between the years 1999 – 2003, the 
macroeconomic policy and beyond continued to target a low inflation rate and stable growth 
in GDP, through intensification of international trade. With the increase of exports and 
limitation of imports a significant increase of Brazil’s trade surplus was achieved in 2002.  
The election campaign of 2002 was driven by the economic crisis, characterized by high 
unemployment rates, negative foreign trade balance, economic growth stagnation, increased 
public debt and capital flight. Lula promised in a letter to Brazilians, that he will continue the 
course of President Cardoso to ensure the stability of the Real and therefore the continuation 
of Plano Real. The latter emphasized the anti-corruption course of PT and aim of intensified 
collaboration with Brazil’s bourgeois, attracted mainly a part of the upper and middle class. 
The economic strategy of the “new developmentalism”, targets on the establishment of 
alliances between the state and national bourgeoisie (not international) as well as with 
informal and rural workers. Especially the national bourgeoisie experienced though times 
during the presidency of FHC, as GDP growth was hardly achieved (Morais, Saad-Filho, 
2011: 33). Lula won the election with 61.3 per cent of votes, mainly gained in the richer areas 
of Brazil, such as São Paulo. The presidential election of the trade union leader, Inácio Lula 
da Silva, has been a novelty for the political history of Brazil, due to his success as a working 
class representative. The historical relationship of Lula and the PT, ensured CUT’s support of 
the new government (Araújo, Veras de Oliveira, 2011, 85). 
During the government of Lula (2003 – 2011) the recovery process of the states’ role was 
targeted as well as the participation of workers in the political and economic agenda. This was 
outlined in the Roadmap for Development Agenda 2003 (DIESSE, 2013). In that period 
Brazil experienced a significant growth period of the economy, driven by the increased 
domestic consumption and credit expansion, which significantly expanded the automobile 
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domestic market, placing it as the largest market quarter on sales light vehicles in the world, 
behind China, the US and Japan (Dickens, 2010).  
As Lula promised in this letter to Brazil’s people, government kept the same current 
macroeconomic policy since 1999, consisting of inflation targeting, a floating exchange rate, 
high interest rates and generating primary fiscal surplus - with a view to containing inflation.  
Due to the traumatic experience of the hyperinflation of the last decade, inflation control 
remained at the center. The new focus of Lula’s government was the establishment of national 
alliances to reduce the “neo-dependency” on the global market, as FHC has created during the 
1990s. Privatizations were stopped, while public companies were re-organized and the state 
role has been strengthened. The national development bank, BNDES, for instance has been 
restructured to change its role from a main financial actor for privatization to a provider of 
reasonable credits to small-sized companies and the export sector. 
The world economic situation improved for semi-peripheral countries, which led to lower 
inflation rates and increased GDP growth until the international crisis of 2008 showed its 
effects (Leubolt, Auinger, 2014: 227-8). 
 
Table 18: GDP Growth, Brazil (2002 – 2013) 
 
Source: IPEA, 2016 
From 2004-2008 GDP grew on average 4.8% per year with increasing emphasis on 
investment and household consumption due to credit expansion, inequality reduction policies 
and recovery of wage purchasing power (Baltar, et al, 2010: 4). Through the substantial 
increase of the minimum wage (R$ 292 in 1999 and R$ 513 in 2009), growth of formal 
employment and the heavy increase of social program (bolsa família, minha casa minha vida, 
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fome zero), the consumption power has strengthened the domestic market and enlarged the 
middle class of Brazil’s society.  
The optimistic scenario created from 2004 encouraged private investment. The increase in 
domestic demand has led not only to the stimulation of domestic production, but also to 
increased demand for imports, contributing less and less to the growth of the balance of net 
exports (IPEA, 2016).  
The economic growth increased formal employment, appreciation of minimum wage and 
income transfers, which resulted in decreased social inequality, increased consumption, and 
investments. This positively affected its industrialization. 
The Brazilian state played an important role to overcome the industrial de-growth of the 
1990s. With a significant change in economic development strategy and the expansion of the 
domestic marked, increased the domestic consumption of manufactured goods. The “Program 
for Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade” (PITCE) was implemented from 2004 
until mid of 2008 and aimed to further development of the national industry by transforming 
its structure. The program targets increased technological innovation, increased exports and 
modernization of industrial institutions (DIESSE, 2015) 
The economic success, high reduction of poverty as well as the increased middle class of 
Brazil supported the re-election of Lula in 2006. Although PT was accused for corruption, 
which mainly affected PT voters from the middle class, especially a higher proportion 
Brazil’s society, living in poverty, voted for Lula, who succeeded in winning a second term 
with 61 per cent of the votes (2006 – 2010).  
Through the strengthening of the state’s role and the role of public companies, the latter 
became highly important employers and drivers of the national economy. To strengthen the 
role of the state, institutions have been restructured to serve the domestic growth. For 
instance, the National Industrial Development Council (CNDI) positively impacted on the 
industrial development and continued integration of Mercosur. Additionally, the new political 
union “Unasur” positively supported the increasing FDIs in neighboring countries, as well as 
on the improvement of transport infrastructure.  
The following councils have been restructured during Lula’s government, to improve social 
and physical infrastructure: 
Council of Economic and Social Development (discussion forum for social and economic 
development, in which employers, trade unions and social movements participated), Council 
for Labour Relations (tripartite council to reform unions and increase democratization of 
labour and industry), Administrative Council for Economic Defense (control competition), 
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Deliberative Council for Worker’s Support (control of unemployment support), National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Development, National Industrial Development 
Council (development of public policies for improvement of infrastructure and supporting 
foundation of national companies), Brazilian Industrial Development Agency (promotion of 
industrial policies to increase innovative technologies of the productive sector) and the 
National Labour Forum (reform labour laws to improve working conditions) (Leubolt, 
Auinger, 2011: 19). The implementation of PAC (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento) 
in 2007 stimulated economic growth by investments in social and physical infrastructure, 
which has been coordinated by Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff.  
The second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009 threatened to disrupt the growth cycle, due 
to the economic crisis of the core capitalist countries. However, with the Brazilian 
government intervention, reducing the tax on Industrialized Products (IPI), such as vehicles, 
and extending credit to banks from automakers, the impact of the international crisis in the 
sector has been delayed. As of March 2009, production and sales levels resumed the pre-crisis 
period (Baltar, et al, 2010: 7). 
With the growth of the Brazilian car industry during the crisis of the core capitalist countries 
and the expansion of China, the global car industry has changed as mentioned earlier. 
Especially the role of China, as a producer of vehicles for the world, the import quantities of 
assembled vehicles, parts and components rose sharply, putting countries, such as Brazil, with 
economic challenges increasingly growing since 2010 (DIESSE, 2015). 
In the following chapter, the development of Brazil’s car industry, the impact on workers of 
Volks and the changes after the administration of Lula will be dealt with in detail.  
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3.4 Brazil’s automotive industry of the 21st century  
The reasons to GVC lead firms, to continue with the shift of innovative power to BRIC 
countries, can be explained with the size of the markets and potential of increased sales, 
increased access to infrastructure, government incentives and still comparably lower wages 
than in Triad countries. Graph 7 shows the steady increase in Brazil’s global share in the 
world production of cars from 2002 until 2009.  
Graph 7: Development of Brazil’s global share in car production, 2002 - 2013 
 
Source: DIESSE, 2015: 107 
 
Nevertheless, in the case of Brazil, car production is mainly executed for and tied to the 
domestic market, which has been further strengthened by governmental interventions. 
Investment in national Research and Development (R&D) activities has been increased 
significantly in this decade. Design and engineering have been concentrated in the 
headquarter countries of GVC lead firms, but have recently been shifted more and more to 
BRIC countries. Therefore, global suppliers have intensified their presence in those too 
(Rasmus, et al, 2012: 9). The following table shows the significant increased R&D 
investment, especially since the election in 2002 of the former trade union leader, Lula. 
Table 19: R&D spending in Brazil’s automobile industry 
 2000 2003 2005 2008 
Total R&D (R$ million) 549 1,363 1,900 3,384 
Total R&D/sales (%) 1 1,6 1,4 1,65 
     
Note: Total R&D spending comprises external R&D and outsourced R&D 
Source: Quadros, Brazilian Innovation Survey (2009) 
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As outlined in Chapter two, during 1990 and 1997 imports regarding car parts increased and 
negatively affected the Brazilian balance of payment. This development was targeted with the 
signature of an agreement, to increase domestic production, called “Regime Automotivo”. As 
mentioned before, Brazil was swept along in a financial crisis, related to the Asian crisis. This 
resulted in decreased car production and sales, fortified by hyperinflation. The overcapacities 
in car production were used to export to new markets. Exports were further regained through 
the modernization of existing factories.  
Graph 8 illustrates the development of imports and exports of cars produced in Brazil. Exports 
slowed down in the course of the 1990s opposed to increasing imports and caused a 
dramatically high negative trade balance. The trend slightly changed in the beginning of the 
21
st
 century. A clearly positive trade balance was achieved from 2003 until 2008. Since then, 
imports skyrocket, reaching a value of 20.647 million USD, opposed to 11.717 million USD 
export value. The expansion of the China’s car market resulted in increased imports of auto 
parts and challenged domestic market. In 2012, the government adopted a new automobile 
regime, which came into power in 2013. Innovate-Auto, for example, is an incentive 
programme, that was introduced in 2012 for the intensification of technological innovation 
(DIESSE, 2015: 114).  
Graph 8: International trade of Brazil’s car industry, 1990 - 2012 
 
Source: ANFAVEA, 2015 
A major increase in car sales was realized between 2003 and 2011. This development was 
facilitated mainly by increased domestic consumption power, which rooted in governmental 
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interventions (credit expansion, tax reduction). Due to its importance for the economy of 
Brazil, policies and tax incentives were implemented to stimulate production, local R&D and 
requirements for a minimum local content. In 2003, the car industry in Brazil had the capacity 
to produce 3.2 million cars, but only 1.6 million cars were produced (DIESSE, 2015: 102).  
 
Through the stimulation of car sales, production was further enlivened, as Graph 9 shows. 
Production steadily increased from 2003 until 2008, followed by an only slightly decline in 
2009, due to the effects of the global economic crisis. Through anti-cyclical measures, a 
recovery was realised until 2013. Those production trends correspond only partly with Volks’ 
reached quantity of production, as illustrated in the graph below. Volks’ experienced decline 
in production in 2005 (-23.137 compared to 2004), with steady but low production increases 
until 2010. By 2010, the number of produced vehicles tremendously declined from 828.444 
production units in 2011, to 500.104 units in 2014. Since then, Volks loss in market share 
becomes clear, as the increase of car production on a national level, was not absorbed by 
Volks to the same extent, but by different car MNCs, such as Fiat. Especially with the 
liberalisation of the car industry in Brazil, new MNCs entered the market: Honda (1997), 
Toyota (1998), Mercedes (1999), Renault (1999), PSA Peugot (2001). The new market 
entrants established factories mainly outside of the labour stronghold of São Paulo state.  
Graph 9: Car production in Brazil and of Volks, 2002 - 2014 
 
Source: oicanet, 2015 
The increased car production in Brazil was further pushed through FDIs of MNCs and global 
suppliers, which resulted in a modernization of existing factories, as well as the construction 
of new factories. As mentioned, the Brazilian government supported the car production and 
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sales growth with policies and aimed to increase the amount of locally produced spare parts in 
the final commodities. In contrast to car production, the following graph 10, illustrates the 
steady increase of car sales in Brazil, since 2003. This trend significantly slowed down in 
2013, which will be explained in the latter.  
 
Graph 10: Car Sales in Brazil, 2003 – 2014 
 
Source: ANFAVEA, 2015 
Especially between 2002 and 2003, due to the economic crisis, FDI and domestic demand 
decreased, but changed by 2004 as shown in the graph below. A remarkable increase of FDI 
is shown in 2013, which can be related to industrial programs and enlarged credit expansion, 
which will be further explained.  
 
The attractiveness of the Brazilian market can be detected by a high presence of the biggest 
car producers in the country. Additionally, the car industry has an important impact on its 
economy, as it significantly contributes to GDP and is an important employer, paying 
comparably high wages. In 2013, for instance, the automotive industry accounted for 5 per 
cent of the GDP and 23 per cent of the industrial GDP. Despite the long history of car 
production in Brazil, the market still shows potential for growth. Nevertheless, the car market 
is oligopolistic, as mainly MNC hold the power over it (DIESSE, 2015: 95-6). 
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Graph 11: FDI in Brazilian automobile industry, 1990 – 2012 (in USD millions) 
 
Source: Wojtowicz, Rachwal, 2014 
In the beginning of the 21
st
 century global suppliers intensively replaced most local suppliers, 
by purchasing them or forcing them to withdraw from the market due to the intensity of 
competition. Table 4 shows the participation of car production of different states in Brazil. On 
one hand, it can be clearly seen, that the car market is dominated by multinational companies. 
On the other hand, Table 17 shows the significance of the car industry in São Paulo in 
comparison to other states in Brazil. With 42.8 % in 2013, São Paulo state still holds the 
biggest car production share within Brazil, as factories there were established for mass 
production and therefore have a big production capacity.  
Table 20: Participation (%) of regions and states in the car production, Brasil 2013 
Region % of national 
production 
State Companies % of national 
production 
South 
East 
69,5 % 
Minas Gerais Fiat, Iveco Mercedes-Benz 21,20 % 
Rio de Janeiro MAN, Peugeot Citroen 5,50 % 
São Paulo 
Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, 
Mercedes Benz, Scania, Toyota, 
Volkswagen 
42,80 % 
South 22 %  
Paraná 
DAF, Nissan, Renault, 
Volkswagen, Volvo 
13,70 % 
Rio Grande do 
Sul 
Agrale, GM, International 8,50 % 
Central-
East 
2,1 % Goiás CAOA 2,10 % 
North 
East 
6,1 % Bahia Ford 6,10 % 
North 0,1 % Amazonas Mahindra 0,10 % 
Source: DIESSE, 2015 
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7Due to the global economic crisis in 2008, the government reacted with strong anticyclical 
policies. The Brazilian government, under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff in 2011, started 
the implementation of short-term interventions as part of cyclical measures as well as long 
term strategic measures, formulated in the so-called “Greater Brazil Plan” (PDM), that 
showed positive effects on the industrial productivity and sales in the automotive industry. 
The car industry was listed as one of five objectives to be strengthened by raising energy 
efficiency, increase safety and to strengthen auto part chain. By 2014, according to the report 
of the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development, 3 per cent of the measures were 
completed, 68 per cent are being executed as planned and 29 per cent are planned to be 
executed in the upcoming years.  
PDM enabled a new Brazilian automotive regime by 2012, named “Innovate-Auto”9. With 
tax incentives for domestic production, increased Industrialized Products Tax (IPI) on 
imported cars, and investment support in R&D, the local production and technological 
innovation regarding environmental protection, energy efficiency and safety is meant to be 
stimulated.  
With increased sales, also the individual number of credit takers for the purchase of a car, 
increased between 2007 and 2013 by 68.8 per cent (R$ 192.8 million by December 2013).  
Especially Argentina was the main country for Brazilian car exports, accounting for 72.7 per 
cent of all total car exports, followed by Mexico with 5.82 per cent. Argentina and Mexico, 
both signed a trade agreement with Brazil. Therefore, especially the economic development of 
Argentina affects the automotive production in Brazil. Imports, regarding this sector, mainly 
come from the countries of global car MNC, such as China, South Korea, Japan and the 
European Union (DIESSE, 2015: 94 – 123).  
The car industry has the role of an important group of employers too. Although the number of 
total employees has a decreasing trend, due to technological innovation, in 2010 2% of the 
total work force of Brazil was employed in this sector. Further 19 per cent of R&D positions, 
are covered by the automobile sector.  
Due to the growing need for mobility, enlarged access to credits and issued tax incentives, the 
number of car owners in Brazil theoretically still has room for growth. Although, there is still 
a big potential for growth of individual transportation, challenges regarding growing 
destruction of the environment, continuous need for enlarged transportation structures (eg 
                                                 
9
  In October 2012 the Brazilian government approved a new program to increase the technological 
innovation: “Imposto sobre produtos industrializados” (IPI). IPI need to be paid, if the production of the car does 
not meet the minimum requirements of a “Inovar-Car” (vehicle efficiency, national production, R&D 
investment) (ICCT, 2013).  
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traffic jams) and increased production of energy became for huge countries, such as the 
BRIC-countries, key challenges in the aim for further substantial growth.  
 
Volkswagen Inc. was holding the largest market share in Brazil in the 20
th
 century. Due to the 
production of a popular car, such as Gol, Volks has taken longer time to implement new 
strategies (modernisation, new car designs) compared to its competitors. Especially with the 
market entrants of new car MNC, Volks has been more and more under pressure. The 
following table shows the car models, which were newly introduced and produced in Brazil.  
Table 21: Car models manufactured in Brazil in 2000s 
 Car model Car MNC 
2000 Ducato Fiat 
2001 Dobló Fiat 
2001 Uno Mille Fire Fiat 
2001 Pick-up Strada Adventure Fiat 
2001 206 Peugeot 
2001 Stilo Fiat  
2003 Vox Volks 
2005 Idea Fiat 
2007 Fiat Punto Fiat 
2008 Dacia Logan Renault 
2008 Dacia Sandero Renault 
2009 Fiat Linea Fiat 
2009 Nissan Livina Nissan 
Source: Just.auto.com, November 2012 
Compared to Fiat and Renault, Volks only introduced the new car model of “Vox” in 2003. 
While Volks only introduced the production of only one new car model, Fiat introduced 8 
new car models, designed for different “consumption power-groups” and therefore enlarged 
its production line-up significantly, as the Table 18 below shows. Although Volkswagen Inc. 
production and sales doubled on a global level from 2003 – 2014, sales and production 
increased less in Brazil. 
For instance, Toyota was registered as the largest global car manufacturer in 2013, with a 
production of 10.3 million car units, but is not one of the main car manufacturers in Brazil. 
Therefore, the global picture of power relations in the car industry differs from the power 
relation of car MNCs in Brazil, as Table 19 shows.  
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While Volks used to be the biggest car producer in Brazil for the last decades, producing 
mainly for the domestic market, but also for exports within Mercosur, its market position of 
Volks started to shift in the second half of 2000s and finally squeezed for the first time by 
Fiat, which produced and sold more car units in 2014. 
Table 22: The biggest car manufacturers in Brazil, 2013 and 2014 
Manufacturers 
% N° TOTAL  
2013 
% N° TOTAL  
2014 
Volkswagen 20,36% 17,7% 
Fiat-FCA 20,24% 21,30% 
General Motors  18,21% 17,4% 
Ford 9,61% 9,3% 
Source: DIESSE, 2015: 107 
 
Volkswagen remains to hold the biggest market share in 2013, which changed in 2014. The 
reasons are manifold, but the table 21 might give an idea, why Fiat succeeded in gaining a 
bigger market share.  
The strategy of the workers’ of Volks of Anchieta will be outlined in detailed in the following 
chapter 3.6.  
 
3.5 Partido dos Trabalhadores – The rise of Brazil working class? 
The labour unions of Brazil have an outstanding reputation internationally, as seen as a very 
dynamic movement, with strong militant labour power. Especially CUT symbolizes the 
resistance against the military regime, with the strong support of inhomogeneous societal 
groups. With the democratically designed enactment of the Citizen’s Constitution of 1988, an 
important legislation for the protection of labour was realised. Another important change for 
labour was the election of “Lula”, as not only the situation for poor people, but also for 
labour.  
 
The following table shows the different union umbrella organisations, whereof CUT has the 
biggest support of formal workers and therefore a powerful position in Brazil’s society.  
 
 
Table 23: Union centrals in Brazil 
CUT Central Única dos Trabalhadores  
FS Força Sindical 
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CSP Conlutas  
CTB Central dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras do Brasil 
CGTB Central Geral dos Trabalhadores, Brasil 
CSB Central dos Sindicatos Brasileiros 
NCST Nova Central Sindical de Trabalhadores 
UGT União Geral do Trabalhadores 
Source: DIESSE, 2016 
In 2010, 66% of the unions are affiliated to CUT, which makes it the biggest trade union 
central in Brazil, followed by FS, which can be defined as a union working rather in the 
interest of employers. The high percentage of 62% of non-affiliated unions show, that 
autonomous national representation for trade unions remained rather low.  
The restructuring of production in the course of 1990 led to precarious employment, which 
affected the union movement due to the shifting composition of the workforce. Rise of strike 
activities reflect on the strength Brazilian workers gained.  
On the political agenda of PT was the aim to improve labour policies and reform trade 
unionism. Due to positive economic development and political power, through labour policies 
the protection of labour was increased. For instance, companies are now required to consult 
with trade unions, in case mass firing of labour is planned and need administrative 
authorization. For the termination of unlimited work contracts, employers need to announce it 
one month in advance or pay equivalent compensation. Further, the termination of limited 
work contracts, the employer need to pay half of the remuneration that would have been 
needed to pay for the remaining time period. After the termination of a contract has been 
announced, employees are granted two hours per day to seek for a new employment. 
Additionally, according to labour law, employers are required to deposit 8 per cent of the 
wage to “Fundo de Amparo dos Trabalhadores” (FAT), which is made available to dismissed 
workers. Labour was further extended by regulating overtime, called “banco das horas”, if 
agreed in the collective bargaining agreement (Auinger, Leubolt, 2011: 16).  
State-led anticyclical intervention softened the impact of the global economic crisis of 2008 
on Brazil’s economy. The negative GDP growth in 2009 (-0.6 per cent) has been comparably 
low and was regained already in 2010. This was mainly achieved due to strengthened 
domestic market and further supported by increased prices of agricultural products (agro-fuels 
and soya), for export (Auinger, Leubolt, 2011: 18). Due to increase of formal employment 
and re-valuated minimum wage, the average income rose from R$ 200 in 2002 to R$ 724 in 
2014.  
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The respective time period is mainly characterised by outstanding shifts in labour market and 
improvement of social indicators. For instance, the Ministry of Labour stated, that in 2007 
only, 2.4 million jobs have been created. Therefore, the urbanization rose from 66 per cent in 
1980s to over 80 per cent in 2000s.  
The increase of formal employment, combined with a strengthening of industrial relations and 
labour conditions, positively affected trade union power. While trade union membership and 
activity declined in European countries and the US, trade unionism has been forecasted of to 
lose the fight against capitalism. Nevertheless, the contrary has been proven as well, as labour 
unrest continued in semi-peripheral countries in cyclical pattern, as several scientific studies, 
such as the ones of Beverly Silver suggest.  
In the case of Brazil union power has been immensely strong in the second half of the 1980s 
(2,200 strikes per year), but decreased by 1991 significantly (930 strikes per year). Union 
crisis have been justified by accelerated technological innovations, new management 
strategies and fragmentation of working class. However, Hobsbawm analysed the rise of mass 
unionism between the end of the 19
th
 to the 20
th
 century, due too economic, political and 
ideological environment, albeit workers at that time were actually strongly fragmented 
(Hobsbawm, 1996: 171 – 180), but managed to unify. Especially the industrial workers have 
always shown high societal diversity.  
The significant loss of trade union power in the course of the 1990s, recovered after the 
presidential election of the trade union leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in 2003, who was 
traditionally supported by CUT. Due to the shift of the political agenda from liberalisation, 
implemented during the administration of FHC, to “neo-developmentalism” during the 
presidency of Lula, economic growth returned and enhanced working class position. Strike 
frequency increased with the achievement of increased real wages. As Beverly Silver 
analysed, Boito also characterised union activities in cyclical pattern. In the case of Brazil, 
Boito classifies the cycle of strikes between 1978 and 1992 as exceptional, as society was 
oppressed by long periods of dictatorship, high growth of capitalists and hyperinflation. 
Therefore, unionism experienced broad societal consent during that period of time (Boito, 
Marcelino, 2011).  
Table 24 shows the strike activity per sector and its stable development. Marcelino justifies 
the frequency of strikes in the beginning of the 21
st
 century as an indicator of growth in 
formal jobs, increased democratization, labour union representation in the government and 
therefore come back of ideological representation, as well as limitation of neoliberal 
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influence. This can be taken as a proof, that unionism is not experiencing its historical 
decline, as being forecasted.  
Table 24: Distribution of Strikes, Brazil, 2004 - 2008 
Sector  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
 # % # % # % # % # % 
Public 185 61,3 162 54,2 165 51,6 161 50.9 184 44,8 
Private 114 37,7 135 45,2 151 47,2 149 47,2 224 54,4 
Offensive 197 65,2 207 69,2 217 67,8 209 66,1 284 69,1 
Defensive 161 53,3 135 45,2 168 52,5 146 46,2 171 41,6 
Total 302 100 299 100 320 100 316 100 411 100 
Source: DIESSE, 2009 
Most of the strikes have been classified by DIESSE rather as offensive, than defensive with 
successfully won wage increased and improvement of working conditions. This is distinctive 
to the strikes of the 1990s, which have been more defensive and less thriumphantly. In 2008, 
about 88 per cent of the strikes led to wage increases to the extent or the inflation rate or even 
more. Although most of the strikes were organised on a local level, particularly the workers of 
the car industry succeeded to organize offensive national-wide strikes. In 2005, 70 per cent of 
strikes were held in car factories, especially in the state of São Paulo. This fact emphasizes the 
strong organisation of workers in the automotive industry, concentrated in the Southeast of 
Brazil. 83 per cent of all strikes registered, have taken place in the Southeast of Brazil (Boito, 
Marcelino, 2011). 
Table 25: Number of Strikes, Brazil 2009 - 2013 
Sector 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Public 130 120 135 410 933 
Private 183 97 162 467 1117 
Defensive  124 104 133 377 1.117 
Offensive 189 113 164 500 933 
Total  313 217 297 877 2.050 
Source: DIESSE 2014 
As the global economic crisis of 2008 impacted on the economic growth of Brazil in 2009, 
this can be connected to the decline in 2009 and 2010. Although economic growth has been 
slightly regained, increased strikes started in 2012 and skyrocket in 2013.  
In 2013, 2.050 strikes were registered. This has been an increase of 1.173 strikes compared to 
2012 and therefore was a dramatic increase especially in the strikes realized in the private 
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sector. Strikes became much more defensive, amounting to 75 per cent of all strikes in 2013, 
according to DIESSE. Of total strikes cleared in the industry in 2013, the vast majority (346 
or 63%) occurred in the Southeast. In the Northeast, they were triggered 74 strikes (13%); 
South, 68 (12%); in the Midwest, 43 (8%) and in the North, 22 (4%). Most movements (308 
or 56%) were triggered by metal workers. The claim for salary increase remained the main 
aim of workers in this sector (DIESSE, 2013). 
 
The planned reform of trade unionism during Lula administration was less successful and the 
corporative structure still burdens Brazil’s union power. Brazil’s “Power-elites” and state 
centralism have a strong impact on Brazil’s institutions of industrial relations. Group of 
industrialists are inhomogeneous and autonomous, while workers’ associations have 
historically been closely tied to the state in authoritarian forms of corporatism. Workers have 
been strongly dependent on the Ministry of Labour and the Labour Court, with only little 
bargaining power. On a company level, representation of workers is still not anchored 
enough. The reform of the industrial relations system and system of TU is one of the longest 
lasting projects in Brazilian history. Lack of traditional social dialogue to reform debate did 
not advance very much. Collective bargaining occurs under various legal regulations. An 
important restriction is determined on regional and local level, which creates a monopoly for 
representative bodies. Contracts are normally binding for only one year, leading to 
considerable time pressure for the bargaining partners. Collective bargaining process takes 
place between local unions and employer organizations. Further, the state has a considerably 
active role in collective bargaining. Until nowadays, the CLT still regulates financing of the 
unions via a trade union tax. It used to finance only local unions until 2008, when it has been 
extended to cover also national confederations (ILO, 2009: 51).  
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3.6 Workers’ strategies of Volks do Brasil  
Volks has a comparably long history in Brazil and so do their workers. During the 20
th
 
century, Volks was the leading car company, which should change in the new millennium.  
Although the modernisation put pressure on the workers of Anchieta, they succeeded to win 
the production of new car model, such as the VW Fox (2003). The production of new car 
models in Anchieta is a key strategy for factory workers, as it helps to remain the importance 
of it. Nevertheless, technological innovation brought along a constant decline of jobs: while in 
the 1970s, 40,000 workers were employed, in 2005 only 12,500 and in 2014 10,900. 
The VW factory of Anchieta primarily was established for mass production with vertical 
integration, which means, that most of the automobile parts were produced “in-house”. In 
1996 the work has been re-organised and so-called “production cells” were introduced. In 
2001 new platforms have been established for the production of VW Polo. Anchieta still has 
its own development department, in difference to the other factories. For instance, the VW 
Fox were developed by this development department of Anchieta.  
The “flexibilisation” of working conditions was realised through group-work, shortage of 
working time and new wage structure. Therefore, fewer workers were required to ensure the 
production process. Further more qualified young workers were employed to enable the 
payment of lower wages. Through outsourcing the vertical integration was heavily changed. 
Although the capacity of this Volks factory is comparably big, only a few number of car 
models are produced there, which will not be sufficient for the size of this factory in the long 
run (Schultz, Côrtes, 2007: 163-72).  
Big conflicts occurred in Volks in the year 1998, 2001 and 2003, as management decided on 
huge dismissals, due to production and financial crisis. Nevertheless, the union and the 
factory committee succeeded in achieving agreements, such as “social responsibility” 
agreements. Since 2000, it has become necessary deal with illegal treatment of workers’ rights 
and signed agreements at labour court, to solve conflicts in the factory of Anchieta. Conflicts 
mainly rooted in wage increases, which management wanted to pay at a lower rate. Luckily 
most of the cases were decided in favour of the workers.  
Further in 2005, a conflict happened due to the payment of profit related pay. Volks Anchieta 
workers went on strike for 17 working days. This case has been decided by court as well. 
Therefore, the collaboration between the management and the workers became more 
conflictive. Workers on Volks Anchieta emphasized on the importance the factory had during 
the 20
th
 century. The guarantee for workers of Volks of Anchieta, that investment for the 
production of new car models, is key, to remain the importance of the production.  
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In 2003, a huge wage campaign of car manufacturer workers of the ABC region, for the full 
compensation of real wage losses between 17 and 29 per cent due to inflation and 
improvement of social clauses, went out successfully. This was possible through a substantial 
commitment of workers, with contracts already including a clause for inflation-compensation. 
200,000 workers of the metalworkers of the ABC region supported the campaign. 
Nevertheless, the strong position and organisation of metal workers’ union of the ABC region 
was not spread out to other regions with employment of metalworkers. For achieving better 
working conditions for the majority of metalworkers, joint struggle is needed to agree on a 
national collective bargaining contract (Metallurgical Tribune, 2003: no1774).  
In October 2005 Volks workers of the factory Anchieta in São Bernardo do Campo started an 
open-end strike, due to pressure from Volks management to accept a lower profit share. Volks 
workers claimed for a profit share of R$ 5,500, while the board of management offered only 
between R$ 4,360 and R$ 4,700. Due to the high profits “Volks” made in the past year 
(CONLUTAS, 2005), a total of 8.500 workers participated in the strike. Due to the deadlock 
of the factory in São Bernardo do Campo, the production in the factories of Taubaté and São 
Carlos and São José dos Pinhais could not proceed, due to dependency on spare parts. On the 
4
th
 of October 2005 the workers of São Carlos and Taubaté started to lay down their work as 
well, while the workers of the other 2 factories decided not to join. Therefore, a total of 
18.000 workers were on strike, which led to a total blockade of production of Volks do Brasil 
for the first time (labournet, 2005). On the 14
th
 of October 2005, the workers on strike 
accepted a profit share of R$ 5,000, except the workers of São Bernardo do Campo. Due to 
the trade union structure in Brazil, each factory has to bargain for its own profit share. This 
extra payment is important for workers, due to the relatively low wages, compared to their 
Volkswagen colleagues in Germany. The share of profit paid to the workers is dependent on 
the productivity of each factory. This is the reason why the workers of the other factories 
ceased the strike. The workers of the factory in Anchieta produce spare parts which are 
important for the production in the other Volks factories. Therefore, their continued walkout 
of Anchieta workers affects the production of other factories. (Papacek, 2005).  
The trade unions of ABC contacted their colleagues in Germany for an action call for 
solidarity. The walkout was terminated on 25
th
 of October 2005, with an agreement on the 
payment of a higher profit share (labournet, 2005). In 2006 Volkswagen Inc. management 
announced to cut jobs in Brazil due to the increased value of the R$, which has an effect on its 
export. It has been expected, that Volks do Brasil’s, exports drop by 40 percent (from 256,494 
to 175,000 units) until 2008. At that time Volks was Brazil’s 5th largest export company. 
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Volks’s management announced to plan a production with a foreign exchange rate of 2,25 R$ 
per USD. Therefore, fewer automobiles were planned to be produced (from 614,248 units to 
514,000). Out of 21,000 workers employed with Volks do Brasil, the management plans to 
cut down 5,773 jobs or 27 percent of its payroll in 3 Brazilian plants (Taubaté, São Carlos, 
Curitiba) by 2008. It is further planned to outsource 2,300 jobs from the Volks factory of 
Anchieta to other contractors. On 31st of May 2006 a “one-day token strike” was held, as the 
restructuring plan, as suggested by Volks management, includes a new wage structure with 
wage reduction, outsourcing of medical plan and reduction of inflation transfer. Although 
long discussions were held, the management did not accept any compromises. Consequently, 
the workers have decided to go on strike. General Secretary, Valter Sanches travelled to 
Germany to join the meeting of Volkswagen’s world works council and report about the 
situation of Volks workers in Brazil.  
Volkswagen Inc. experienced years of growth in sales on a global level. Its net profit 
increased with USD 141 million in the 1
st
 quarter of 2006, which is 4 times higher compared 
to the past year (Hofmann, 2006). The car sale of Volks was also constantly increasing from 
2003 – 2013, although slower, than in other semi-peripheral countries. Nevertheless, the 
management of Volkswagen Inc. planned to cut jobs not only in Brazil, but also in the lead 
country, Germany. After long negotiations, IG Metall offered “early retirement” and 
“severance packages” to workers of Volkswagen in Germany, to soften the planned work 
place reduction (Lopes, 2006).  
The conflict between Volks management and workers escalated, as 1,800 dismissals in the 
factory of Anchieta were announced. Lula engaged in the labour conflict and reminded the 
management of Volks to the need for consultation with the government in case of such a 
planned enormous reduction of jobs. Volks management started to enforce workers to get on 
vacation. The strike was ended, due to the agreement with Volks management, to cancel the 
announced dismissal of 1,800 workers. In November 2006 an agreement was reached, to 
reduce 1,000 jobs with the payment of a compensation for dismissal.  
Members of the factory in Anchieta have reported, that due to the political support from PT, 
the strong organisation of metalworkers in the ABC, as well as the solidarity of IG Metall, the 
planned reduction of workers could had been cushioned.  
Between 2004 and 2008 substantial economic growth was realised, which seemed to connect 
with a higher number of strikes. A worker said: “Metalworkers are not afraid of losing their 
job, so they’re not afraid to strike” (Thomson, 2012). 
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A “Letter for working relationships within Volkswagen Inc.” was signed off by its global 
works council and its board of management in 2009. This Carta defines the participation 
rights of democratically elected representatives of Volks’ workers, including the recognition 
to ensure the economic profitability of the company. In principle the Carta codifies the regular 
information about companies strategic planning, the need for consultation for planned 
restructuring action and dislocations and the participation right for all staffing and social 
affairs (Thomson, 2012). Beside the WWC, 2 workers’ networks exist for the region of South 
America and Middle-Eastern Europe. Those networks are more focused on trade union 
politics. The main coordination of the networks and meeting financing is done by German IG 
Metall.  
In 2011 the workers of Volks in São José dos Pinhais decided on an open-end strike, as the 
management did not offer any wage increases, to compensate inflation. 4.000 workers of 
Volks and 1,600 of supplier companies supported the strike and successfully reached the 
payment of 80% of what has been paid to the workers of São Bernardo do Campo. This shows 
the strong position of Volks Anchieta workers, as they still gained more profit share as their 
colleagues in other factories.  
Volks employed workers temporarily via a sub-contractor company, which conflicts with the 
Brazilian labour legislation. In 2012 Volks got condemned by labour court to terminate the 
contracts of with sub-contractor, with which the temporary workers were employed. Members 
of the factory commission of Volks stated that temporary employment is a common practice 
in Brazil and are mostly not condemned (Interviews, 2016).  
Overall, the interviewees replied that as PT was in power from 2003 – 2008, it was easier to 
achieve agreements with the management of Volks do Brasil and therefore the need for labour 
unrest declined. Further it has been announced, that the occurred strikes went out more 
successful compared to the prior decade. Especially during the administration of Lula, the 
working conditions of Anchieta workers were increased through collective agreements. 
Again, the collaboration with IG Metall was stated as being very supportive for planned 
action by the factory commission, while the representation in the WWC was not observable 
for the interviewees (Interviews, 2006).  
The main reason for strikes, occurring between 2002 and 2008 in the metalworking sector, 
were related to profit-related pay (62.2 per cent of strikes in relevant sector). While the 
metalworkers, employed with big companies benefitted from labour unrest, subcontracted 
workers did not. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the replacement of profit-related payment and 
“hour bank” further fragmented the solidarity among workers in the metallurgist sector. The 
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“hour bank” as well as the profit related payment enabled Volks management various ways of 
calculation. Mello e Silva therefore criticizes the strategy of CUT and CNM to target 
decentralized labour bargaining, as only few workers benefitted from it (Mello e Silva, 2014: 
32). 
Graph 12: FDI inflow Brazil, 2006 - 2016 
 
Source: OECD, 2016 
 
The increase of strikes beyond 2010 can be connected with strong inflow of FDIs by 2009. 
Especially financial capitalism gained an increasingly power, as interest rates remained 
comparably high and capital was seeking for profits in BRIC countries. The increase of strikes 
shows the strong workplace power, especially of the metalworker sector in the Southeast of 
Brazil. Therefore, the union power of especially metalworkers increased with the growing 
production expansion of car MNCs in Brazil. Although global car manufacturers aimed to 
avoid the union stronghold of São Bernardo do Campo, union power also increased in the 
newly established regional production. The technological/organisational fixes have not 
weakened the workplace bargaining power of labour in the automobile industry and has even 
been stronger compared to the resistance of workers in the textile industry.  
The automobile industry lost its position of being the globally leading industry of capitalism 
and therefore it is expected, that labour unrest will continue to occur with the product fix as 
well as with the financial fix, in the case of Brazil. Nevertheless, the workplace bargaining 
power of metal workers is significant stronger compared to worker in the service sector and 
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education. The strategic power of metal workers can be used to regain power of other sectors, 
through the renewal of Brazil’s successful “novo sindicalismo”.  
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CONCLUSION 
The organisation of the Global Value Chain of the car industry changed very much since 
1970s. Due to a product fix shift to automobile industry, it became the most powerful global 
sector in the 20
th
 century, but less in the 21
st
 one. In the decade of the 1970s the profits gains 
achieved in the car industry, in particular of the Triad countries were declining, as labour 
movements of the core capitalist countries gained power and therefore succeeded to improve 
working conditions, wage shares and the establishment of a solid social system. Capitalists of 
leading car companies, such as Volkswagen Inc., started to seek for new geographical 
locations, such as Brazil, to fix their profit gains. Technological fixes were achieved with the 
shift from Fordism to Toyotism in the 1980s and continued to intensify through global 
sourcing and global sub-contracting. Politically a global wave of liberalisation attacked state 
power to protect its national production and employment conditions. The fragmentation of 
workers alongside the GVC has increased and therefore organisation of labour could be 
improved through GVC analysis.  
In the case of Brazil, labour and social movements (novo sindicalismo) broke the power of the 
military regime and gained power against increasing capitalist exploitation during the 1980s. 
With the formation of CUT and PT the working class eked out power of political 
representation and influence. The number of strikes reached the highest levels in the history of 
Brazil’s labour movement from the second half of the 1980s till the first half of the 1990s, 
reaching a peak of strikes between 1990 and 1992. At that time, labour movement was 
nationally better embedded than later on. Capitalist attacked labour through hyperinflation 
the growing power of the working class. The increasing internationalisation of Brazil’s car 
industry in the course of the 1990 through liberalisation measures and increasing 
unemployment further attacked Brazil’s labour movement. Therefore, labour unrest 
significantly declined. CUT leadership saw itself under high pressure and shifted to more 
defensive strategies and decreased efforts towards internal democratization. Nevertheless, in 
particular the metalworkers in the South of Brazil remained strong in their fights against 
exploitation, due to their workplace-bargaining power, as the number of strikes in comparison 
to the overall trend show. During the presidency of FHC, hyperinflation was significantly 
decreased, but with the negative impact of tremendously increased dependency and 
liberalisation of Brazil’s system. Capitalists achieved to fix their profit gains through a 
“political fix”, as mainly capitalists interests were represented by the government which again 
weakened the working class.  
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The liberalisation of Brazil’s market in the second half of the 1990s led to a high influx of 
FDI, due to state-driven incentives. Especially during the 1990s MNCs of the car industry 
enlarged their production capacities and implementation of technological fixes through the 
introduction of the “lean and mean”-model, as defined by Beverly Silver.  
The well organised workers of the older factories, such as the factory of Volks in Anchieta, 
were put under pressure with an immense reduction of jobs during the 1990s and therefore 
were pressured to shift from an offensive to a more defensive strategy. Their main strategy 
was focused on one hand to access latest technological equipment to regain productivity and 
survive competition and on the other hand to improve the working conditions of the 
remaining workers. The introduction of individualized agreements (hour bank, profit related 
pay) mainly benefitted workers engaged with big companies, due bargaining power and their 
position in the GVC, but caused a growing fragmentation of the solidarity between workers. 
Interviews proofed as well, that workers of Volks in Anchieta were less offensive, due to a 
lack of political representation in the government of the 1990s, which changed in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. 
With the election of the former trade union leader, Inácio Lula da Silva, in 2003 working 
conditions and wage levels improved significantly. The interviewed members of the Volks 
Anchieta factory commission stated, that everything improved during PT’s administration and 
expressed no criticism. The number of strikes remained stable during Lula’s administration, 
with the strongest participation of metalworkers. Nevertheless, the strikes have become more 
powerful, as more workers participated and the duration of strikes decreased, due to the strong 
political representation of workers during PT’s government. For instance, the strike of 
Anchieta’s workers in 2006 was directly supported by Lula. This symbolizes that capital 
interests were limited through representation of labour in the government. The “political fix”, 
as realized in the course of the 1990s, was significantly limited during Lula’s administration, 
although not eliminated.  
Through social programs and industrial incentives, PT government succeeded in 
strengthening the domestic market and positively impacted on economic growth and 
employment. Nevertheless, the required reform of the trade union system was not 
achieved. While the poor population of Brazil did not vote for Lula in his first administration, 
this has changed very much in his second turn, due to the tremendous reduction of poverty. 
As mentioned before, strikes remained at a stable level, although the working class gained a 
strong power level, through political representation. The low level of labour conflict can be 
connected with the historically strong tie of CUT with PT. The traditional binding might 
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have limited direct actions, as the working class was politically represented and therefore 
labour conflicts could have been solved with the support of PT. Additionally, labour 
movement activists have been integrated into the state system, which might have lowered 
potential external criticism.  
Economically Lula’s “Neo-Developmentalist path” succeeded with implementing 
redistributive fiscal and financial policies, aiming to maintain high international reserves, 
raise aggregated demand, redistribution of income and expansion of consumer credit for the 
poor and provision of subsidized credit for productive investments in Brazil. BNDES 
expanded investment in state-owned enterprises, house construction and consumption. The 
growth of global liquidity and demand during that time helped to raise Brazil’s foreign trade 
and contributed to the increase of inward and outward investment flows. The rapid growth of 
international reserves helped to stabilize the exchange rate. Therefore, the economy grew 
strongly. The secured alliance with domestic capital renewed its commitment to the organized 
workers and civil servants, through higher wages and enlargement of social programs. Higher 
minimum wage, expansion of domestic credit and social provision helped to create a cycle of 
growth supported by domestic investment, mass consumption, growth of formal employment 
and decrease of inequality and enlargement of middle classes. Although the political 
representation of the working class was strong during Lula’s administration, the taxation of 
the capitalist class has not been increased and neither the interest rates gains of financial 
capitalists have been lowered. Neo-developmentalists’ strategy survived the onset of the 
global crisis, as GDP growth quickly recovered in 2010.  
 
The election of 2010 imposed a choice between two political, economic and social projects 
and two visions of the Brazilian state. It was not revolutionary, anti-capitalist, but supported 
social alliances. Dilma’s presidency was mainly supported by the poorer regions of Brazil 
and the South East, except São Paulo. Dilma won the presidential election in 2010 with 56 per 
cent of the votes. She faced difficulties to keep the coalition together and to continue 
developmental and redistributive policies, as the global economic environment as such 
remained unfavourable. In the context of strong machismo, Lula was comparably more 
accepted, as Dilma was the first woman in the position of presidency. Further, in the 
administration of Lula attempts to dismantle right-wing media oligopoly were not successful 
and not pushed further, due to risk of increased political instability. Dilma’s victory is no 
signal to start socialist transformation in Brazil, as she is also not committed to dismantle 
capitalism and building democratic system of accumulation.  
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The domestic sale in Brazil still increased until 2012, which put Brazil on the fourth rank of 
global sales. Industrial groups expected a sale of 4.5 million cars in 2015. As the local 
industry suffered from the increased competition with imported goods and challenging 
development of the Real, imported cars amounted to 25 per cent of domestic sales. Therefore, 
the import of automobile parts contributed increasingly negatively to the foreign deficit of 
Brazil’s economy.  
Car sales in Brazil started to decline slightly in 2013 and therefore production declined in 
2014. The number of car production of Volks already started declining in 2012 and reached a 
significantly low level in 2014 (500.104 cars), which lies below the production achieved in 
2002. Volks production capacities were not fully used. Hence, since 2013, Volks is not the 
leading car producer in Brazil anymore. According to the interviewed members of Anchieta’s 
factory commission, Volks management did not introduce new car models in Brazil and 
therefore sales declined. Nevertheless, Volkswagen Inc. increased its production and sales on 
a global level. Potentially, due to the stronghold of Volks workers, management was 
intensifying geographical fixes in other countries (China, India) than Brazil (Interviews, 
2016). 
Although anti-cyclical interventions cushioned the impact of the global crisis of 2008, 
Brazil’s GDP growth increased in 2010, but tremendously slowed afterwards. With regained 
GDP growth of 7.6 per cent in 2010, Dilma Rousseff, as PT candidate got elected as the first 
female president of Brazil. Her aim was to intensify Keynesian economic reforms and 
strengthening of the domestic market. Through decrease of the comparably high interest rates 
and control of the exchange rate regime, the national industry was aimed to be strengthened. 
Due to the decrease of global prices of raw materials, the economy of Brazil was negatively 
impacted. The GDP growth declined tremendously after 2010. Therefore, the presidential re-
election of Dilma Rousseff in 2014 was enormously under pressure, due to economic 
recession and consequently burdening the “new middle class” and increased their resistance. 
Dilma Rousseff marginally won the presidential election in the second round in 2014, with 
51.6 per cent of the votes. While poverty was decreased, the proletariat further lost its 
unification due relatively lost consumption power of the “better-off working class” and 
increasingly criticized PT for being corrupt, although the cases can be doubted to be judged as 
corrupt (Morais, Saad-Filho, 2011). 
As the aim of PT was the enlargement of consumption power, with special regards to the 
automobile sector, challenges regarding natural resources, energy supply and overload of 
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individual traffic occurred. Especially the urban areas, where mostly affected by the 
continuous increase of individual transport.  
Connected with the FIFA Confederation Coup, new waves of mass protest formed mainly in 
the urban area of São Paulo and have been started by the so-called “Movimento Passe Livre” 
in 2013, who claimed for free public transportation. The protest against the announced 
increase of ticket prices for public transportation pulled a wave of mass protest, in which CUT 
did not play an important role. As PT and CUT have a traditionally strong connection to 
workers of the automobile sector and its union, the political agenda was influenced by the 
importance of this industrial sector. Lula, as a trade union leader of metalworkers can be taken 
as a symbol for the long emphasis on Brazil’s car industry. The claim for enlargement of 
public means of transport was not on top of the agenda of CUT and PT. Therefore, the social 
and political groups, participating in the mass protest, did not belong to the traditional 
supporting groups of CUT and PT. The monopolized media took the chance to place the aim 
of the protesters against the PT government and heavily increased the pressure on Dilma 
Rousseff. The conservative forces succeeded in 2016 in the impeachment against the first 
female president of Brazil (Leubolt, Strazzeri, 2016).  
The novelty of the mass strikes, which started in 2013, can be seen in the losing ground of 
CUT supporters. CUT, as being the stronghold for mobilisation of national protests since its 
foundation, continuously lost its support and shifted to new groups. Due to CUT’s strong ties 
with PT and therefore limits to political criticism, it became difficult to remain the former 
societal support for PT. The lack of criticism of CNM/CUT on PT was also the case within 
the held interviews with 3 members of Volks Anchieta factory commission. The entire 
administration periods of PT were mentioned as exclusively positive. As Volks was the 
biggest car company in Brazil till 2013, Volks workers are well positioned in the GVC and 
might have had a potential major impact to fight for the general improvement of all workers 
in Brazil.  
The political coup of 2016 and attacks on the mainly state owned oil company, Petrobras, will 
have enormous impact on the poor and working class of Brazil, which will become clearer in 
the upcoming years. Due to the constantly high power of financial capitalist, lacking 
regulation of bank and high indebtedness of Brazil’s society, capitalist gained a strong 
financial fix. According to Boito, PT did not manage to break with neoliberalism and 
therefore capitalism remains strong in Brazil, due to a lack of state regulation. CUT’s aim for 
decentralised labour regulation (profit related payment, hour bank) negatively impacted on 
labour conditions.  
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In regards to the feedback of Volks workers of Anchieta, as well as GVC analyses suggest, a 
stronger organisation and commitment with social movements on a local and national level, as 
well as the organisation of workers along the GVC could facilitate the slow down the dynamic 
of spatial fixes (Fichter, 2015).  
MNCs have learned how to effectively exert political influence, using “regime competition” 
among governments to shop for lucrative investments and shield their profits from taxes. The 
review of GVCs allows identification organizing strategies for labour. To strengthen the 
power of workers included in one GVC, it is important that unions are locally and 
nationally anchored on one hand and build strong transnational alliances. Metalworkers 
could be crucial to use their strong workplace bargaining power, to strengthen the regional 
and national solidarity with workers of other sectors. In the case of Volks Anchieta, the 
transnational alliance with Volkswagen workers in Germany, through IG Metall, and the 
representation in Volkswagen’s World’s Works council is actually strong. Nevertheless, the 
local and national organisation of workers in Brazil has potential to improve. The 
fragmentation of labour was not overcome during the administration of PT.  
Without any doubt, the success of Volks workers in conflicts against profit interest of 
capitalists can be linked with strong collaboration between CNM and IG-Metall as well as 
its high level of organisation on a regional level. Nevertheless, the decreasing national 
embeddedness of labour movement in all working sectors has weakened its potential power.  
Hyman states that trade unions power was mainly built upon “male manual full-time 
workers”. The service sector is globally on a rise, while the manufacturing sector is declining. 
This development will challenge trade unions, as unionisation in the service sector is 
comparably low. According to Hyman, trade unions globally need to strengthen their 
organisational capacity to improve their strategic position (Hyman, 2007). This includes the 
improvement of the structure, internal intelligence, strategy, efficacy and union democracy. 
As the unionisation rate of metalworkers is traditionally high, the bigger access to resources 
can be used to improve the organisational capacity to better organise all workers of Brazil.  
The regain of “Novo Sindicalismo” and consequently mass solidarity could strengthen the 
power of all workers in Brazil as well as of the poor society. To oppose spatial fixes quicker, 
the solidarity of workers at all levels, and especially on a global level needs to be improved. 
Analyses of GVC can help to support building stronger solidarity among workers on a global 
level.  
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